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Abstract 
This thesis offers a pragmatic analysis of subjectless sentences in non-null subject 
languages, focusing on English ‘diary drop’ (as in ‘Saw a good film yesterday’).  In 
chapter 1, I survey the data and discuss existing syntactic analyses (Haegeman & Ihsane 
1999, 2001).  While these generally acknowledge the importance of pragmatic factors in 
an overall account, no detailed investigation of their contribution has been proposed. 
In chapter 2, I consider subjectless sentences in child language, and suggest that 
relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95) can shed light on why such utterances 
occur.  In chapter 3, I revisit the adult data, and having established that null subjects 
function as referring expressions, I consider two pragmatically-oriented approaches to 
the analysis of referring expressions: Accessibility Theory (Ariel, 1990) and the 
Givenness Hierarchy (Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski, 1993). Both adopt the relevance-
theoretic framework, but claim that relevance alone is insufficient to account for the 
data. 
In chapters 4 and 5, I develop a relevance-based account of referring expressions, 
and argue that we can do without the machinery of Accessibility Theory and the 
Givenness Hierarchy on two assumptions: first, that referring expressions encode 
procedural as well as conceptual meaning (Blakemore 1987, 2002), and second, that this 
procedural meaning does not identify the intended referent by appeal to considerations 
of Accessibility or Givenness.  An important implication of my account is that the 
choice of referring expression not only affects reference resolution but can also 
contribute to what is implicitly communicated by an utterance.  I provide detailed 
evidence for this. 
In chapter 6, I return to the original null subject data and show that my relevance-
based approach sheds new light on how these utterances function in a non-null subject 
language.  In Chapter 7, I draw general conclusions and revisit the conceptual-
procedural distinction in light of the analyses proposed. 
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Chapter 1:  The Diary Null Subject in English 
1.1  Introduction 
English is generally considered to be a non-null subject language.  Whereas subject 
pronouns may be omitted in some languages (including Spanish, Italian and Japanese), 
they must be overtly realised in others (including English, Danish and French) 
(Chomsky, 1981; Jaeggli & Safir, 1989).  So, whilst (1) is perfectly grammatical in 
Spanish, the corresponding subjectless sentence in English, (2a), is ungrammatical.  The 
pronominal subject must be articulated, as in (2b). 
(1)  baila bien. 
(2)  a.  *dances well. 
b.  He dances well. 
This thesis examines a range of data that seem to contradict this generalisation, and 
considers some of the pragmatic factors affecting their interpretation and use.   
In certain registers of English, speakers systematically produce utterances with 
missing or null subjects.  Consider a sentence such as (3), written as the opening line of 
a diary entry.  
(3)  Got up late this morning. 
It is not unusual for native speakers to produce such subjectless sentences when 
communicating in certain registers.  In this chapter, I take a closer look at this 
phenomenon, examining some of the environments in which it occurs and the 
constraints on its use.  Given the importance for syntactic theory of null-subject 
sentences in a non-null subject language, it is perhaps not surprising that most existing 
analyses have been heavily syntax oriented, and I will briefly outline some of the 
syntactic treatments proposed.  However, the interpretation and acceptability of null-
subject utterances varies considerably from situation to situation, and most syntactic 
theorists also appeal more or less explicitly to pragmatic factors to explain this 11 
variation.  My main aim in this thesis is to provide a pragmatic analysis of null subject 
utterances in English, focusing in particular on the case of diary drop. 
Much research into the properties and distribution of null subjects in non-null 
subject languages has been undertaken by Liliane Haegeman and her colleagues 
(Haegeman, 1990a; 1990b; 1997; 2000; Haegeman & Ihsane, 1999; 2001).  In several 
articles she has surveyed a wide range of examples and offered various syntactic 
analyses of the phenomenon.  My discussion of the grammatical aspects of English null 
subject data is greatly indebted to her invaluable insights and analyses. 
1.2  Environments 
The term ‘diary drop’ has often been applied to the phenomenon of null subjects in 
written English.  However, their distribution is not limited to diaries.  We find examples 
of dropped subjects in a wide range of written material including emails, text messages, 
telegrams, postcards, note-taking and message boards
1.  The diaries themselves can be 
fictional or non-fictional and examples can be found as far back as the diary of Samuel 
Pepys, as well as in contemporary works such as Bridget Jones’ Diary. 
(4)  Walked to Westminster hall. (Pepys, 1985, p. 610) 
(5)  Sat there for ¾ hour. (Woolf, 1985, p. 334) 
(6)  Went to the chemist to discreetly buy pregnancy test. (Fielding, 1996, p. 117) 
Postcards, as in (7), telegrams, as in (8), and other written sources where space or time 
is restricted also provide a range of examples. 
(7)  Visited the castle yesterday.  Wish you were here. 
(8)  A:  Please attend first night my new play.  Will hold two tickets for you.  Bring 
friend if you have one. 
                                                
1 Many of the examples discussed in this thesis come from written sources.  However, I will refer 
throughout to ‘utterances’ and to the ‘hearer’ and ‘speaker’.  Unless specified, I do mean to imply any 
interesting distinction between written and spoken uses of language. 12 
(9)  B:  Impossible attend first night.  Will attend second night if you have one.
2 
(10)  Contains nuts. 
Certain first person narrative literary texts, whilst not explicitly diaries, employ the 
device of dropped subjects, as in (11)-(12). 
(11)  Went to the Argyll Lounge; good view of the harbour from there.  Drank pints. 
(Banks, 1996, p. 313) 
(12)  Saw a glowing red line in front of me, like a vein of burning blood, like lava, in 
front of me.  Noise terrific.  Smell of sulphur, something of that nature; smell of 
the devil, though I think that was just coincidence.  Fell down.  Half blind.  
Thought a bomb had gone off.  Heard ringing, like the church bells all going on 
at once.  Realised it was lightning.  (Banks, 1996, p. 316) 
The recent increase in electronic and online forms of written communication brings with 
it examples of diary-style nulls from emails, online message forums and text messages. 
(13)  Still have horrible cold. (personal email) 
(14)  Just ate a huge prawn ciabatta for lunch. (personal email) 
(15)  Was delivered promptly. (internet auction site message board) 
(16)  Very happy with dealer.  (internet auction site message board) 
(17)  Am delighted with dress. (internet auction site message board) 
(18)  Will act on stage in 1
st play. (Message on Twitter.com – K.Spacey 4
th June 
2009) 
(19)  Must have missed one another. (personal SMS/text message) 
                                                
2 Attributed to George Bernard Shaw and Winston Churchill respectively. 13 
It has been observed (Massam & Roberge, 1989; Culy, 1996; Wharton, forthcoming) 
that in recipes and other instructional registers objects often remain implicit, as in (20) 
and (21).    
(20)  Roll out pastry and cut. 
(21)  Peel carrots and boil. 
1.3  Distribution and properties 
1.3.1  Distribution 
The examples in (4)-(19) are drawn from a variety of sources.  However, there are 
certain distributional features which they all appear to share.  Whilst null subjects are 
most commonly understood as first person singular, they are not restricted to this 
interpretation.  Examples (22) and (23) illustrate null subjects in the third person 
singular and first person plural, respectively, and  Haegeman and Ihsane (1999, p. 132) 
give (24) as an example of a second person null subject.
3 
(22)  Probably wants you to reply to his message. (personal email) 
(23)  Very excited about entering our 2
nd phase of 10 year plan. (Message on 
Twitter.com K. Spacey 4
th June 2009) 
(24)  Trouble is, Rebecca’s stings are aimed so subtly at one’s Achilles’ heels, like 
Gulf War missiles going ‘Fzzz Whoosssh’ through Baghdad hotel corridors, that 
never see them coming. (Fielding, 1996, p. 146) 
Haegeman and Ihsane (1999) suggest that the relative rarity of second-person examples 
could be ‘due to the fact that diary writing rarely addresses an interlocutor directly’ 
(1999, p. 121).  Examples of third person null subjects can be found with both 
referential (25) and expletive (26), and both human (27) and non-human interpretations. 
(25)  Was my mother. (Fielding, 2004, p. 5) 
                                                
3 Perhaps this example is better analysed as involving the generic third-person singular pronoun ‘one’.  14 
(26)  Is pissing it down. (Fielding, 2004, p. 10) 
(27)  Still has not woken up. (Fielding, 2004, p. 4)  
(28)  Will be so lovely having a boyfriend when it is warm. (Fielding, 1996, p. 137)  
Consider the utterance in (29), taken from an online discussion board. 
(29)  Empathise about the masters thing.  My dissertation is due in tomorrow.  Can't 
wait!!!  Nearly wasn't going in at all.  Got burgled last night.  Took a bag with 
my 3 copies of my dissertation in!  Luckily dumped them outside – it’s 
obviously not a very exciting read!! 
Here the speaker drops all but one of her pronominal subjects.  Alongside the first 
person singular (and possibly plural), we also have examples of the speaker dropping 
third person pronominals (when referring to the burglars). 
1.3.2  Syntactic properties 
Haegeman (1990a) presents clear evidence that the null subjects in diary texts are 
represented syntactically.  Consider the examples in (30) and (31) 
(30)  (ec)i am going to try and behave myselfi. (personal email) 
(31)  (ec)i walked there PROi feeling light and airy. (Smart, 1991, p. 15) 
In (30), the empty category in subject position binds the reflexive pronoun: it agrees 
with ‘myself’ in number, gender and person.  In example (31), taken from Haegeman 
(1997), the null subject controls PRO in a non-finite clause. Both examples demonstrate 
that the null subject is syntactically active. 
This syntactic behaviour contrasts with that of the non-overt argument in passive 
constructions.  Such arguments are understood, but are not syntactically active. 
(32)  They put the book on sale. 
(33)  They put the book on sale and it was sold last week. 15 
(34)  They sold the book to themselves. 
(35)  *The book was sold to themselves. 
In the passive clause in (33), the agent is not overtly expressed but is understood. 
However, (35) demonstrates that, in contrast to the diary null subject in (30), the 
understood passive subject is unable to bind a reflexive.  So whilst it is possible to have 
empty argument slots for which a referent is understood without being syntactically 
represented, this does not seem to be the situation with the diary nulls.   
There is also evidence that the diary nulls are represented at the semantic level. 
Consider (36). 
(36)  (ec) saw John at the weekend.   
This sentence and others like it are interpreted as if they have a subject: indeed, 
throughout the texts containing diary style nulls, we see overt forms alternating with the 
null subjects.  From a semantic perspective, the theta criterion (Chomsky, 1981; 
Haegeman, 1994, p. 54) stipulates that there must be a one-to-one mapping between 
theta roles and arguments.  A transitive verb such as ‘see’ assigns two theta roles: a 
perceiver and a perceived. We would therefore expect a sentence in which it occurs to 
have two arguments.  However, (36) is perfectly acceptable in a diary context.  In this 
example, the theta role associated with the role of the entity perceived is assigned to the 
overt argument ‘John’, but the sentence is also understood as involving someone or 
something doing the perceiving.  In order to avoid a violation of the Theta Criterion, it 
is therefore necessary to hypothesize that there is some sort of empty category (ec) in 
the subject position, to which the perceiver theta role is assigned. 
The hearer’s goal in interpreting an utterance is to infer the speaker's meaning 
from the linguistic properties of the sentence uttered, together with background 
information.  To achieve this goal, reference must be assigned to the missing argument, 
marked here as (ec).  The logical form of (37), which contains a null subject, should 
therefore be identical to that of a parallel sentence containing an overt pronoun, such as 
(38).  
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(37)  a.  ec saw a good film. 
b.  LF: X saw a good film. 
(38)  a.  He saw a good film. 
b.  LF: X saw a good film. 
Semantically, then, the null subjects function as non-overt pronouns.  
The evidence surveyed above suggests that the null subjects in diary-style texts 
are syntactically and semantically active non-overt NPs.  They can carry theta roles, and 
they enter into syntactic relations in much the same way as overt NPs, but have no 
realization at the level of phonological form (PF).  Thus, they appear to be functioning 
as some kind of empty grammatical category.  Taking this as a starting point for our 
analysis, we are led to ask what the nature of this empty category might be.  In the next 
section I attempt to answer this question, comparing the behaviour and distribution of 
the diary-style nulls with those of the empty categories that are independently motivated 
in the Government and Binding grammatical framework (Chomsky, 1981; Haegeman, 
1994). 
1.3.3  Associated characteristics 
The texts and registers in which we find null subjects commonly also display other 
deletions.  The example from a telegram in (8) contained instances of unarticulated 
determiners, prepositions and even the infinitival ‘to’, and we see similar patterns in the 
diary texts.  Determiners, both definite, as in (39) and (41), and indefinite, as in (40), are 
frequently left non-overt in such texts, and in (40) we also have an instance of a non-
overt possessive pronoun. 
(39)  That would indeed be sick in manner of Oedipus. (Fielding, 2004, p. 5)  
(40)  Also managed to conceal coat by rolling it into ball to create pleasing sense of 
having been in for hours. (Fielding, 2004, p. 8) 
(41)  Dialling tone seems normal. (Fielding, 2004, p. 45) 17 
Auxiliary verbs and the copula also frequently remain non-overt straight after a null 
subject, as in (42)-(43). 
(42)  Maybe could read in car when at traffic lights. (Fielding, 2004, p. 13) 
(43)  If not working might mean everything is fine. (Fielding, 2004, p. 45)  
1.3.4  Null objects 
Although it is most frequently subject arguments which remain unarticulated, there are 
examples of null objects in many of the diary-style texts. 
(44)  Eventually locate under clothes from wardrobe. (Fielding, 1996, p. 93) 
(45)  Search for hairbrush.  Locate in handbag. (Fielding, 1996, p. 92)
4 
(46)  I have xmas cards in the office. If you wish to send one to a supplier please 
come to the office and collect. (personal communication) 
Whilst such examples exist, there is a clear asymmetry in the distribution of null 
subjects as compared with null objects.  A comprehensive analysis of the data should be 
able to account for the fact that both null subjects and null objects are attested, while 
also addressing the striking asymmetry in their distribution. 
1.3.5  Interrogative sentences 
It has been observed (Haegeman & Gueron, 1999; Haegeman & Ihsane, 1999; 2001) 
that there appear to be syntactic constraints on the distribution of non-overt subjects in 
the diary-style registers.  According to Haegeman and Gueron, null subjects may only 
occur in declarative sentences, since they are incompatible with both wh-movement and 
subject-auxiliary inversion.  They give the following as examples of attested subjectless 
sentences, which are judged to be ungrammatical when interpreted as interrogatives. 
(47)  *Ought (I) to resign? 
                                                
4 Examples (44), (45),(50) and (51) are taken from Haegeman & Ihsane (1999) 18 
(48)  *Am (I) jealous? 
(49)  *What can (I) say? 
In a survey of diary-style texts, Haegeman and Ihsane (1999) find no examples of null 
subjects occurring in wh-preposing or subject-auxiliary inversion environments.  
However, they acknowledge that given the relative rarity of interrogative sentences in 
these texts, ‘the absence of the null subject may be a sampling accident’ (1999, p. 134). 
1.3.6  The question of embedded null subjects 
Rizzi (1994), Haegeman (1997), and Haegeman and Gueron (1999) assume that null 
subjects are restricted to root clauses.  In section 1.6.1 I will outline an analysis based 
on this assumption which also claims to account for the lack of null subjects in 
interrogative sentences.  However, Haegeman and Ihsane (1999; 2001) discuss data 
which casts doubt on the validity of this assumption.  Certain recent diary-style texts 
contain null subjects in embedded positions: 
(50)  But even that is inadvisable since am fat. (Fielding, 1996, p. 17) 
(51)  Deceiving her impossible as would be unsuccessful in long run. (Ginsburg, 
1995, pp. 49-50)  
(52)  Wonder if should quickly ring Mark Darcy to tell him where am going? 
(Fielding 2004, p. 13) 
Whilst some texts contain only root null subjects (RNS), all those that include 
embedded null subjects (ENS) also display root nulls along with the other omissions.  
Setting aside theoretical considerations, it feels intuitively as if they are part of the same 
phenomenon and ideally I hope to settle on an analysis which covers both sets of data. 
1.3.7  The optionality of the null subjects 
In texts and registers which feature the diary-style null subjects, it is notable that the 
omission of the articulated form is always optional.  There appear to be no cases where 
it would be ungrammatical to use an overt form, and the overt and non-overt subjects 19 
alternate, apparently freely.  Thus, an utterance such as (53) can be followed by (54) 
without either being judged ungrammatical in the diary-style register. 
(53)  Seems rude not to reply.  (Fielding 1996, p. 44) 
(54)  I’ll just send him a tiny friendly message. (Fielding 1996, p. 44) 
However, despite their grammaticality and apparent synonymy, there are subtle stylistic 
differences between these two utterances, which an adequate pragmatic analysis should 
help to explain. 
1.4  Diary drop in other languages 
So called diary-drop is also attested in other non-pro-drop languages.  Haegeman 
(1990b; 1997) and Haegeman and Ihsane (2001) discuss some examples from French, 
such as (55), whilst Haegeman (1990b, pp. 171-172) provides examples from Dutch, as 
in (56), German, as in (57) and Danish, as in (58). 
(55)  Suis tellement  énervée que me suis assise sur la télécommande. 
Am so   nervous that me am seated on the remote control. 
‘ am so nervous that I have just sat down on the remote control.’ 
(Stroumza, 1998, p. 182)  
(56)  Vind, in Gryll Grange,   ook een erg   aarige  uitdrukking   die. 
Find, in Grylle Grange,   another   nice  expression  which. 
(57)  Beschloss,   ihn zu kaufen,   anderte diesen Beschluss... 
Decided   it to buy,   changed this  decision... 
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(58)  Har blot ingen tid at scrive i. 
Have just no time to write in. 
A detailed contrastive analysis - which lies beyond the scope of the present thesis - 
might shed valuable further light on the phenomenon of diary drop.  
1.5  Other null subjects 
Although English is traditionally classified as a non-pro-drop language, there are 
several situations in which subjects may remain unarticulated.  In this section I examine 
these data and consider whether they pattern with the diary-style nulls described above.  
I will also consider whether diary drop is best approached in terms of a pro-drop or 
topic drop analysis as I compare the characteristics of the diary nulls with independently 
motivated empty categories. 
1.5.1  Informal style deletions 
With many utterances of spoken English, some expected initial material is left 
unpronounced.  This is especially common in isolated utterances and in fast, casual 
speech.  Consider the examples in (59)-(67), where the missing material is shown in 
brackets. 
(59)  (I will…) See you soon. 
(60)  (I…) Can’t find my earrings. 
(61)  (Have you…) Seen the paper today? 
(62)  (Is the…) Post here yet? 
(63)  (Are you…) Coming for a drink? 
(64)  (A…) Fine friend you turned out to be! (Napoli, 1982). 
(65)  (The…) Cat’s been sick everywhere. 21 
(66)  (Of…) Course you can! 
(67)  (I expect…) ‘spect so. 
Data such as these are discussed by Napoli (1982) and Zwicky & Pullum (1983).  The 
roles played by sentence position, constituency and stress in deletions of this kind are 
considered, and both analyses conclude that the phenomenon cannot be syntactic in 
nature.  For Napoli, informal speech may involve a phonological rule that ‘deletes 
unstressed (or lightly stressed) initial material’ (1982, p. 99).  Zwicky and Pullum, on 
the other hand, conclude that the informal style deletions are the result of a 
morphophonemic process. 
How far might these analyses be useful to us in our investigation of diary-style 
null subjects?  Whilst there are certain similarities between the data in (59)-(67) and the 
diary null subjects, there are also notable differences.  As Napoli points out, the 
informal-style spoken deletions, like the written examples, are syntactically represented.  
They trigger agreement on the verb, co-refer with the subject of a tag question, as in 
(68), and can control the subject of an infinitival clause. 
(68)  Can’t sing a note, can he? 
However, the restriction of this type of deletion to initial position is far stricter than in 
the diary-style cases, and the associated deletion of determiners and copulas is also 
restricted to first position.  As Haegeman and Ihsane (2001) note, an utterance such as 
(69), from Thrasher (1977), whilst acceptable in the written diary-style texts, is 
ungrammatical in all registers of spoken English, where the determiner in the object 
noun phrase must be overtly articulated. 
(69)  Damn dogs are taking over city. 
Despite the differences, in both the diary-style nulls and the casual spoken deletions, the 
hearer must recover the content of the unpronounced material in order to understand the 
speaker’s meaning.  If, as I will argue, the vulnerability of a given item to deletion 
depends partly on the nature of the encoded material, then we would expect to see some 
overlap in the pragmatic factors affecting deletion in the two different registers. 
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1.5.2  Empty categories: pro and topic-drop analyses 
1.5.2.1  Government and Binding empty categories 
Given the above evidence that the diary null subjects are syntactically active, a natural 
move in investigating them further is to compare them with other empty categories.  
Within the Government and Binding framework(Chomsky, 1981; 1982; Riemsdijk & 
Williams, 1986; Haegeman, 1994; Black, 1996), two binary feature specifications (+/-
pronominal and +/- anaphoric) combine to yield four independently motivated empty 
categories.  An anaphoric element is referentially dependent on an antecedent which 
provides the necessary information for its interpretation.  Pronominal elements, on the 
other hand, substitute for and function as nouns or noun-phrases. 
 
Table 1: GB Empty Categories 
Anaphoric  Pronominal  Empty Category 
+  +  PRO 
+  -  NP-trace 
-  +  pro 
-  -  WH-trace 
 
 
Within the Government and Binding framework, all empty categories are subject to the 
Empty Category Principle (ECP), given here in (70).   
(70)  a.  Formal licensing: An empty category must be governed by an 
appropriate head. 
b.  Identification: An empty category must be chain-connected to an 
antecedent. 
For an empty category to be licit, it must be both licensed and identifiable, so that both 
clauses of the ECP are satisfied.  In the remainder of this section, I consider the 
suitability of the different empty categories in the table above for analysing diary-style 
nulls.  Several accounts of the non-overt English subjects align the nulls with one or 
other of these categories, and I will now consider the advantages and disadvantages of 
such accounts in more detail (Haegeman, 1990a; Bromberg & Wexler, 1995). 23 
1.5.2.2  Anaphoric and pronominal: PRO  
PRO (‘big pro’) is the non-overt subject of non-finite clauses.  Within the GB 
framework, the Extended Projection Principle (EPP) states that every sentence must 
have a subject, and the Case Filter states that only case-marked NPs may be 
phonetically realized.  In the case of non-finite clauses, these two principles combine, 
leaving us with a syntactically active yet phonetically null subject: PRO.   
(71)  PRO to pass one's exams is something to be proud of. 
According to the EPP, since (71) is a sentence, it must have a subject.  However, the 
verb in its non-finite form is unable to assign case to the subject position.  The subject 
position is therefore not case-marked and so the subject, although obligatory, cannot be 
phonetically realized.  Hence, PRO only occurs in non-finite clauses and does not 
alternate with overt NPs.  An overt form in the PRO position would lead to a case filter 
violation, as in (72). 
(72)  *John to pass his exams is something to be proud of. 
The overt subject, ‘John’, is unable to receive case from the infinitival verb, and so 
cannot be overtly realised.  The diary null subject, on the other hand, occurs in finite 
clauses and, as noted above, is found alternating with overt arguments.  The first of the 
independently motivated empty categories, PRO, is therefore ruled out as a possible 
analysis for the diary null subject. 
1.5.2.3  Anaphoric and non-pronominal: NP-trace 
NP-traces have the features [+anaphoric] and [-pronominal], and are found when 
movement takes place to an argument position, for example, in cases of passivization 
and raising, as in (74). 
(73)  There seems to be a man at the door. 
(74)  A mani seems ti to be ti at the door. 24 
As was the case with PRO, NP-traces are only found in non-finite clauses, and do not 
alternate with overt subjects. They can therefore also be ruled out as a possible analysis 
of the diary null subject. 
1.5.2.4  Pronominal and non-anaphoric: pro 
In traditional pro-drop languages, such as Italian, pronominal subjects may remain non-
overt.  In their place we find pro - ‘little pro’, the empty category with the features 
[+pronominal] and [-anaphoric].  Like the diary null subject, pro represents a 
syntactically active understood subject which may alternate with an overt form in 
certain circumstances.  It has therefore been suggested that some speakers of English 
have a ‘pro-drop dialect’ that is available to them in certain registers of written and 
spoken language.  An alternative suggestion might be that English is undergoing a 
change from being a non-pro-drop to a pro-drop language.  However, although the data 
might, on the surface, seem to point to such explanations, on closer examination the 
diary null subject begins to look less and less like an instantiation of pro-drop.  
The availability of pro as an alternative to an overt subject pronoun is generally 
treated as varying parametrically across languages.  As we saw in example (1) from 
Spanish, if the parameter is positively set, subjectless sentences are grammatical, while 
the parallel sentence in a non-pro-drop language such as English is ungrammatical, as in 
(2a).  Languages in which the pro-drop parameter is positively set generally display a 
bundle of associated properties.  If the diary null subjects were instances of pro, with 
some sort of parametric change taking place in English, then we would expect to see the 
associated properties also occurring in the diary-style texts.  In pro-drop languages, a 
definite subject may occupy a post-verbal position, as in the Italian example (75) taken 
from Haegeman (2000, p. 136). 
(75)  Ha telefonato il deano. 
has telephoned the dean. 
‘The dean has telephoned.' 
(76)  *Has telephoned the dean. 25 
The corresponding sentence in English, (76), is not grammatical in either the core 
grammar or the diary drop registers on an interpretation where ‘the dean’ is the subject. 
Similarly, consider (77) and (78), again taken from Haegeman (2000). 
(77)  *Whoi do you think that ti has come? 
(78)  Chii    credi      che   abbia telfonato ti?  
Who   believe you   that   have (subj) telephoned? 
‘Who do you think has called?’ 
Sentence (77) is unacceptable in all registers of English due to a that-trace violation. 
However, in traditional pro-drop languages, an embedded subject may move across an 
overt complementizer, as illustrated by the grammatical Italian sentence in (78).  
Moreover, in pro-drop languages expletive subjects are always non-overt.  In Italian a 
construction with an overt expletive, as in (79), from Haegeman (1997, p. 236), is 
ungrammatical. 
(79)  *Ciò piove. 
It is raining.   
However, throughout the registers that display diary-style null subjects, we find overt 
expletives alternating with non-overt expletives, as in (80) and (81) below. 
(80)  Is relief to have fag in open and not to be on best behaviour. (Fielding 2004, p.4) 
(81)  It was great. (Fielding 2004, p. 33) 
Finally, and perhaps most dramatically, Italian style pro-drop is traditionally associated 
with a rich inflectional paradigm.  It is often claimed that the rich inflection in Italian 
both licenses and identifies the empty category (Rizzi, 1986; 1994; Haegeman & 
Gueron, 1999, pp. 399-400), satisfying both clauses of the ECP (70).  The English 26 
inflectional system remains consistently poor across the varying registers, raising the 
question of how the empty subject is identified (Adger & Harbour, 2008, pp. 5-7).   
In sum, if the occurrence of null subjects in the diary registers signalled a switch 
in the pro-drop parameter, then we would expect these associated properties to also be 
present.  This is not the case.  However, the absence of these characteristics is not the 
only evidence pointing us away from a pro-drop analysis.  Not only do the diary-style 
texts lack the properties generally associated with pro-drop languages, but the 
characteristics which commonly co-occur with the diary nulls (see 1.3.3) are not 
generally present in pro-drop languages.  Similarly, the apparent constraints on the 
distribution of the diary nulls, (see section 1.3) do not apply to the null subjects in pro-
drop languages.  Thus, Italian style pro-drop occurs in interrogative sentences, both root 
and embedded, and is freely compatible with wh-preposing, as in (82), and subject-
auxiliary inversion, as in (83).  It is also found with argument and predicate 
topicalization, as in (84)-(85). 
(82)  Quando [pro]   tornerà? 
When    return-future-3sg. 
‘When will he/she return?'      (Haegeman, 2000, p. 140) 
(83)  Tornerà [pro]    presto? 
Return-future-3sg   soon?       
‘ Will he/she return soon?'  (ibid) 
(84)  Questo libro, non lo voglio. 
This book non it want-I. 
‘This book, I don't want.'    (Haegeman and Guéron, 1999, p. 621) 
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(85)  Intelligente, non è. 
Intelligent, non be-3sg. 
‘intelligent, he isn't.'    (ibid) 
Along with the distributional differences and the absence of the associated features that 
we would expect to see with a pro-drop dialect, there are also conceptual problems with 
a pro analysis of the diary style nulls.  
If the diary null subjects were instances of pro, then some kind of register-specific 
parameter resetting would have to be taking place.  The speaker would then have two 
grammars: a core grammar in which null subjects are ungrammatical and a peripheral 
one in which they are allowed.  Haegeman (1990a) considers this possibility and 
suggests that such a register-driven resetting may be possible given enough exposure to 
relevant evidence, and once the core grammar has been firmly established.  In a later 
article, however, (Haegeman, 2000) she identifies a range of problems with this 
account.  The argument for treating the diary null subjects as instances of pro would be 
greatly strengthened if there were evidence of register driven parameter resetting 
elsewhere in the grammar.  However, no such evidence seems to exist.  We do not see, 
for example, languages with VO core word order changing to OV in a particular 
register.  To justify a parameter-resetting approach, we would therefore have to show 
what makes the pro-drop parameter special in this respect, and why no other parameters 
vary in this way. 
This combination of otherwise unattested parameter resetting and the absence of 
the expected associated features severely weakens the case for analyzing diary null 
subjects as instances of pro.  So whilst at a first glance the diary nulls seem to pattern 
with the pro of null subject languages, an analysis on these lines would bring into 
question much that is commonly assumed of the classic pro-drop languages.   I will 
revisit the possibility of a pro-drop analysis and what we can learn from it in the next 
chapter, when I look at the child null subject in English and its similarities with the 
diary style nulls. 
1.5.2.5  Non-anaphoric and non-pronominal: Topic Drop 
The remaining empty category in the GB typology carries the features [-anaphoric] and 
[-pronominal] and is the trace of A'-movement.  This type of movement, for discourse 28 
related purposes such as topicalization, focus or question formation, leaves a trace in its 
base position.  Movement of this kind is widespread in English, including for the 
purposes of overt topic preposing, as in (86). 
(86)  CP[Johni  IP[I spoke to ti yesterday.]] 
In languages such as Portuguese, this kind of movement may take place whilst the 
topicalised constituent remains non-overt.  
(87)  A Joana   viu na televisao   ontem a noite. 
Joana   saw on television   last    night. 
‘Joana saw him/her/it on television last night.’ 
(88)  CP[TOPi IP[a Joana viu ti na televisao ontem a noite.]]  (Rizzi, 1986, p. 513) 
The topic in [spec, CP] is an empty operator, which binds the object trace of ‘viu’. 
Identification of this empty operator then relies on some salient element in the 
discourse, in this case the person who is the current topic of the discourse.   
It has therefore been proposed (Haegeman, 1990a; Bromberg & Wexler, 1995) 
that the diary drop empty category is the A' trace of a non-overt topic antecedent.  Null 
operators are indeed attested in English under certain conditions (Haegeman & Ihsane, 
1999): 
(89)  I need a friend [ OPi [ I can rely on ti.]]] 
The object trace of the embedded verb ‘rely’ is bound by a non-overt antecedent, the 
null operator OP, and this in turn is identified by the adjacent head, ‘a friend’.  On this 
account, the representation of a diary-style sentence such as (90) would be as in (91). 
(90)  Could stand it no longer. 
(91)  CP[OPi[ IP[ti could stand it no longer.]] 29 
As Haegeman (1990a, p. 176) sums up: 
there is a trace of wh-movement (specifically topicalization…) in the subject 
position of the sentence…and this trace is coindexed with the moved non-
overt or zero discourse TOPIC. 
Bromberg and Wexler (1995) argue that this analysis works well to explain the 
incompatibility of the null subject with wh-preposing.  They start from the assumption 
that both topic and wh-preposing target the same tree position and cannot, therefore, 
occur simultaneously.  However, this argument breaks down once the underlying 
assumptions are examined.  As Haegeman (2000) points out, several linguists (Reinhart, 
1981; Rizzi, 1997), have argued for an articulated rather than unitary CP projection.  
This articulated CP is made up of various functional projections with specific roles and 
functions, including a singular Focus Phrase, which is the landing site for wh-
movement, and a recursive Topic Phrase that, in turn, is the landing site for topicalized 
constituents.  This independently motivated articulated CP therefore undermines one of 
Bromberg and Wexler's main supporting arguments for the topic drop analysis.  
Two further substantial objections to this analysis have also been raised 
(Haegeman, 2000).  Firstly, there is the matter of subject/object asymmetry.  As 
discussed above, the texts containing cases of subject drop show few, if any, 
corresponding instances of object drop.  By contrast, in languages, such as Portuguese, 
that display topic-drop, the null topic is often, if not typically, an object.  To justify the 
topic-based analysis, this asymmetry in the diary drop data would need to be accounted 
for by some other means.  Secondly, if the null subject in these registers were in fact a 
topic, then we would expect only referential, non-expletive subjects to be found in this 
position.  However, non-referential null subjects are abundant in these texts: 
(92)  Must be an accident up ahead.          (Schmerling, 1972, p. 582) 
(93)  Isn't much we can do about it.        (Thrasher, 1977, p. 44) 
(94)  Seems weird to have been so close during the year...(Fielding, 1996, p. 296) 
In conclusion, the analysis of the diary-style null subjects as instances of topic drop fails 
to be fully compatible with the distributional properties observed, and I will therefore 
not adopt it here. 30 
1.5.3  Child nulls as an analogue 
Having rejected the analyses based on the empty categories identified by Government 
and Binding theory, alternative possibilities for how we might account for the data must 
be considered.  It is well documented (Hyams, 1986; 1992; Bloom L. , 1970; Bloom P. , 
1990) that children acquiring a non-null subject language go through a stage in which 
they persistently produce subjectless sentences.  It has been observed (Haegeman, 2000; 
Haegeman & Ihsane, 2001; Rizzi, 1994) that the diary-style null subject utterances share 
syntactic and distributional properties with the utterances produced by children during 
this stage of acquisition.  For example, children in this stage frequently also omit other 
parts of speech, including articles, auxiliaries and copulas.  Unlike the adult casual 
speech examples discussed in 1.5.1, these omissions are not restricted to initial position.  
Haegeman & Ihsane (2001, p. 331) give examples of non-initial article omission, as in 
(95), and auxiliary omission, as in (96). 
(95)  Paula play with ball. (Paula, 1, 9) 
(96)  Daddy gone. (Hayley, 1, 8, as cited in Radford (1996, p. 44)) 
In this respect, the diary style null subjects seem to pattern more with the child nulls 
than with the informal register nulls in adult English.  In the next chapter, I take a closer 
look at the phenomenon of null subjects in the speech of children acquiring non-null 
subject languages.  Meanwhile, the observed similarities between diary-style nulls and 
child omissions have been influential in the development of subsequent syntactic 
analyses of the diary null subject.  I consider these accounts in the next section. 
1.6  Subsequent analyses 
1.6.1  An antecedentless empty category 
As we have seen, according to Government and Binding theory, the four types of empty 
categories can be distinguished by breaking them down into the primitive features of 
[+/- anaphoric] and [+/-pronominal].  None of the types of empty category that emerge 
fits exactly with the distribution and behaviour of the null subject found in the diary 
style texts.  However, building on the similarity between diary null subjects and child 
null subjects, and drawing on work by Lasnik & Stowell (1991), Rizzi (1994) proposes 
a further option.  He argues that another feature should be added to distinguish sub-31 
categories within the category of A' traces.  Ordinary operator constructions such as 
questions, as in (97), differ from null operator constructions, such as (98), in both their 
interaction with weak crossover effects and their interpretative properties. 
(97)  John wonders whoi to please ti. 
(98)  John is easy OPi to please ti. 
In (97), quantification of the trace of A’-movement (t) ranges over a ‘possibly 
nonsingleton set’ (Rizzi 1994, p. 158): there can be more than one person corresponding 
to the interrogative ‘who’.  In (98), however, the identification of the trace is fixed by 
that of the antecedent, John, and so cannot range over a non-singleton set.  Rizzi 
concludes that only when a trace is bound by a genuine quantifier, as in (97), can it be 
said to be a variable.  When the trace is bound by a non-quantificational empty operator, 
as in (98), Rizzi classifies it as a ‘null constant’.  Rizzi incorporates this difference into 
the taxonomy of empty categories by adding a [+/- variable] feature.  A' traces resulting 
from wh-movement typically quantify over a ‘nonsingleton set’ and have their variable 
feature positively specified.  In contrast, the traces resulting from the null operator 
movement never quantify over a nonsingleton set, and so are assigned the feature value 
[- variable].  Recall that, according to the ECP (see (70) above), all traces are subject to 
an identification requirement.  As Haegeman and Ihsane (1999, p.124) put it: 
The content of an empty subject is identified by a c-commanding 
antecedent, i.e. an antecedent which precedes the empty category and is 
hierarchically higher in the structure. 
So, in order for this analysis to hold in these null subject cases where there is no 
antecedent, Rizzi has to modify the identification clause of the ECP.  He does this as 
follows:  
(99)  A non-pronominal empty category must be chain connected to an antecedent if it 
can be. 
It follows that an exception to the identification condition is allowed if the empty 
category is in the highest position in the structure.  This analysis is based on the 
assumption that null subjects are restricted to root clauses.  If the null subject is 32 
anywhere other than in the root clause, then there will be a potential site for the 
antecedent, and so one must be supplied and chain connected to the empty category.  In 
the case of a root null subject, there is no potential antecedent position and it can 
therefore remain antecedentless. 
Rizzi’s work is particularly concerned with the null subjects found in child 
language, and suggests that whilst root clauses must be projected to CP in the adult 
grammar, they may be truncated in the child grammar.  If, in the child's grammar, finite 
clauses need not be projected past IP, there will be no potential site for an antecedent to 
sit in these cases. According to (99), such empty categories may remain antecedentless, 
and so will have the structure in (100).  Haegeman (2000) considers parallel cases in 
adult language and suggests that a similar process of truncation is taking place in 
abbreviated registers.  In the core grammatical registers that do not allow truncation, the 
presence of a CP projection means that an antecedent position is available, as in (101), 
and root null subjects are therefore not grammatical. 
(100)  
 
(101)  
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What, then, might be driving the truncation of structure and subsequent licensing of the 
null subject forms in child versions of non-pro-drop languages and in the diary style 
registers of the same languages?  The child null forms will be discussed in more detail 
in the following chapter.  However, Haegeman (1997) draws on work from Rizzi (1994; 
1997) to offer a possible solution based on the interaction of two principles: 
(102) Root = CP. 
(103) Avoid Structure. 
Principle (102) is based on the assumption that C carries information about illocutionary 
force, and that since all clauses must have illocutionary force, they must all project to 
CP level.  Rizzi (1994, pp.162-163) paraphrases this as a claim ‘that we normally speak 
through propositions, not fragments of propositions’ and that ‘the root category is the 
canonical structural realization of the proposition’.  Principle (103) is based on economy 
considerations: it ensures that syntactic structure is not projected unless it is necessary, 
and cannot be posited purely to avoid rule violation (Rizzi, 1997, p. 314).  These two 
principles will on occasion be in conflict, as Haegeman explains: 
because of [(102)], a fundamental structure building principle, CP must be 
projected.  By [(103)], on the other hand, syntactic structure cannot be 
added, for instance, to salvage a potential empty category principle 
violation.  (Haegeman, 1997, p. 243) 
In ‘normal’ adult English, rule (102) wins most of the time, and as a consequence each 
clause must project to the CP level.  When a CP level is projected, there will 
automatically be a slot for an antecedent, and according to (99) it must be filled.  
However, Haegeman (1997; 2000) and Rizzi (1994) suggest that under certain 
circumstances, including both child language and diary style registers, considerations of 
economy become more important, and (102) may be overruled by (103): 
In view of the fact that economy considerations (‘brevity’) clearly play a 
part in the abbreviated registers, one might then suggest that there too 
[(102)] is overruled by economy considerations [(103)].  (Haegeman, 1997, 
p. 246). 34 
If the clause is only projected as far as the IP level, there is no higher position in which 
the antecedent can sit.  The diary null subject is therefore ‘an antecedentless empty 
category in [Spec, IP], with CP being truncated’ (Haegeman 2000, p. 147), and it is 
claimed that this truncation is characteristic of abbreviated registers such as diaries, note 
taking and casual speech. 
Rizzi's account predicts that null subjects will always be the leftmost constituent 
in the structure.  Haegeman (1997; 2000) demonstrates that this is not always the case.  
She provides examples of adjuncts preceding the null subject, as in (104), and contrasts 
this with ungrammatical cases of argument preposing, illustrated in (105). 
(104) At night sent a packet to London. (Pepys, 18 April) 
(105) *More problems don't need. (Thrasher, 1977, p. 83) 
To account for these data, Haegeman offers a reinterpretation of Rizzi's original 
analysis.  Firstly, Haegeman (1997, p. 251) presents independent motivation for 
decomposing the CP into a ‘set of functional projections’, with truncation free to apply 
at any level.  In the case of adjunct preposing, the empty category has moved to the 
specifier of an agreement projection and so actually precedes the adjunct, as in (106). 
(106) eci at night ti sent a packet to London. 
Whilst movement can bypass adjuncts, it cannot bypass arguments, and so (105), with 
the structure in (107), is ungrammatical. 
(107) *eci more problems ti don't need. 
In sum, the interaction of the rules in (102) and (103) could go some way towards 
explaining what drives the dropping of subjects in the given diary contexts.  In child 
language, we may suggest that the relative importance of the two rules has not yet been 
fully acquired, while in the adult null subjects we may look to the issue of economy for 
motivation.  Root null subjects tend to occur in casual, informal, abbreviated registers.  
Newspaper columns and fictional diary writing are often subject to word limits, and text 
messages and e-mails may also be governed by time and/or length restrictions.  In the 
adult, non-core registers that display null subjects, the pressure to abbreviate may 35 
therefore prioritize an economy-based principle such as (103) to the point where it takes 
precedence over the rule in (102).   
This account satisfies a version of the ECP with the second clause modified as in 
(99), but how does it account for the other properties associated with the diary-style 
nulls? The analysis seems to work well to explain the absence of subject drop with wh-
movement.  For wh-preposing to take place, a CP level must be projected, providing a 
potential antecedent site which, according to (99), must be used.  Similarly, this account 
rules out subject-auxiliary inversion constructions occurring with a null subject, since 
with no CP projection, there is no C position available as a landing site for the auxiliary 
after inversion.  It therefore seems satisfactory as an explanation for the distribution of 
the root diary null subjects, whilst simultaneously treating these null subjects as a 
possible adult analogue of the early null subject in child language
5. 
Each of the analyses considered in this section was designed to account for, and in 
most cases relied upon, the assumption that null subjects are restricted to root position 
and so do not occur as the subjects of embedded clauses.  Although Haegeman (1997; 
2000) and Horsey (1998) address the issue of null subjects appearing with preposed 
adjuncts, the assumption has remained that the missing subject cannot appear in an 
embedded environment.  As outlined in section 1.3.6 above, this assumption has been 
questioned in recent work, and this has led Haegeman & Ihsane (1999; 2001) to offer a 
still further analysis, in which the phenomenon is characterised as a form of pronoun 
ellipsis. 
1.6.2  Pronoun ellipsis 
Given the embedded data discussed by Haegeman and Ihsane (1999; 2001), the 
antecedentless empty category analysis (Haegeman, 1997; Rizzi, 1994; 1997; Horsey, 
1998) appears to be inadequate, since it predicts that such data will be unacceptable. 
However, both the root and embedded null subjects are otherwise identical and 
interpreted in the same way, and it seems preferable from a theoretical point of view to 
provide a single account that covers both.  Accordingly, Haegeman & Ihsane (2001) 
propose that the two dialects which differ as to the grammaticality of embedded null 
subjects are not the output of two different grammars with differing parameter settings 
                                                
5 With the development of the minimalist framework (Chomsky, 1995), it became necessary to adjust 
this analysis in line with the new and different assumptions introduced by this framework.  Horsey (1998) 
offers a reinterpretation of Haegeman's analysis in these terms.  However, I will not go into the details of 
this proposal here, since it covers much the same data as Haegeman and as such does not provide further 
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of the pro-drop (or other) parameter, but are rather the output of a single grammar with 
an optional pronoun ellipsis rule.  Haegemen & Ihsane support this analysis by 
providing evidence that registers displaying the diary-style null subjects also often 
reduce reflexives, again ellipting the pronominal part, as in (108)-(110). 
(108) trying to whip up frenzy of emotion in self about end of war. (Fielding  1996, p. 
121) 
(109) brace self for touchdown. (Emma D. May, p. 11)
6 
(110) Have cigarette to cheer self up. (Fielding 1996, p. 92) 
As discussed above, empty categories are subject to the ECP: they must be licensed and 
their content must be identifiable.  On their pronoun ellipsis account, Haegeman and 
Ihsane (1999) propose that diary-style null subjects are ‘licensed by a specifier-head 
relation with AGR’ (1999, p. 143).  They also propose that in the relevant registers, the 
usual constraints on identification are relaxed: ‘identification may be achieved either by 
an antecedent in the matrix clause or by a discourse antecedent’ (1999, p. 142).  As 
Haegeman and Ihsane point out, a pronoun ellipsis account of this sort predicts that 
objects too should be omitted.  The examples in (44)-(46) show that object omission 
does occur in these registers.  However, it is far less common than subject omission, and 
this asymmetry is not directly addressed by the pronoun ellipsis account. 
1.6.3  Zero spell-out and a move towards pragmatics 
As mentioned above, an association is often made between the richness of a language's 
inflectional paradigm and the setting of the pro-drop parameter.  European languages 
such as Italian and Spanish on one side, and English and French on the other, typically 
exemplify the divide.  However, there is also a class of languages in which null subjects 
occur but which lack the expected rich inflectional paradigm, Chinese and Japanese 
being much discussed examples (Huang, 1984; Jaeggli & Safir, 1989).  Several analyses 
of this phenomenon have been offered.  The fact that argument omission in these 
languages is more widespread than in the classic pro-drop languages, since it is possible 
for any pronominal, has led to it being termed ‘rampant’ or ‘radical’ pro-drop. 
                                                
6 Taken from ‘Bad Trip, the diary of Emma D. May’, a 1000 word fictional diary in The Independent 
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Several different characterizations of radical pro-drop have been offered in the 
literature, and it is worth considering whether any of these proposals could provide 
insight into the diary null subjects in typically non-pro-drop languages.  Neeleman & 
Szendroi (2007) provide an overview of some existing accounts, including an analysis 
of radical pro-drop as a form of topic-drop.  In section 1.5.2.5, I considered the topic-
drop analysis of diary null subjects and found it wanting; Neeleman and Szendroi  
provide arguments against a general analysis of all radical pro-drop as topic-drop.   
It has often been noted that radical pro-drop languages such as Chinese and 
Japanese not only lack rich agreement, but in fact have no agreement at all.  Jaeggli & 
Safir (1989) maintain that pro-drop is related to agreement, and propose that subjects 
are only obligatory when there is poor agreement rather than rich agreement or no 
agreement at all.  Since Chomsky (1981), subject-verb agreement has been 
characterised in terms of a specifier-head relation between the head of the inflectional 
node (I) and the specifier of the inflectional node [SPEC-I].  A head may contain 
grammatical features known as φ-features which typically relate to person, number and 
gender.  When those features are unspecified, their values must be provided via 
specificer-head agreement with a subject.  Pronouns, anaphors and R-expressions each 
have grammatical features, and so may license the agreement.  Pro, however, lacks φ-
features and so cannot act as a licenser.  Speas (1994; 2006) relates agreement with pro-
drop in an analysis based on the assumption that by the end of the syntactic derivation 
all φ-features must be specified.  In languages with rich agreement, all φ-features are 
fully specified already, removing the need for a subject.  In languages without 
agreement, there are no φ-features to be specified, and so no need for an overt subject.  
However, in languages with poor agreement, some, but not all, of the φ-features are 
specified, and so an overt subject is required to specify those remaining features.  Whilst 
this seems an elegant way to capture the correlation between poor inflectional 
morphology and overt subjects, Neeleman and Szendroi point out that counter-examples 
to this paradigm exist: for instance, they note that Swedish and Afrikaans both have no 
agreement, but pro-drop, radical or otherwise, is not a grammatical option in these 
languages. 
Tomioka (2003) offers an alternative approach.  He makes the general claim that 
all languages which allow radical pro-drop also allow bare NP arguments.  Null 
pronouns are therefore ‘simply the result of N-deletion/NP ellipsis without determiner 
stranding’ (p. 336).  This seems an intriguing approach from the diary drop perspective, 
as the diary-style texts typically also display determiner omission.  However, Neeleman 38 
and Szendroi again provide counterexamples: for instance, Cheke Holo has obligatory 
determiners and yet radical pro-drop is possible. 
Having found the existing proposals unsatisfactory, Neeleman and Szendroi 
propose a new analysis of radical pro-drop which links the availability of radical pro-
drop with the morphology of the pronominal paradigm.  In brief, radical pro-drop is licit 
if a language ‘has at least some agglutinating pronominal morphology’ (p. 678).  In 
languages with agglutinating morphology, the various morphemes making up a word 
are clearly demarcated and can be easily differentiated.  For example, in Japanese, the 
nominative case affix ‘ga’ may be attached to the masculine singular pronoun stem 
‘kare’ to form ‘kare-ga’.  By contrast, in languages with fusional morphology, such as 
English, the individual morphemes are not always readily distinguishable from the stem 
or from one another.  This is evident if we compare the accusative masculine pronoun 
‘him’ with its nominative counterpart ‘he’.  According to Neeleman and Szendroi, 
languages in which ‘case on pronouns is fusional do not permit radical pro-drop’ (p. 
679), although agreement-sensitive pro-drop may still be allowed in traditional pro-drop 
languages such as Italian and Spanish.  It seems immediately clear that this does not 
offer a general solution to the issue of diary null subjects in English, as the pronominal 
morphology does not alter in the registers which allow diary-style nulls.  When 
pronominals in the diary-style registers are overt, they take the standard, fusional forms.  
However, in the course of their analysis Neeleman and Szendroi offer a minimalist 
characterization of the empty argument slots in both classic and radical pro-drop 
languages which differs from the possibilities available in the Government and Binding 
framework. 
According to the Government and Binding theory of empty categories, pro is a 
silent pronoun which sits in the subject position [Spec, IP] and is interpreted by virtue 
of the agreement features on the Inflectional head.  However, this characterisation is not 
compatible with developments introduced with the minimalist program (Chomsky 
1995).  Pro cannot have inherently valued features, since its interpretation varies with 
the context.  Because pro may be interpreted as a referential subject, its features must be 
derived at some point in the syntactic computation.  In GB terms, pro gets its feature 
specification from the I-node.  However, this solution violates the principle of 
Inclusiveness (Chomsky, 1995; Neeleman & Van de Koot, 2002), according to which 
‘the properties of a terminal node are recoverable from the lexicon and...the properties 
of a non-terminal are recoverable from the structure it dominates’ (Neeleman & 39 
Szendroi, 2007, p. 683).  The subject position where pro sits, [Spec, IP], does not 
dominate the I node, and so the features from I cannot be copied to it. 
Neeleman and Szendroi’s solution to this problem is to propose that pro carries a 
full set of features and that pro-drop is simply the ‘zero spell-out of regular pronouns’ 
(p. 683) according to a spell-rule such as (111). 
(111) [+p, -a] → Ø 
This rule is seen as applying to both the classic pro-drop null subjects and the radical 
pro-drop cases, and is one of the assumptions on which their analysis of radical pro-
drop is built.  In their view, null arguments are ‘regular pronouns that fail to be spelled 
out at PF, rather than instantiations of a special silent lexical item, pro’ (p. 679).  This 
brings us to the main point of interest for this thesis: the idea that, as Neeleman and 
Szendroi acknowledge, ultimately the realization or otherwise of a pronominal 
argument may be a pragmatic matter: 
What circumstances require phonological realization of a pronominal is a 
matter of debate, but it is clear that under the present proposal contrasts 
between overt and covert pronouns must be attributed to pragmatic 
considerations (2007, p. 685). 
Holmberg (2004; 2005) reaches a similar conclusion.  Again, applying minimalist 
principles, his work on Finnish leads him to conclude that null subjects are specified for 
interpretable φ-features, and that ‘the nullness is a phonological matter’ (2004, p. 3).  
He goes on to propose that ‘deletion is a phonological operation, but one which is 
dependent on a condition of processing, namely recoverability of the deletion,’ with 
recoverability being possible via ‘agreeing auxiliary, verb or adjective in conjunction 
with contextual cues’ (2004, p. 10).  Having removed the issue of pronoun realisation 
from the domain of narrow syntax and presented it as a phonological and processing 
matter, Holmberg considers whether ‘null subjects are in principle available in any 
language’ (ibid).  This issue is considered in more detail in Holmberg (2005), where he 
suggests that typically non-null subject languages have a ‘stricter “phonological” EPP 
condition that requires not only a filled [SPEC, IP], but also a pronounced [Spec, IP]’ 
(2005, p. 557).  This in turn raises the question of the contextual and processing 
conditions under which this strict condition might be relaxed in non-pro-drop languages 
containing the diary-style nulls.  This is the starting point for my pragmatic analysis of 40 
the diary-style null subject, and seems largely compatible with the ellipsis conclusion 
reached by Haegeman and Ihsane.  From now on, I will therefore assume that the 
subject is a fully specified, syntactically active pronominal which is optionally deleted 
under certain conditions via a phonological rule.  I will argue that since these conditions 
involve both pragmatic considerations and processing constraints, they are best 
investigated using a cognitively oriented pragmatic framework such as relevance theory. 
1.7  Concluding remarks and the next steps 
Syntax clearly has something to say about the distribution of the diary-style null 
subjects.  However, as I have tried to show, the jury is still out as to the best way to 
formalise the syntactic constraints and patterns.  Although I am tentatively adopting the 
proposal put forward in Holmberg (2005), my main aim is to address an issue which is 
acknowledged by all existing syntactic accounts, and may well be the one thing they all 
agree on: the need for certain contextual and pragmatic conditions to be met if a null-
subject utterance is to be both interpretable and appropriate.  This is a theme that runs 
through all the existing attempts to analyse the diary drop data.  In early work on the 
subject, Haegeman (1990a) expresses the view that ‘the accessibility of the referent is 
not a matter of syntax properly speaking but a matter of pragmatics’ (1990a, p. 167).  
Neeleman and Szendroi acknowledge that ‘a full theory of pro drop requires an 
additional pragmatic component that governs the use of null pronouns in languages 
whose grammar allows them,’ (2007, p. 673); and according to Tomioka, ‘the 
descriptive content of the null NP is pragmatically retrieved’ (2003, p. 329). 
Although the pragmatic factors governing the use of diary-style null subjects have 
not so far been considered in detail, several pragmatic proposals have been put forward 
about what is often seen as a related phenomenon: the use of null subjects in child 
language.  In chapter 2, I will consider these null subjects, which occur systematically 
during a particular phase of language acquisition, as a possible analogue to the adult 
diary-style forms.  I will look at both syntactic and pragmatic analyses of child null 
subject data, and consider the strengths and weakness of these accounts and the 
potential for extending them to the adult domain.  I will then introduce the main 
principles of relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95; Carston, 2002a; Wilson & 
Sperber, 2004), and discuss how they might shed light on the null subject examples in 
child language and help to integrate the informal pragmatic observations found in the 
existing literature.   41 
In chapter 3, I return to the assumption that the diary-style nulls are non-overt 
pronominals, and therefore function as referring expressions.  To examine the 
pragmatics of reference in more detail, I consider two influential pragmatically-oriented 
accounts of referring expressions: Accessibility Theory (Ariel, 1988; 1990; 2001) and 
the Givenness Hierarchy (Gundel, Hedberg, & Zacharski, 1993; Gundel & Mulkern, 
1998).  Both accounts are intended to be compatible with the relevance theoretic 
framework, but both claim that relevance theory alone is not enough to explain the use 
and distribution of referring expressions, and must be supplemented by additional 
machinery.  In chapter 4, I challenge this view, and propose a relevance-based approach 
to referring expressions which does not require any theory-external notions of the type 
proposed by Ariel or Gundel.  My central claims are, first, that referring expressions 
encode conceptual and/or procedural meaning which may contribute to what is 
explicitly and/or implicitly communicated by an utterance, and second, that these 
meanings are specifiable without invoking any notions from Accessibility Theory or the 
Givenness hierarchy.  I go on to develop these claims and apply them to further data in 
chapter 5.  In chapter 6, I return to the diary null subject data, and show how it fits into 
my account of referring expressions.  I argue that null subjects in English are not 
exceptional, but emerge as a natural consequence of the speaker’s aiming to make her 
utterance optimally relevant.  In chapter 7 I discuss some outstanding issues, and draw 
some general conclusions about the nature of the procedural/conceptual distinction in 
light of my analysis of null subjects in English. 42 
Chapter 2:  Null Subjects in Child English 
2.1  Introduction  
2.1.1  The null subject phase 
Children learning English go through a phase in their linguistic development where they 
systematically produce sentences like those in (1)-(5).
1 
(1)  missing there. 
(2)  ride truck. 
(3)  bump my train. 
(4)  want go get it. 
(5)  read bear book. 
This phase generally occurs when the child is between 20 and 25 months old, although 
exact timings vary from child to child.  The same pattern is observed in other non-pro-
drop languages including French, as in (6) and Danish, as in (7) and (8):  
(6)  a tout tout tout mangé . 
‘has all all all eaten.’    (Hamann, Rizzi, & Frauenfelder, 1996) 
(7)  er ikke synd. 
‘is not a pity.’ 
 
                                                
1 Examples taken from Hyams (1986) quoting from the corpora of Bloom (1970) and Bloom, 
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(8)  ikke køre traktor.  
‘not drive tractor.’        (Hamann & Plunkett, 1997; 1998) 
According to a Principles and Parameters approach to language acquisition, a child must 
set her pro-drop parameter either positively or negatively.  If she is learning Spanish or 
Italian the parameter will be set positively, and if she is learning English, French or 
Danish the parameter will be set negatively.  Wexler (1998) provides evidence for what 
he terms the Very Early Parameter setting hypothesis of language acquisition (VEPS), 
arguing that, ‘parameters that are set at the earliest observed stage (i.e. at the beginning 
of production of multi-word combinations, around 1;6) include...Null subject or not’ 
(1998, p. 29).  If this is the case, we would not expect to find null subjects in the speech 
of a child acquiring a non-pro-drop language after the age of 18 months.  From this 
perspective, the data in (1)-(8), produced at a later stage in development, seem 
problematic.   
However, closer inspection reveals that the environments in which null subjects 
occur during the null subject phase do not pattern consistently with those of adult null 
subjects in pro-drop languages.  As noted in 1.5.3, they look rather more like adult 
diary-style null subjects.  Haegeman (1997, p. 234) goes so far as to describe the 
distributions of child null subjects and adult diary-style null subjects as ‘strikingly 
similar’.   
 In this chapter, I take a closer look at the acquisition data and consider some of 
the analyses that have been proposed to account for it.  I will then outline the basic 
principles of relevance theory, and suggest that this cognitively-orientated framework 
offers an insightful perspective on the pragmatic aspects of subject drop in child 
language.  Although most accounts of both adult and child null subjects emphasise the 
importance of pragmatics for understanding the null subject data, and some make 
informal suggestions as to how we might characterise this, I suggest that adopting a 
relevance-based approach has the advantage of allowing us to examine the data from the 
perspective of an independently motivated pragmatic framework.  My discussion of the 
child data in this chapter will set the scene for my relevance-based account of referring 
expressions in general, and diary-style nulls in particular, which I will develop over 
chapters 3 to 7.  
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2.1.2  Competence or performance?   
Existing treatments of null subjects in child language fall broadly into three camps: 
competence (syntactic) accounts (Guilfoyle, 1984; Hyams, 1986; 1992; Kazman, 1988; 
Guilfoyle & Noonan, 1989; Hyams & Wexler, 1993; Rizzi, 1994, 2005; Bromberg & 
Wexler, 1995), performance accounts (Bloom L. , 1970; Bloom P. , 1990; 1993; 
Gerken, 1991; Valian, Aubry, & Hoeffner, 1996), and discourse-pragmatic accounts 
(Greenfield & Smith, 1976; Allen, 2000; Schaeffer, 2005).   I begin by considering the 
first two categories in more detail.  
The distinction between the roles of competence and performance in language 
production and processing was first highlighted in the work of Noam Chomsky (1965), 
where competence is tacit knowledge of language, and performance is the practical use 
of language in concrete situations.  Language acquisition involves acquiring a grammar 
that allows us not only to produce and understand utterances in a certain language, but 
also to make judgments of well-formedness for sentences we might never have heard 
before.  These intuitions about sentence meaning and well-formedness are seen as 
reflections of our linguistic competence. 
However, there are many external mental or physical factors which may affect our 
ability to utilize this internal grammar to produce appropriate utterances or to 
understand the utterances of others.  These ‘performance’ factors (e.g. false starts, slips 
of the tongue and other types of mis-speaking) may vary across persons, times and 
situations. We may, for example, be likely to make more performance errors when we 
are tired, drunk, nervous or distracted.  Such errors are not taken to reflect a deficit in 
our underlying linguistic competence, but are rather treated as on-line glitches in 
production or comprehension.  There are also more general performance factors which 
affect or constrain our linguistic output across circumstances.  Language is recursive, 
and a grammar should, in theory, generate indefinitely long sentences.  However, 
working memory places limitations on how much information can be kept active for use 
in computation at any one time, and there are corresponding practical length restrictions 
on language production.  Similarly, we may have difficulty processing certain 
structures, such as multiple embeddings, so that sentences such as (9) or (10), which are 
perfectly well-formed sentences according to the grammar, are not usually able to be 
processed by our performance systems, at least not without considerable conscious 
effort:  45 
(9)  Bricks bricks break break bricks. 
(10)  The dog the stick the fire burned beat bit the cat. (Pinker, 1994, p. 205) 
This distinction between competence and performance leaves us with two possible lines 
of explanation for the child null subject phase.  It could be the result of some deficit in 
the child’s underlying grammar (as compared with the adult’s) or it could be due to 
performance factors.  Competence-based approaches start from the assumption that all 
children pass through a stage where their grammar allows null subjects.  Utterances with 
null subjects are therefore fully well-formed according to their internal grammar.  Then, 
as acquisition proceeds, this grammar switches, changes or matures in such a way that it 
converges with the adult grammar of the language being acquired (Hyams, 1986; 1992; 
Hyams & Wexler, 1993; Bromberg & Wexler, 1995).  According to performance 
accounts, on the other hand, the child is acquiring the target language grammar from the 
start, and the omission of subjects is the result of some form of processing constraint, 
perhaps combined with pragmatic considerations (Bloom L., 1970; Bloom P., 1990; 
Gerken, 1991). 
Proponents of both approaches have put forward theoretical and conceptual 
arguments designed to show that a competence or performance approach is preferable 
on general grounds.  Empirical evidence has also been provided in support of one or 
other approach.  I begin by considering the claimed advantages of a competence 
approach, and outline some of the specific analyses that fall into this category.  We will 
see that there are similarities between these accounts and the accounts of adult diary 
nulls outlined in the last chapter.  
2.2  Competence Accounts 
2.2.1  Advantages of a competence approach to child nulls 
Hyams and Wexler (1993) argue that competence accounts are superior to performance 
accounts on theoretical, conceptual and empirical grounds.  Discussing the distributional 
properties of the child null subject, they observe an apparent asymmetry between 
subject and object drop during this stage in acquisition.  Data from the CHILDES 
corpus (MacWhinney, 2000) suggests that during the null subject phase children ‘drop 
specific subjects about twice as often’ (1993, p. 428) as they drop specific objects.  This 
statistic, they claim, is most easily accounted for under a competence model.  In their 46 
view, performance accounts have difficulty explaining why performance factors might 
specifically target subjects in this way.  The grammatical nature of the competence 
accounts, on the other hand, makes it possible to deal with this asymmetry by specifying 
that ‘the option to drop a specific argument is available only to subjects’ (p. 428).  
Hyams and Wexler go on to discuss correlations between the child null subject stage 
and various other specific stages in the language acquisition process, arguing that the 
acquisition of inflection (Meisel, 1987), tense (Clahsen, 1986) and non sentence-
external negation (Pierce, 1992) all correlate with the end of the null subject phase.  
Competence-based accounts, they claim, are best placed to explain such correlations, 
since these accounts work from the assumption that ‘the child is developing an adult 
grammatical system and that, depending on the precise structure of the system and the 
various interrelations that exist, each development may generate a wide range of effects’ 
(Hyams and Wexler, 1993, p. 425). 
Given these general arguments in favour of a competence-based approach to the 
child null subject phenomenon, I will now consider the details of some specific 
grammatical accounts.  
2.2.2 The pro hypothesis 
At least superficially, the subjectless utterances produced by children during the null 
subject phase can look like the subjectless sentences of a pro-drop language such as 
Italian or Spanish.  Hyams (1986) begins from this observation and argues that the 
child’s early grammar differs from the adult grammar in that it has the pro-drop 
parameter positively set.  On this account ‘young children speak a language with the 
essential properties of an adult pro-drop language like Italian, and the early grammar of 
English…represents a MIS-SETTING along a specific parameter of UG’ (Hyams, 1996, p. 
94).  This approach differs slightly from the pro-drop accounts of the diary nulls that we 
saw in the previous chapter.  The child need only switch her setting once as she moves 
from a pro-drop setting to the non-pro-drop of the target language, whereas the adult 
must switch back and forth between the two settings as she moves between dialects.  
Hyams suggests that in its initial state the pro-drop parameter is positively set, and 
children learning English produce these subjectless sentences up until the point when 
the parameter is reset to negative.  She also considers what might trigger such a 
resetting, and outlines the kind of evidence the child would need in order to make this 
change.   47 
On Hyams’ account, when the child hears a well-formed sentence of English that 
she is unable to generate with her current pro-drop grammar, this will provide a piece of 
evidence against a positive setting of the pro-drop parameter, and should be enough to 
trigger the switch.  Such evidence would be provided by expletives.  Given the Avoid 
Pronoun Principle
2, a language in which subjects are optional would always avoid the 
use of expletives, and indeed, expletives are not found in pro-drop languages.  Thus, the 
presence of an expletive in the input to the English-speaking child should be enough to 
show that overt subjects are obligatory in subject position in the target language.  
According to Hyams, children begin to use expletives at around the time that they stop 
producing subjectless sentences, and she concludes that they therefore provide the 
necessary trigger.  In sum, Hyams’ 1986 analysis attempts to assimilate the child null 
subject with the null subject in languages such as Italian and Spanish. 
However, this pro-drop analysis faces several objections, some of which were 
discussed in chapter 1 in relation to the diary-style nulls in adult language.  Hyams 
(1992) revisits the data and identifies empirical, conceptual and logical problems with 
her earlier account.  Valian (1990) also provides experimental data suggesting that the 
predictions of a pro-drop analysis are not borne out.  
The most striking objection to a pro-drop analysis has to do with structural 
differences between the distribution of the child null subject and adult pro.  If the child 
at this stage of development has her pro-drop parameter positively set, then we would 
expect to find the child null subjects occurring in the same environments as in adult pro-
drop languages.  According to Rizzi (2005), however, the child null subject is found 
very rarely, if at all, in subordinate clauses, whereas in true pro-drop languages such as 
Italian, subordinate clauses are a licit environment for pro.  Thus, sentences such as (11) 
are perfectly acceptable in Italian and are found in the speech of both adults and 
children.  By contrast, equivalent sentences, such as (12), are unattested in child 
English.  
(11)  Ho detto che _andava a casa.  
(12)  *I said that _ went home.    
(Hyams 1996) 
                                                
2 See Chomsky (1981) and Hyams (1986), along with chapter 6, section 6.2.2 for further discussion of 
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As Rizzi (1994) points out, this evidence may be less significant than it appears, since 
children do not produce genuine subordinate clauses until their mean length of utterance 
(MLU) has gone beyond that usually associated with the null subject phase.  However, 
he does give examples of occasional utterances of this sort that have been attested in 
this phase, for example (13).  
(13)  _ know what I maked.  
Here, the subject in the main clause, but not the subordinate clause, is omitted.  Rizzi 
treats this as evidence that null subjects in child English are restricted to main clauses 
(although he acknowledges that further investigation is needed before firm conclusions 
can be drawn).  Empirically, then, it seems that in the early language examples, we are 
dealing with a phenomenon that differs significantly from adult pro-drop.  
As noted above, all children drop subjects.  If this is because all children in this 
phase have the same, pro-drop grammar, then we would expect the ratio of overt to null 
subjects to be constant cross-linguistically.  Valian (1991) reports on a study that reveals 
that American children learning English produce at least twice as many overt subjects as 
Italian children.  This distributional difference suggests that there is some difference 
between the two developing grammars, and that the underlying cause of the subjectless 
sentences may not necessarily be the same.  
Conceptually, the idea of a mis-set parameter is also troublesome.  There is no 
evidence that such mis-setting occurs with other parameters, and, indeed, the evidence 
rather suggests that parameters are set very early in the child’s language development 
(Hyams 1996; Wexler 1998).  Logically too, Hyams’ 1986 approach is somewhat 
problematic.  Valian (1990) discusses some objections to the notion of a single-value 
default parameter.  If the parameter has a default setting, then the question arises of how 
the child comes to reset it.  If, as Hyams suggests, the default for pro-drop is a positive 
setting, then the presence of sentences with subjects is not enough to invalidate this 
initial setting, since sentences with subjects are optional in null subject languages. It 
follows that the set of sentences with overt subjects is a subset of the set of possible 
sentences in a null subject language, and exposure to sentences with subjects will not on 
its own be enough to prove that subjects are obligatory.  There is also the added 
complication that a child acquiring English or another non-pro-drop language is likely 
to hear subjectless sentences as part of the input. As discussed in chapter 1, subjects 
may at times remain non-overt in sentences of casual spoken English as well as in the 49 
diary-style registers.  Yet according to the pro-drop account, children must somehow 
manage to reset their parameter, and so end up with a non-pro-drop grammar despite 
this contradictory input. 
As discussed above, Hyams suggests that expletive use is specific to non-null 
subject languages.  However, this too proves to be problematic.  If the child’s grammar 
is parametrically set to pro-drop, then she will be unable to construct a representation 
for expletives when they do occur.  They will, in effect, be unanalysable and, therefore, 
filtered out.  Alternatively, as Valian suggests, the child with a pro-drop grammar may 
assign a referential interpretation to any expletive pronouns she hears.  Nor is this the 
only problem for the expletive explanation of parameter resetting.  Valian cites 
empirical data that bring into question Hyams’ basic assumptions about the distribution 
of expletives in child language.  If expletives are the trigger for the parameter resetting, 
we would predict that the child should only start producing them at the end of the null 
subject phase.  Although the overall frequency of sentences with expletives is low in 
child language, contrary to Hyams’ (1986) predictions, Valian found instances of their 
use across the age and MLU range studied.  This included children who were still firmly 
in the null subject stage.  
In Hyams (1992) the author herself outlines some problems with her earlier 
analysis.  In non-pro-drop languages such as Spanish and Italian, it is often claimed that 
the rich inflectional systems license identification of the subject.  Children acquiring 
these richly inflected languages master the inflectional systems at a very early stage.  
Whilst the inflectional systems of non-pro-drop languages such as English and French 
are considerably poorer than their pro-drop cousins, children acquiring them do not 
master the inflectional paradigms until well after they have begun to produce null 
subjects.  As a result, the null subjects of children acquiring non-pro-drop languages are 
‘unidentified’ (Hyams, 1992, p. 253).  There is no inflectional information to identify 
the missing subject. 
Hyams therefore moves away from her earlier focus on inflection, and presents an 
adjusted account which treats morphological uniformity as the crucial factor 
determining whether a language allows null subjects or not.  As noted above in chapter 
1, whilst pro-drop languages such as Italian and Spanish have rich inflectional systems, 
there are also languages, such as Chinese, which have no inflection but nonetheless 
allow null subjects.  To incorporate this data, Jaeggli and Safir (1989) propose that ‘null 
subjects are permitted in all and only those languages which have morphologically 
uniform inflectional paradigms’ (Hyams 1992 p. 253).  Accordingly, Hyams suggests 50 
that during the null subject stage, English speaking children analyse their language as 
morphologically uniform (and more particularly, as non-inflectional).  This leads to two 
predictions: first, that inflection will be omitted during the null subject stage, and 
second that when inflection is acquired, the child will cease to use null subjects.  Hyams 
claims that these predictions are borne out by the data.  Although this modified account 
addresses the problems that Hyams herself identified with her 1986 approach, many of 
the other objections remain.  It is still unclear how we might explain the distributional 
difference between child null subjects and adult pro-drop, and how we might account 
for the cross-linguistic differences in the frequency of child nulls.  The conceptual 
issues relating to the notion of a mis-set parameter also remain. 
2.2.3  The VP hypothesis 
Valian (1991) uses data from American and Italian children to test the predictions of 
both the pro-hypothesis and an alternative grammatical approach which she terms the 
VP-hypothesis.  This competence-based analysis (Guilfoyle, 1984; Kazman, 1988; 
Guilfoyle & Noonan, 1989) proposes that the child’s immature grammar generates only 
a VP, with no inflectional phrase (INFL) or complementizer phrase (COMP).  In the 
mature, adult grammar, the need to check case means that the Spec of VP must be filled 
with an NP that can move to become the subject of the INFL phrase.  Since the child’s 
immature grammar provides no INFL phrase, there are no sentential subjects.  Instead, 
when subjects do occur, they are located in the Spec-VP position.  As this position is 
optional, so too are subjects.  This account predicts that the language of a child in the 
null subject phase will also lack infinitival ‘to’, modals and nominative case marking.   
Valian (1991) tests these predictions against the American and Italian data, and 
finds them not to be borne out.  The subjects produced by the American children ‘look 
like real subjects rather than VP subjects, because the children consistently used 
nominatively case-marked pronouns in subject positions’ (1991, p. 76).  Furthermore, 
American children produce twice as many subjects as Italian children, and they also 
contrast with the Italian speakers in that the majority of their subjects are pronouns.  
Although the American and Italian data in general contained few modals, children 
acquiring American English produced more, and no correlation was found between the 
onset of modal use and the loss of the subjectless option. 
Valian notes, however, that the predictions of the VP hypothesis do seem to hold 
true for the very youngest child in her data set, who also had the lowest MLU. She 
therefore entertains the possibility that at this very early stage the child does indeed 51 
have a VP grammar.  However, since the use of subjectless sentences persists well past 
this stage, other or further explanations are needed for the later data.  
2.2.4  Topic drop 
As noted above, in certain languages, including Chinese, Korean and Japanese, null 
subjects are licit despite the impoverished inflectional systems of these languages.  It 
has been argued that what distinguishes such languages is not the pro-drop parameter, 
but a parameter that allows zero topics in so-called ‘discourse-orientated’ languages 
(Huang, 1984, p. 551).  These languages also differ from traditional pro-drop languages 
in that they allow the omission of objects as frequently as the omission of subjects.  This 
is to be expected if the null element is a topicalised constituent, rather than an 
unpronounced subject pronoun.  Topic-drop can also be found in some languages more 
traditionally thought of as non-null subject.  In Dutch, for instance, any constituent may 
be topicalised, and hence appear in first position: [Spec CP].  In certain pragmatic 
conditions these topics may then be dropped, as in (14), where the name of the film in 
question (Rainman) might be seen as being topicalised and then dropped. 
(14)  a.  Ga je mee   naar   Rainman   vanavond? 
Go you   to   Rainman   tonight? 
b.  Heb   ik   al     gezien. 
Have   I   already   seen. 
Haan and Tuijumen (1988) argue that Dutch children have a process of Topic-drop.  
Both subjects and objects may be dropped when in topic position, but subjects are 
hardly ever dropped when not in first position.  Similar accounts have been suggested 
for the English data.  These topic-drop approaches hypothesize that during the null 
subject phase, children acquiring English have a topic-drop grammar (Hyams & Jaeggli, 
1988; Hyams & Wexler, 1993; Bromberg & Wexler, 1995).  As discussed in chapter 1, 
movement of a constituent to topic position is a commonly attested phenomenon in 
English, with examples such as (15).  
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(15)  a. John, I spoke to yesterday.  
b. CP [Johni [I spoke to ti yesterday]]  
Furthermore, Bromberg and Wexler (1995) suggest that adult English may have a 
limited capacity for topic drop, which allows subjects to be dropped when they are 
topics, as in (16) (1995, p. 243). 
(16)  a. What happened to Mary?  
b. ___ went away for a while. 
However, unlike Dutch children, English speaking children do not drop objects.  Their 
topic-drop is restricted to subjects.   
Hyams and Wexler (1993) attempt to explain these distributional facts whilst 
maintaining a topic-drop analysis of the child null subjects of finite verbs.
3  According 
to their version of the topic-drop analysis, a constituent may be dropped if it is outside 
the VP.  Subjects are already outside the VP, and will therefore be candidates for 
omission.  According to Hyams and Wexler (1993), there is good evidence that Dutch 
speaking children can topicalise objects as well as subjects (Wexler, 1991; Hyams, 
1994), and so both may be subject to omission.  In contrast, the fact that English has a 
‘much less robust pattern of topicalization’ (Hyams & Wexler, 1993, p. 430), leads 
Hyams and Wexler to conclude that, at this stage, English speaking children do not have 
a process of topicalization.  As a result, objects will never move to a position outside the 
VP, and so will not be dropped.   
According to Hyams and Wexler, the cross-linguistic variation in frequency of 
null subjects discussed by Valian (1991) is also predicted on this topic-drop account.  
Italian-speaking children have a pro-drop grammar where the empty subjects are 
identified via rich inflection.  All subjects are therefore suitable candidates for dropping.  
In the case of the English-speaking children, however, not every subject will be a topic, 
and so the overall rate of omission will be lower. 
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Bromberg and Wexler (1995) argue that the absence of null subjects in tensed wh-
questions provides further evidence for a topic-drop analysis
4.  Since topics and wh-
words target the same tree node in the syntactic structure, they cannot co-occur in the 
same sentence.  If the absent nulls are topics, then we should expect to find no instances 
of wh-questions amongst the null subject data.   
Although the topic-drop analysis seems to account for many of the child null 
subject distributional facts, several questions remain unanswered.  Topic-drop accounts 
do not explain why maturing speakers lose the option to use the topic-drop construction 
that they so freely used as children.  Indeed, Hyams and Wexler acknowledge in a 
footnote that their analysis does not address either this issue or the issue of how the 
phenomenon relates to the adult language in general. This seems less than ideal for a 
theory of child language, and leaves as many questions unanswered as it addresses.  
2.2.5  Truncation  
The so-called Truncation account of the child null subject was developed by Rizzi 
(1994).  It is this analysis that forms the basis for Haegeman’s (2000) analysis of adult 
diary-drop outlined in chapter 1.   
Recall that, according to Rizzi’s amended identification condition (Rizzi, 1994), if 
the empty category is in the highest position in the structure and there is therefore 
nowhere for an antecedent to sit, then the need for the antecedent is waived, and, 
instead, identification takes place via the discourse.  Rizzi proposes that, in the child’s 
grammar, the empty category is indeed in the highest position because the child does 
not obligatorily project to the CP level (see chapter 1, section 1.6.1).  When a CP is not 
projected, null subjects are licensed via Rizzi’s amended ECP.  In sum, the child’s 
grammar lacks a rule specifying that the root must project to CP (ROOT=CP), and until 
this is acquired as an obligatory condition, null subjects may occur.  We therefore see 
the same process as in the parallel adult account, but with a different motivation.  In the 
adult cases, it is the special circumstances of certain registers which block the projection 
to CP level, whereas in the child cases, it is the immature state of the child’s grammar 
which stops this projection from being mandatory. 
This account clearly predicts that null subjects will not occur in sentences where 
wh-movement has taken place. For wh-preposing to take place, a CP level must be 
projected, which means that potential antecedent site will be available and, according to 
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the identification clause of the ECP, must be used.  Rizzi claims that this is indeed the 
case and that child null subjects and wh-preposing do not co-occur.  However, 
Bromberg and Wexler (1995) present data from the CHILDES corpus which contradicts 
this claim. They find that ‘null subjects are abundantly present in wh-questions’
5, citing 
minimal pairs such as (17) and (18) as evidence:  
(17)  Where go?  
(18)  Where dis go?  
So again we find ourselves with a grammatical, competence-based account which deals 
with certain aspects of the phenomenon, but is left wanting when further data is 
considered.  
2.2.6  Summary 
In this section, I have given an overview of some of the major competence accounts of 
null subjects in child language.  According to some of these, child nulls are the result of 
the child’s having a pro-drop or topic-drop grammar during a specific stage in the 
acquisition process.  Alternative accounts work from the assumption that the child’s 
syntactic representation is truncated.  Whilst I have tried to show that there are problems 
with the specific details of these accounts, this does not necessarily invalidate the 
general claim (Hyams and Wexler 1993) that competence accounts in general are best 
placed to deal with the child null subject data.  Hyams and Wexler specifically argue 
that performance accounts are unable to explain the subject-object asymmetry and the 
association between the null subject phase and ‘a range of other theoretically related 
grammatical properties’ (1993, p. 452).  With this in mind, in the next section I will 
outline the arguments in favour of a general performance-based account of the data, and 
consider some of the performance analyses that have been proposed. 
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2.3  Performance Accounts 
2.3.1  General advantages of performance-based accounts 
The previous sections considered possible ways of treating the child null subject stage 
as resulting from either an immature grammar or a mis-setting of a parameter during the 
acquisition process.  The alternative is to analyse the child’s output as a matter of 
performance.  The assumption behind this approach is that the child’s grammar is not 
qualitatively different from the adult’s, but that the output is affected by factors relating 
to the child’s ability in production. 
General evidence in support of performance analyses is provided by Lois Bloom 
(1970), who argues that the child knows more about the adult grammar than is reflected 
in her own utterances.  Bloom reports an experiment by Shipley, Smith and Gleitman 
(1969) which reveals that children, including those in the ‘telegraphic’ phase, respond 
more readily to full, well-formed commands than to commands expressed in a 
telegraphic style similar to their own.  This suggests that children know more about the 
rules and structure of language than is superficially evident from their own utterances, 
and that we should take performance factors seriously when analysing child language 
production.  
There are several other empirical advantages to a performance-based account.  For 
instance, children during the null subject stage do not only omit subjects.  As in the 
adult diary-style registers, other categories, including determiners, verbs, auxiliaries and 
prepositions, are liable to omission during this stage.  Ideally, an account should shed 
some light on these further omissions.  As Bloom  notes, ‘no one has proposed a 
parameter of subject-determiner drop’ (1990, p. 727).   
Bloom (1990) and Valian (1991) both provide evidence that the change from the 
subject drop stage to adult-like subject use is gradual.  Competence accounts would 
seem to predict a more abrupt change as the child re-sets the appropriate parameter or 
acquires the necessary grammatical structure.  A performance account incorporating 
reference to the child’s developing cognitive systems seems better suited to dealing with 
gradual change. 
It is worth emphasising here that competence and performance analyses should 
not be seen as mutually exclusive.  Indeed, many competence-based accounts of child 
null subjects acknowledge at least some role for pragmatic and performance factors.  
Hyams and Wexler (1993, p. 452) note that ‘It is a trivial observation that children are 
limited in their productive abilities’, whilst for Rizzi (2005, p. 24), language is 56 
‘grammatically based, but performance driven’.  Even in accounts that do not explicitly 
acknowledge the role of performance factors, there is clear evidence of exceptions to the 
grammatical rules or patterns.  For example, Hyams and Wexler (1993, p. 428) explain 
the subject/object asymmetry via a grammatical model in which ‘the option to drop a 
specific argument is available only for subjects’.  Yet their own data reveal instances of 
object drop, albeit at a much lower rate than subject drop.  Similarly, Hyams (1996) 
concludes that, based on 94-99% of cases, modals occur ‘almost exclusively’ with overt 
subjects.  In both cases it is claimed that a competence account provides the best fit with 
the data.  However, even this best fit leaves a number of exceptions to be dealt with, and 
it is not clear how is this to be done if not in terms of performance. 
The grammatical accounts considered above mostly deal in absolutes.  A certain 
utterance is or is not well-formed according to a particular grammar.  Such accounts, in 
some sense, abstract away from practical production and comprehension considerations. 
As Paul Bloom (1990) points out, performance accounts, by contrast, deal with a 
‘tendency’ rather than an absolute.  Whilst performance factors play some role in each 
of the processing analyses of child null subjects, in this section, I concentrate on 
accounts which place performance factors at the heart of their analyses.  
Most performance-based accounts focus on processing limitations in the child.  
The idea is that omissions in production occur because the child’s capabilities are 
overloaded: some form of constraint on processing ability in the developing stage, 
combined with complexity in certain sentences, leads to reductions and omissions in the 
output. I begin by considering the earliest of these accounts, proposed by Lois Bloom, 
which focuses on the complexity added by extra sentence length.  I then move on to 
other accounts which focus on factors such as VP length and metrical complexity.  
Processing accounts also rely, to varying degrees, on pragmatic factors to explain 
why certain constituents are more vulnerable to omission than others when processing 
capacity is limited.  As a result, there is some overlap between the performance-based 
and pragmatics-based accounts of the data, although none offers a fully integrated 
approach.  I consider discourse-pragmatics-based accounts separately in section 2.4.  In 
section 2.5, I will argue that by taking relevance theory as a pragmatic framework, we 
can develop an integrated approach which builds on the strengths of both kinds of 
account.  The implications of relevance theory for the production and interpretation of 
subject noun phrases in general will be explored in more detail in chapters 3-5.  In 
chapter 6, I return to the issue of child null subjects in light of my analysis. 57 
2.3.2  Processing accounts 
2.3.2.1  Sentential complexity:  a general processing approach 
The earliest performance-based account was that provided by Lois Bloom (1970), who 
analyses the speech of three children in the null subject stage and claims that complex 
sentences, combined with the child’s cognitive limitations, lead to omissions in 
production output.  Bloom categorises the speech of the children as ‘telegraphic’, 
likening it to the utterances produced by an adult ‘who is under pressure to be brief’ 
(1970, p. 139). 
Considering which factors might cause the child’s output to resemble the 
‘telegraphic’ utterances of adults, Bloom finds that the length and, more specifically, the 
complexity of an utterance contribute to the likelihood that the output will be 
abbreviated.  Between the ages of 20-23 months, the child is more or less limited to two 
word utterances.  Where a longer utterance would have been required by the adult 
grammar, the child omits one or more of the words.  Initially, this may look like a 
simple length constraint.  However, Bloom suggests that what is at work here is rather a 
‘cognitive limitation in handling structural complexity’ (1970, p. 165).  To investigate 
this hypothesis, she considers the effect of negation on the child’s utterances, on the 
assumption that negation increases sentential complexity, and she provides an in-depth 
analysis of its use in the speech of children during the telegraphic phase. She finds that, 
in sentences with negation, the probability that the utterance will be in some way 
reduced is higher than in sentences of comparable length without negation, and 
concludes, more generally, that the omissions in child language are due to a limitation 
on the linguistic and logical complexity with which the developing child can cope.  As 
the complexity of a sentence increases, so do the chances that ‘something had to give in 
its production’ (1970, p. 165).  
Under Bloom’s analysis, both linguistic and cognitive factors play a role and may 
interact to determine both when an omission is likely to occur and what type of 
constituent is most likely to be omitted.  Whilst a linguistic factor such as unfamiliar 
vocabulary or a logical factor such as negation may constrain the child’s ability, Bloom 
also notes that cognitive constraints, such as reduced memory span, make the child’s 
task still more complicated.  The relation between memory and language acquisition is 
considered in more detail by Olson (1973).  Rather than seeing the child’s limited 
memory span as an underlying cause of the shorter utterances, he presents both 
phenomena as symptoms of the same process: it is the child’s as yet underdeveloped 58 
abilities to ‘recode, encode, to plan and monitor, to integrate and unitize’ (p. 153) which 
underlie both limitations.
6 
Whereas the grammatical, competence-based accounts concentrate on the 
omission of subjects, Bloom’s account considers the overall reduced nature of the 
speech of children during this phase.  Her evidence suggests that subjects are not the 
only elements to ‘give’ under the pressure of cognitive constraints.  Omissions are not 
random, and Bloom draws on the findings from previous experiments (Brown & Fraser, 
1963; Brown & Bellugi, 1964) to argue that the omissions are in fact both predictable 
and systematic.  Words that are persistently retained in the surface utterances tend to be 
‘contentives’ (nouns, verbs and adjectives) whilst those which are omitted tend to be 
‘functors’ (articles, prepositions, auxiliaries and pronouns).  Here we see a parallel with 
omissions in the adult diary style contexts discussed in chapter 1.  Bloom notes that 
‘functors’ tend to be ‘weakly stressed, carry little information value [and] are most 
predictable’ (1970, p. 140).  In this way, she seems to be making a move towards 
incorporating pragmatic factors into her processing-based account.  In sum, Bloom’s 
account suggests that complexity resulting from syntactic or logical structure or from 
unfamiliar vocabulary may overload the child’s processing capacities.  Given these 
constraints, the child produces those parts of an utterance which ‘carry the most 
information and are least predictable’ (1970, p. 140).  Whilst this is a fairly general 
analysis of child language during the telegraphic phase, Bloom’s ideas are developed in 
more detail by subsequent performance accounts.  
2.3.2.2  VP length and rightward complexity  
Paul Bloom (1990) builds on Lois Bloom’s performance account, and presents results 
from a further study in its support.  He focuses on the structure of the sentence, citing 
three strands of empirical evidence which favour a processing account over a 
competence approach.  First, like Lois Bloom, he points out that various different types 
of constituent are omitted alongside subjects during this phase.  The correlation between 
null subjects and other null constituents is not predicted on a grammar-only account.  
Second, he cites evidence from experiments by Brown and Fraser (1963) which show 
that constituents are omitted in imitated speech in the same way, and to the same 
degree, as in spontaneous speech.  This suggests that the crucial factor is not so much a 
grammatical problem or difference from adult speech, but that the child may simply 
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have ‘a general difficulty in producing long strings of words’ (Bloom P. , 1990, p. 492).  
Finally, he reports data from Mazuka et al (1986), which reveal that some children 
phonologically reduce their subjects to a schwa, rather than omitting them altogether.  
These data are hard to explain on a competence account where the child’s grammar 
either allows null subjects or doesn’t.  By contrast, they are predictable on a 
performance account where the child knows a subject is necessary but lacks the 
necessary resources to consistently realise it phonetically.  
Paul Bloom adopts Lois Bloom’s proposal about the significance of sentence 
length and tests it with specific attention to VP length.  Counting the number of words 
from the verb position to the end of the sentence, he confirms the predictions of the 
performance-based account by finding a significant difference in the length of VPs in 
sentences with and without subjects.  When a subject was overtly realised, the VP 
tended to be shorter than when it was omitted.  As Bloom himself points out, there is an 
alternative way of accounting for this finding in purely pragmatic terms, since extra 
length in the VPs is likely to provide extra contextual information, which should make 
the subject referent easier to identify, and therefore more likely to be omitted.  Bloom 
tests the predictions of this pragmatic account against those of the processing approach 
by comparing the length of overt subjects produced by children in this stage with the 
length of VPs in the sentences in which they occur.  Whilst a pragmatic account (as he 
envisages it) predicts that the length of the overt subjects should have no effect on VP 
length, the processing account predicts that the extra effort involved in processing a 
complex subject will result in a shorter VP than for a simple subject
7.  Bloom found that 
his processing hypothesis was confirmed: there was a gradual decrease in the length of 
VP as the length of the subject increased.  
In Bloom’s view, a purely pragmatic, discourse-orientated story cannot fully 
account for the null subject phenomenon.  He quotes findings from Goldin-Meadow & 
Mylander (1984) which suggest that the likelihood of omission of a particular element 
cannot be predicted in terms of whether it carries old or new information.  However, he 
does suggest that the distinction between old and new information might help to explain 
the observed object/subject asymmetry.  Objects are more likely to convey ‘new’ 
information than subjects, which are more likely to convey ‘given’ information.  His 
suggestion is that ‘given’ subjects are more likely to be omitted when processing 
capacity is overloaded.  Alongside this suggestion, he also provides an alternative 
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explanation for the subject-object asymmetry, based on what he sees as a general 
linguistic bias to ‘save the heaviest for last’ (1990, p. 501).  The idea behind this 
proposal is that processing load is ‘proportional to the number of yet-to-be expanded 
nodes’ (p. 501) in the syntactic representation. It follows that sentence initial subjects 
are associated with greatest number of unexpanded nodes, and therefore impose the 
largest processing load. As a consequence, subjects should be omitted more frequently 
than objects occurring later in the sentence.  
Bloom ends by noting that his processing account is not incompatible with more 
competence-based mis-set parameter accounts.  However, he points out that a 
performance approach explains many of the data which motivated the grammatical 
accounts, and that much of the reason for positing a competence account in the first 
place is therefore lost.  He also suggests that the problems posed by competence 
accounts, such as the issue of how the grammar changes, are substantial drawbacks 
when weighed against performance accounts  
2.3.2.3  A metrical approach  
Taking a slightly different angle, LouAnn Gerken (1991) recapitulates some of the 
problems with competence-based accounts.  She goes on to assess a variety of 
performance approaches, and argues that they all fail to capture the generalization that if 
the omitted elements were overtly realised, they would tend to be weakly stressed.  Her 
alternative analysis is based on the hypothesis that children tend to ‘omit the weak 
syllables from iambic [weak-strong] feet’ (1991, p. 437).  She notes, first, that children 
are more likely to omit a weak syllable at the beginning of a word than in word-final 
position.  For example, both ‘giraffe’ and ‘monkey’ are two syllable words, but ‘giraffe’ 
has the main stress on the second syllable, whereas in ‘monkey’ the main stress comes 
first.  According to her data, it is much more likely that we will find ‘giraffe’ being 
reduced to ‘raffe’ than ‘monkey’ being reduced to ‘mon’.  Gerken claims that this same 
tendency towards deletion of weak initial syllables applies at the level of sentences as 
well as individual words, so that subjects, as weakly stressed sentence initial elements, 
are most vulnerable to omission.   
Gerken places her account firmly in the processing limitation camp, claiming that 
her metrical hypothesis ‘provides a mechanism by which some sentential elements are 
omitted when sentential complexity becomes too great’ (p. 443).  She goes on to suggest 
that the hypothesis may also provide ‘a measure of the sentence complexity itself’, since 
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objects.  Her approach would therefore seem to satisfy many of our requirements for a 
comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon. It can account for the object/subject 
asymmetry, it appears to be supported by experimental data, it accounts for at least one 
aspect of the complexity which presents problems for the child, and it offers a 
systematic mechanism for reducing the processing requirements.   
However, on closer inspection, Gerken’s account faces some problems.  Hamann 
and Plunkett (1998) point out that, although her approach works well for the English 
data, it does not hold cross-linguistically.  For example, Gerken’s explanation for the 
subject/object asymmetry is that ‘children omit weak syllables from iambic feet [(he) 
COMES] more often than from trochaic feet [HIT him]’ (Hamann & Plunkett, 1998, p. 
39).  In French, subject and object pronouns are clitics which usually occur before the 
finite verb, and object clitics may occur in iambic or trochaic feet.  On Gerken’s 
account, object clitics in trochaic feet should be omitted less often than those in iambic 
feet.  However, this is not the case, since ‘object clitics fail to occur in either trochaic or 
iambic feet’ (Hamann & Plunkett, 1998, p. 39).  Hamann and Plunkett also point out 
that Gerken’s account predicts that the sentence and word level omissions will occur at 
the same stage in development, and they present evidence from Danish showing that 
this is not necessarily the case cross-linguistically.  In sum, whilst offering a fairly 
convincing account of the English data, Gerken’s metrical account does not hold up to 
cross-linguistic scrutiny. 
2.3.3  Testing the predictions 
Both the competence and performance-based accounts make fairly robust predictions 
about what we should expect to find in the language of children in the null subject 
phase, and how their language use might pattern.  Valian, Hoeffner & Aubry (1996) test 
these predictions using data from two groups of children: one inside the MLU range 
associated with null subjects, and one outside.  Using an imitation method where the 
children were asked to repeat what the experimenter had just said, they measured a 
variety of different factors, and their findings are summarized as follows.  First, MLU 
and age were found to correlate.  Second, pronominals were imitated less often than full 
lexical subjects.  Third, sentence length was a factor in subject use for the low MLU 
group, but not for the group with high MLUs:  children in the low MLU group imitated 
subjects in short sentences more often than in long sentences.  This correlation between 
sentence length and subject omission is not expected on the competence-based accounts.  
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expletives was the same across both groups.  Again, this is not expected on the 
competence-based accounts, which predict that children outside the null subject MLU 
range should produce expletives more often than those within it.  Fifth, all children used 
some functional elements, and no link was found between production of inflection and 
production of subjects.  Finally, expletives were imitated less often than referential 
pronouns. 
Each of these conclusions supports the hypothesis that the child subject omissions 
are the result of performance factors rather than a competence deficit.  The results 
pattern more closely with a performance account where the child’s cognitive and 
processing capabilities gradually increase, than with an account where the lower MLU 
group have different grammatical competence.  The finding that expletives were 
imitated less often than referential pronouns is problematic for a purely metrical 
analysis, since they are both ‘low-stress sentence-initial syllables’ (Valian, Aubry, & 
Hoeffner, 1996, p. 161). 
The authors conclude that the two groups they studied have the same competence, 
and that even very young, very low MLU children understand that English requires 
subjects.  Like Paul Bloom, they found a correlation between subject use and both 
sentence length and VP length, and they conclude that a performance account explains 
the data more comprehensively than the grammatical accounts.  
2.3.4  Comparing approaches 
I return again to the claim made by Hyams and Wexler (1993) that performance 
accounts are unable to explain either the subject/object asymmetry found in omissions 
in child language, or the association between the end of the child null subject stage and 
the acquisition of other theoretically associated grammatical categories (e.g. inflection).   
In the previous section I outlined the findings of Valian, Aubry and Hoeffner 
(1996) which cast doubt on the validity of the second claim.  There does not seem to be 
a clear link between inflection or other functional categories and the production of 
subjects.  How, then, might a performance account deal with the objections concerning 
the subject/object asymmetry? 
As we have seen, Bloom (1990) presents possible pragmatic and processing 
explanations for the subject/object asymmetry.  He develops these arguments in his 
1993 reply to Hyams & Wexler (1993).  The asymmetry, he argues, is to be expected in 
both adults and children, given the pragmatic and processing differences between 
subjects and objects.  Not only is there a preference to ‘save the heaviest for last’, as 63 
described above, but there is also evidence that adults are more likely to hesitate at the 
beginning of an utterance, suggesting that there is an increased processing load at this 
point.  Assuming that this is the case, and that the child is therefore functioning under 
processing limitations, Bloom suggests that pragmatically redundant information is 
more likely to be omitted, and that subjects are more likely than objects to carry 
redundant information.  To support this claim, he provides evidence that subjects are 
more often pronominalised than objects, and that nonpronominal subjects are 
significantly shorter than nonpronominal objects.  These are aspects of a subject-object 
asymmetry that cannot be handled in a purely grammatical account. 
In sum, the apparent advantages of a competence account can be either dismissed 
as unfounded or carried across into a performance account.  By contrast, it remains 
unclear how the advantages of a performance account might be carried across to a 
competence account.  In particular, the omission of other elements alongside subjects 
during the null subject stage and the gradual change to adult-like production are both 
hugely problematic for grammatical competence-based accounts. 
2.4  Discourse pragmatic approaches: two types of informativeness 
2.4.1  The role of pragmatics 
In general, pragmatic accounts of child null subjects have received much less attention 
and are far less developed than their processing-focused cousins.  However, most 
processing theorists acknowledge at least some role for pragmatics.  As noted above, 
Paul Bloom (1993) suggests that, although the child’s ability to perform is affected by 
processing limitations, children ‘also have some control over what to omit’, and they 
choose to omit ‘pragmatically redundant material’ (1993, p. 726).  But he does not 
develop this suggestion much further, and the emphasis in processing accounts remains 
firmly placed on processing load as the most significant factor.  In this section, I turn to 
discourse pragmatic accounts which place the main emphasis on pragmatic rather than 
processing factors, and consider two approaches which appeal to different notions of 
‘informativeness’ in dealing with child null subjects. 
2.4.2  Informativeness 1: Greenfield & Smith (1976) 
Greenfield and Smith (1976) offer a pragmatic perspective on the null subject stage.  
They base their approach on a notion of informativeness, in what they call ‘the 64 
information-theory sense of uncertainty’ (1976, p. 184)
8, and claim that the most 
uncertain or most informative elements in the utterance content will be linguistically 
encoded, whilst less informationally rich elements are omitted
9.  In their view, an agent 
in subject position is the most obvious of the ‘situational elements that can be taken for 
granted’ (p. 108), and this is why subjects are so frequently dropped.  Their theory is 
based on a study of several children’s speech, which reveals that subjects are ‘expressed 
infrequently,’ especially in single word utterances and in sentences in which the 
children are referring to themselves.  They find, in particular, that the AGENT concept is 
only overtly expressed in contexts where there is some uncertainty about who the 
referent is: these might involve a change in agent, or a conflict between one or more 
agents.  Greenfield and Smith summarise their account as involving a ‘pragmatic 
presupposition’ that whatever the child can assume or take for granted is not overtly 
expressed.  They go on to draw parallels between the null subject stage in the child’s 
language development and what they call ’telegraphic ellipsis’ in adult conversation, 
claiming that the child in the null subject stage is acquiring the ability to combine 
linguistic and non-linguistic information.  
One problem with this account is that, although it provides a possible basis for 
choosing which items are to be omitted and which overtly expressed, it does not explain 
why such omission is necessary.  Another is that Greenfield and Smith are more 
concerned with one-word utterances in general than with subjectless sentences in 
particular.  As a result, they deal only briefly with issues such as the subject/object 
asymmetry found in child language, commenting merely that the child may ‘be 
egocentric in taking more elements of his own perspective for granted’ (1976, p. 195), 
and that we might therefore expect them to show a preference for subject omission.  
Despite these issues, Greenfield and Smith offer a new perspective on child null 
subjects.  Processing accounts provide evidence that the child is operating under 
cognitive processing limitations, but do not provide much insight into why subjects 
should be particularly vulnerable to omission in these circumstances.  Although 
Greenfield and Smith’s notion of informativeness remains rather vague, their pragmatic 
account is a first step towards offering some answers to this question.  Allen (2000) 
attempts to provide a more theoretically adequate notion of informativeness by breaking 
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informativeness.  
9 Greenfield and Smith stress that this notion of uncertainty is assessed in relation to the child 
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it down into various features, and it is to her analysis of child null subjects that I now 
turn. 
2.4.3  Informativeness 2: Allen (2000) 
2.4.3.1  Overview 
Allen (2000) starts from much the same basic hypothesis as Greenfield and Smith, 
proposing that children will ‘tend to omit arguments when the referent of the argument 
is maximally clear from the discourse and situational context’ (2000, p. 486).  However, 
she attempts to work out the hypothesis in more detail by analysing the notion of 
informativeness in terms of what she calls ‘informativeness features’.  These are 
features that have been claimed elsewhere (Clancy, 1993; 1997) to have some effect on 
the representation or omission of arguments.  Allen uses these features in analysing 
child data from the Eskimo-Aleut language Inuktitut, a language which allows ‘rampant 
argument omission’
10.  She therefore starts by raising the question of what makes 
children produce any overt arguments at all.  Her answer is that children will ‘produce 
as overt only those arguments that represent informative referents’ (2000, p. 86). 
Informativeness, as Allen describes it, is a property of the referents of 
arguments
11..  She tests eight informativeness features, divided into three groups: 
knowledge features, confusion features and search-space features.  Each feature is 
binary, and the ‘informative value’ is the one which makes the identity of the referent 
less certain.  For example, if the referent has not previously been talked about in the 
current discourse, it will be classed as ‘new’.  A ‘new’ referent requires the speaker to 
be more informative, and the specification for the binary feature ‘newness’ will be 
positive in this case.  Allen works from the hypothesis that the more ‘informative’ 
values a given referent scores, the more informative the speaker will have to be to pick 
it out successfully, and therefore the more likely it is to be explicitly articulated.  
Conversely, the more ‘uninformative’ values a referent has, the more likely it is to be 
omitted. 
Allen’s experimental work suggests that five of the eight features that she tests 
have a ‘significant effect’ (p. 515) on the likelihood that an argument will be omitted.  
She goes on to test various possible ‘thresholds’ for the number of features that would 
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have to be negatively specified in order to successfully predict that an argument will be 
overtly realised.   
2.4.3.2  The features 
Allen classifies three of her informative features as ‘knowledge features’.  Each relates 
in some way to the ‘joint knowledge of the speaker and hearer’ (2000, p. 487).  The 
ABSENCE feature has to do with whether the referent is physically present in the context 
of the exchange.  If a referent is physically absent, the value for this feature will be 
[+ABSENT], and the referent accordingly scores an ‘informative’ value for this criterion.  
NEWNESS is a second knowledge feature.  A referent is considered ‘new’, if it has not 
been mentioned in the last twenty utterances, and it is then assigned the value [+NEW].  
All first and second person referents are automatically assigned the value [-NEW].  The 
final knowledge feature, QUERY, distinguishes referents which are the ‘subject of or 
response to a question’ (p.488) from those which are not.  A referent which is not 
queried, [-QUERY], requires the speaker to be less informative than one which is under 
question.  The idea here is that [+QUERY] entities are either unidentified or newly 
identified, and so the hearer has ‘little mental knowledge’ (p. 488) of them.  Allen’s 
experimental data from child Inuktitut indicates that whilst NEWNESS and ABSENCE have 
a significant effect on the likelihood that an argument will be omitted, QUERY does not. 
As their name suggests, the three ‘confusion features’ relate to the possible 
confusion that may arise when more than one potential referent is present (physically or 
linguistically).  The CONTRAST feature is assigned a positive value when the speaker is 
making an explicit contrast with other potential referents (this is usually indicated via 
gesture or tone of voice).  If there is more than one potential referent in the physical 
context of the utterance, the DIFFERENTIATION IN CONTEXT feature will be positively 
specified.  Similarly if there is more than one potential referent in the preceding 
discourse (here defined as the last five utterances) then DIFFERENTIATION IN DISCOURSE 
is assigned a positive value.  For both the DIFFERENTIATION features, identification of 
potential referents may be facilitated by factors such as the semantics of the verb, 
markers of gender, person, number and so on.  In each case, competition for the position 
of understood referent introduces uncertainty, and therefore an informative value is 
scored.  Allen’s initial investigation of the confusion features indicates a significant 
effect on explicit argument representation for CONTRAST and DIFFERENTIATION IN 
CONTEXT, but not for DIFFERENTIATION IN DISCOURSE.  Further investigation reveals that 67 
DIFFERENTIATION IN DISCOURSE may indeed have an effect on the form of argument 
chosen, but that this is confounded by the effects of the other two confusion features. 
The final category of informativeness features deals with factors relating to the 
size of the search space involved.  Here, Allen identifies the features THIRD PERSON and 
INANIMACY.  She claims that in typical (child) discourse, there are far fewer animate 
objects than inanimate objects.  As a result, if the referent is inanimate, the search space 
will be much larger, and so an ‘informative’ value is assigned for this feature.  Allen’s 
analysis reveals that INANIMACY does not have a significant effect on the form of 
referring expression used.  In fact, her definition of this feature seems to make it no 
more than a special case of DIFFERENTIATION IN CONTEXT, since there are likely to be 
more inanimate than animate potential referents. 
According to Allen’s data analysis, the final feature, THIRD PERSON, has the most 
dramatic influence on the likelihood that an argument will be overtly realised.  This 
feature has a positive value for any third person referent, while first and second person 
referents receive a negative score.  However, Allen acknowledges that although her 
results suggest that this criterion has a significant influence on the form of the argument, 
in Inuktitut it is generally considered ungrammatical to represent a first or second 
person referent overtly.  This finding may therefore be at least partly accounted for by 
the grammar rather than by considerations of informativeness alone. 
As well as considering the informativeness features separately, Allen looks at 
their collective effect, and carries out various analyses to investigate the predictive 
power of different combinations of features.  She concludes that whilst the 
informativeness of an argument affects the likelihood that it will be expressed, and that 
a ‘model with informativeness features as predictors’ is an improvement over one 
without, the predictive ability of her model is far from comprehensive.  As she 
acknowledges, ‘not all informative arguments are represented by overt forms…and 
some uninformative arguments are represented by overt forms’ (p. 512).  She suggests 
various possible ways of accounting for this lack of consistency, including an appeal to 
extra-linguistic factors, possible hierarchical or cumulative effects and practical factors 
such as speaker mistakes, repetition or imitation. 
2.4.3.3  Informativeness and English null subjects 
Allen suggests that the conclusions she draws from her analysis of Inuktitut might carry 
over to children acquiring a non-null subject language such as English.  Shaeffer (2005) 
takes these conclusions one step further and applies the informativeness features not 68 
only to nulls in child English but also to the adult nulls found in the diary-style texts.  
Schaeffer’s hypothesis is that if more than half of the features have a negative, 
‘uninformative’ value, then the subject may be dropped
12.  She puts the difference 
between child null subjects and those found in diary-style contexts down to the 
application of what she terms the ‘Concept of Non-Shared Assumptions (CNSA)’ 
(2005, p.106).  The idea behind this proposal is that adult speakers are aware that their 
own assumptions may differ from those of their hearers, and they take this difference 
into account when constructing their utterances.  Children in the null subject phase, by 
contrast, are not so consistent in recognising such differences.  If they wrongly assume 
the hearer shares their assumptions, they may represent a referent as identifiable when it 
is not.  As a result, children ‘allow null subjects in a larger number of pragmatic 
contexts than adults do’ (2005, p. 110). 
2.4.3.4  Problems and limitations of the informativeness account 
Each of Allen’s features is defined in terms of binary values which are seen as 
corresponding directly with the properties of referents.  Each value is classed as either 
‘informative’ or ‘uninformative’.  I suggest that this is a substantial weakness in Allen’s 
approach.  On her analysis, a referent is treated as absent or present, new or old, 
differentiated or not, and these binary distinctions are used to predict the null or overt 
forms of the associated referring expressions.  In my view, an approach based on a 
continuum of cases and features would be more appropriate, and would more accurately 
reflect what goes on in speech production.  In practice, we find not only null and overt 
forms of referring expressions, but amongst the overt forms, we find a wide range of 
more or less informative forms among which the speaker must choose.  Replacing 
binary distinctions with a continuum or gradient of ‘informativeness’ would make it 
possible to incorporate the full range of referring expressions into the account.  It would 
also make it possible to make comparisons among different forms of referring 
expressions relative to the context and to each other.  Consider the NEWNESS feature.  
With a binary distinction, two potential referents in a given context may end up being 
classified as non-new.  However, one of these non-new entities may be less ‘new’ than 
the other.  For example, a child and its carer have been playing with a toy bear for half 
an hour, when a toy dog is introduced into the play.  According to Allen, the bear is a 
non-new entity, and as soon as the dog has been referred to once, it too becomes ‘non-
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new’.  As long as both have been mentioned in the last 20 utterances, then both will 
score the same ‘newness’ value.  Allen’s treatment does not make it possible to 
distinguish the bear’s status as an established entity in comparison with the fairly novel 
dog.  On her analysis, the dog’s newness is an absolute value, and is in no way relative 
to other entities in the context.   
Work by Wittek and Tomasello (2005) reveals potential problems with the use of 
binary distinctions in relation to the QUERY feature.   They investigated which referring 
expressions, including nulls, were produced by German speaking children when 
answering different types of questions, comparing specific, general and contrast 
questions, as illustrated in (19)-(21) below. 
(19)  What happened to the broom? (specific) 
(20)  What do we need to get? (general) 
(21)  Did the clown use the vacuum cleaner? 
No, the broom. (contrast) 
Their results revealed that when replying to a specific question, such as (19), the 
children overwhelmingly used pronouns or nulls, whilst for general and contrast 
questions, such as (20) or (21), the answers were ‘almost exclusively’ (2005, p.555) 
lexical nouns or noun phrases.  These results suggest that the form of the question 
significantly affects the likelihood of a null being produced, and this is not reflected in 
Allen’s binary ‘query’ feature approach.  Allen’s analysis may provide some degree of 
predictive capability, but it is very narrow in its coverage.  Ideally, an account of null 
subject usage would be integrated within a more general theory of the use of referring 
expressions, and this would require more than simple binary distinctions.   
Apart from the limitations of using binary features, there appears to be significant 
overlap between the various features preposed
13.  For example, the feature THIRD 
PERSON is problematic in that it does not doubly dissociate from each of the other 
features. Whilst it is possible that an argument which is [+THIRD PERSON] may be either 
new or non-new, absent or non-absent, the same is not the case for the negative 
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specification of the feature.  Any argument that is [-THIRD PERSON] will necessarily also 
be [–NEW], according to Allen’s definition of the NEWNESS feature.  Thus, whenever a 
referent is 1
st or 2
nd person, it will score two ‘uninformative’ marks for what is, in 
effect, the same quality.  The features are not independent. 
Similar problems arise with the other ‘search-space’ feature.  Allen’s justification 
for treating INANIMACY and THIRD PERSON as separate features relies on the respective 
numbers of animate versus non-animate entities and 1
st and 2
nd person versus non-1
st 
and 2
nd person entities.  This in turn relies on the assumption that a child is aware of the 
relative proportions of such entities present in the environment and wider context.  
Although I would not wish to dispute these assumptions outright, the more such 
assumptions have to be made, the more vulnerable the theory becomes.  This particular 
assumption also requires the child to be sensitive to the hearer’s knowledge state in 
respect of the entities to which she is referring.  Witteck and Tomasello (2005) provide 
experimental evidence that at age 2.0 years, children are ‘much less sensitive to the 
knowledge states of their interlocutor’ than is envisaged in this assumption (2005, p. 
552).  If so, then it becomes difficult to argue that the child takes the hearer’s search 
space fully into account when formulating her utterance.  Even assuming that Allen is 
correct, there is an overlap between the INANIMACY feature and the DIFFERENTIATION IN 
CONTEXT feature.  Indeed, as I mentioned in passing above, INANIMACY seems to be no 
more than a specific and predictable instance of DIFFERENTIATION IN CONTEXT.  Both 
features are defined by the need to distinguish between more than one potential referent 
in the context.  A referent that scores a positive value for the INANIMACY feature, 
should, by Allen’s own reasoning, also score a positive value for the DIFFERENTIATION 
IN CONTEXT feature.  According to Allen, inanimates require the speaker to be more 
informative because there are usually more of them to choose between than inanimate 
objects.  She claims that ‘ if the listener knows nothing about the referent except 
whether it is animate or inanimate, the identity of an inanimate referent will be much 
less certain than that of an animate referent’ (2000, p. 489).  As a result, there is more 
potential for confusion, since there are more potential referents.  This feature covers 
much the same ground as DIFFERENTIATION IN CONTEXT.  The INANIMACY feature 
simply identifies one group of entities which will be likely to have an informative value 
for the already identified differentiation features.  Including both features in a theory of 
argument representation risks treating the same contextual element as contributing to 
two separate informativeness values.  Once again, the features are not independent. 71 
Furthermore, Allen gives no indication of why these two ‘search-space’ feature 
distinctions are chosen over other potential dichotomies.  For example, it could be 
argued that in a given situation there are likely to be more non-human than human 
entities, and yet ‘human’ is not presented or tested as a possible informativeness feature. 
In sum, when considered carefully, it becomes apparent that the eight 
informativeness features overlap somewhat in their remits.  This overlap stems partly 
from the lack of a clear definition of context.  Allen’s notion of context is unclear and 
inconsistent, with the inconsistencies evident even within one feature family.  For 
instance, the two differentiation-based members of the confusion family operate over 
very specific contextual domains.  For DIFFERENTIATION IN CONTEXT, what is involved 
is the ‘immediate physical context’, even more specifically defined as the ‘portion of the 
room where the child is directing his/her eye gaze’ (p. 488).  However, when defining 
the CONTRAST criterion, one feature is used to cover anything influenced by ‘potential 
referents in the discourse or in the shared physical or mental context’ (p. 488).  No 
suggestion is made about why an individual feature is required for each aspect of the 
context in the DIFFERENTIATION cases, whilst the CONTRAST feature refers to context in 
general.  Moreover, the definition of context given for the problematic search-space 
features does away with the immediate context altogether, and is instead based on levels 
of usage in ‘child discourse’.  So it seems that Allen’s notion of context fluctuates with 
the various features, and lacks any constant or concrete definition. 
2.4.4  A move towards relevance 
The informativeness analyses put forward by Allen and Shaeffer seem to have a certain 
degree of descriptive value and, as Allen argues, as predictive models they are a 
significant improvement on preceding accounts.  The fact that omissions are optional 
even when licit may help to explain the lower than expected level of predictive success 
in the informativeness model.  It is noticeable that Allen’s model was much more 
successful at predicting which arguments would be null than with predicting which 
arguments would be overt.  It is possible that some of these overt arguments could 
legitimately have been left unarticulated, but that for some reason the speaker chose not 
to omit them.  This optionality factor (in the cases we are considering, it is never 
ungrammatical to replace a null with an overt form – although the converse is not the 
case) is missing from Allen’s account and is not directly addressed by Shaeffer.  
However, in her final discussion of the data, Allen hints at what I feel could be an 
important step in moving the work forward.  She acknowledges that a discourse-72 
pragmatic account such as her informativeness approach could be ‘complementary to 
processing accounts’ (p. 515).   
The competence-based approaches discussed above have nothing to say about the 
other omitted elements of child language, and they are unable to account for the gradual 
change in subject realisation as the child develops.  As noted above, their reliance on the 
notion of a mis-set parameter is also conceptually problematic.  The processing 
accounts, by contrast, offer some insight into why omissions occur, but are rather vague 
when it comes to explaining why subjects (and other elements) should be particularly 
vulnerable.  The discourse-pragmatic analyses discussed in this section offer a richer 
analysis of some of the factors affecting omission, but fail to explain why omissions 
should occur in the first place.  In the next section, I give a brief overview of relevance 
theory, and argue that it offers a theoretically well-developed framework in which 
processing and discourse-pragmatic factors can be combined to produce a more 
comprehensive and finer-grained account. 
2.5  Relevance Theory 
2.5.1  An overview of relevance theory 
Relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95; Blakemore, 1992; Carston, 2002a; 
Wilson & Sperber, 2004) offers a cognitive approach to utterance interpretation based 
on two main principles.  The first, or cognitive, principle of relevance deals with 
cognition in general and states that human cognition tends to be geared towards the 
maximisation of relevance.  The second, or communicative, principle of relevance deals 
specifically with communication, and is formulated as in (22). 
(22)  Communicative principle of relevance: 
Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own 
optimal relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 260). 
Utterances, as acts of ostensive communication, fall under this principle.  The heart of 
the relevance-theoretic approach to pragmatics thus lies in the definitions of relevance 
and optimal relevance.   
Sperber and Wilson define relevance as dependent on two separate factors: 
cognitive effects and processing effort.  At any one time, an individual will hold a set of 73 
existing assumptions about the world, from which a subset will be drawn to act as 
context for the processing of utterances or other inputs to cognitive processes.  
Cognitive effects result when an input interacts with these contextual assumptions in 
one of three ways: it may (a) strengthen an existing assumption, (b) contradict and 
eliminate an existing assumption or (c) combine with an existing assumption to yield 
contextual implications (conclusions derivable from input and context together, but 
from neither alone).  To illustrate, consider the following examples.  Susan is a tennis 
enthusiast.  The week before the Wimbledon tournament begins, she decides the 
following: 
(23)  If the sun is shining on Monday I will go to the tournament. 
Susan waits in anticipation and wakes up early on Monday morning.  As she looks out 
of the window she sees that: 
(24)  The sun is shining. 
The new information in (24) combines with Susan’s existing assumption in (23) to yield 
the conclusion or contextual implication in (25). 
(25)  I will go to the tournament. 
Other things being equal, the more contextual implications are derivable from a given 
input to cognitive processes, the more relevant that input will be. 
As the tournament progresses, Susan is lucky enough to be given a ticket to the 
men’s final.  She believes that the tennis player Murray is on good form and so she 
holds the assumption in (26) with a fair degree of confidence. 
(26)  I will see Murray play in the final. 
A few days into the tournament, Susan opens the newspaper and sees the headline in 
(26). 
(27)  Murray breezes past opponents in first two rounds. 74 
The new information in (27) strengthens her assumption in (26), and achieves relevance 
thereby.  However, two days later she sees the headline in (28). 
(28)  Murray knocked out in straight sets. 
In this case, the new information contradicts Susan’s assumption in (26) and removes 
her confidence in it entirely. Other things being equal, the more assumptions are 
strengthened or eliminated by processing a new input, the more relevant it will be.  Thus 
we see how new information can interact with existing assumptions to result in the three 
types of cognitive effects, and achieve relevance thereby. Other things being equal, the 
greater the cognitive effects achieved, the more relevant the input will be. 
The other factor in Sperber and Wilson’s definition of relevance is processing 
effort.  When cognitive effects are derived by processing an input, in a context of 
existing assumptions, some mental effort is expended.  Other things being equal, the 
less effort required to derive a given set of cognitive effects, the greater the relevance of 
the input.  Thus, when Peter asks Mary what time the train leaves, it would be more 
relevant for her to answer with (29) than with (30). 
(29)  At 5 o’clock. 
(30)  At 5 o’clock and Paris is the capital of France. 
In processing the longer utterance in (30), Peter will use more effort, and if the 
information that Paris is the capital of France contributes no further effects, the overall 
relevance of Mary’s utterance will be reduced.  The level of effort required to process 
an utterance may be affected by a range of linguistic and non-linguistic factors, 
including amount of linguistic material, logical complexity of the utterance, frequency 
or recency of use of linguistic constructions or conceptual representations, and the size 
and accessibility of the context.  More generally, other things being equal, the less 
mental effort a hearer is required to expend when processing an input to cognitive 
processes, the more relevant that input will be.  Thus, cognitive effects and processing 
effort combine to produce a level of relevance for each potential input that is 
comparable with the effects and efforts required for other potential inputs.  According to 
the cognitive principle of relevance, the human cognitive system tends to maximise 
relevance by automatically allocating attention and processing resources to those inputs 75 
with the greatest expected relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, pp. 118-132; Wilson 
& Sperber, 2004; Carston, 2002a, pp. 44-47). 
However, according to Sperber and Wilson, the addressee is not entitled to expect 
that the speaker, in producing an utterance or ostensive stimulus, has aimed at maximal 
relevance, and that the utterance will therefore provide the maximum effects for the 
minimum effort, as compared with other possible utterances.  Rather, as stated in the 
communicative principle of relevance, the hearer is entitled to presume that any 
utterance addressed to him will be optimally relevant, and to interpret it accordingly.  
This presumption of optimal relevance is itself part of what is communicated by an 
utterance, and Sperber and Wilson (1986/95, p. 270) define it as follows: 
(31)  Presumption of optimal relevance (revised) 
a. The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee’s 
effort to process it. 
b. The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the 
communicator’s abilities and preferences. 
This presumption in turn motivates the following comprehension procedure which, 
according to Sperber and Wilson (2002), is automatically used in interpreting an 
utterance (or other ostensive stimulus). 
(32)  The Relevance Theoretic Comprehension Procedure: 
a. Follow a path of least effort in deriving cognitive effects: test interpretive 
hypothesis (reference assignments, disambiguations, implicatures etc) in order of 
accessibility. 
b.  Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied. 
A consequence of the procedure is that the first accessible interpretation which makes 
the utterance relevant in the expected way is the one that the hearer should select.  
According to Sperber and Wilson (2002), the relevance-theoretic comprehension 
procedure is the central component of a comprehension module which automatically 76 
constructs an interpretation for any utterance (or other ostensive stimulus) addressed to 
one.
14 
2.5.2  Relevance and child nulls 
I have argued that neither existing competence accounts nor existing processing or 
pragmatics accounts can fully deal with the phenomenon of null subjects in child 
language.  Each seems to tell some of the story, but none provides an adequate analysis 
of the full range of data.  In this section, I will argue that we gain more insight into the 
issue if we break it down into two separate but related questions: first, why does the 
child’s speech frequently involve omissions, and second, how does the child ‘select’ the 
items to omit?  Processing accounts tend to focus on the first of these questions, whilst 
pragmatic accounts attempt to answer the second.  I will argue that by adopting the 
framework of relevance theory, we will be in a position to answer both questions.  In 
later chapters, I will apply the same principles to the adult null subjects in diary-style 
registers. 
According to the communicative principle of relevance, when a child in the null 
subject phase produces an utterance, she communicates, as part of her meaning, that her 
utterance is optimally relevant. The hearer is therefore entitled to assume that it is at 
least relevant enough to be worth processing, and that it has been formulated – to the 
extent that this is compatible with the speaker’s abilities and preferences – so as to 
produce as many cognitive effects as possible, for the lowest possible cost in processing 
effort.  
This definition of optimal relevance suggests answers to both of the questions 
raised above.  In particular, it allows us to integrate into a single account the processing 
constraints which encourage the child to omit some surface element or other and the 
pragmatic constraints which help to determine which element she will omit.  
Relevance theory provides at least two points at which to incorporate processing 
considerations into an account of the data.  In the first place, processing constraints on 
production are covered by the reference to the speaker’s ‘abilities’ in the second clause 
of the definition of optimal relevance.  In the second place, the role of processing effort 
in comprehension is covered by the claim that to be optimally relevant, an utterance 
must be at least relevant enough to be worth the hearer’s processing effort, and that it 
has been formulated so as to yield the greatest effects, for the smallest effort, compatible 
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with the speaker’s abilities and preferences.  I will start by considering the role of 
processing constraints on production.  
The child’s linguistic abilities and performance skills are not yet fully developed, 
and the child producing an utterance must try to communicate within these limitations.  
As we have seen, Paul Bloom and Lois Bloom provide evidence for some kind of 
cognitive or processing limitation in the child speaker, as a result of which sentence 
length or structural complexity may trigger an overload of the processing systems, 
leading to some surface constituent(s) giving way and being omitted.  Olson’s (1973) 
work on memory span and cognitive development suggests a further possible factor in 
the child’s need to reduce surface form.  
On this approach, the child omits surface linguistic elements to simplify the 
utterance and bring it within the range of her productive abilities.  The extent to which 
subjects are dropped varies across children and from situation to situation, and 
relevance theory suggests an explanation for this.  Just like adults, children are affected 
in their ability to express themselves by the state of their emotions, their physical 
condition and the circumstances in which they are speaking.  They are also undergoing 
the process of acquiring a language, learning other new things about the world and 
developing many other skills as they grow.  Relevance theory does not entail any 
particular account of the child’s productive processing abilities, or choose between the 
competing accounts outlined above, but it does suggest two points that may be worth 
bearing in mind in developing a fuller account.  
First, it predicts that the child subject-drop phenomenon makes things easier for 
the speaker rather than the hearer.  From the point of view of an adult hearer, it makes 
the utterance less stylistically acceptable, and must be condoned on the grounds that the 
child is unable to do better, rather than seen as making a positive contribution to overall 
relevance.  Second, the different productive processing constraints discussed in 
performance accounts may lend themselves to comparative treatment.  Some surface 
forms may require more productive processing effort than others, and we may be able to 
assess how much overall effort would be saved by the omission of individual 
constituents.  A speaker who is forced to omit some surface linguistic element because 
of productive processing constraints should omit enough elements to bring the utterance 
within the range of her productive abilities, while minimising the risk of 
misunderstanding to the extent that she is able.  In considering which elements will 
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into account, and I will now turn to this and the second question: how does the child 
‘select’ the items to omit?  
The presumption of optimal relevance again suggests an answer. A child aiming at 
optimal relevance, but forced to omit some surface element, should omit those elements 
whose omission is least likely to detract from overall relevance.  Of course, this 
suggestion raises many more questions. What is it that makes the omission of some 
surface elements detract less from overall relevance than others?  Why are subjects and 
certain other categories consistently omitted, whilst other elements are retained?  
According to the relevance theoretic account, the general answer must be that a surface 
element can be omitted if its content is easily inferred (causing minimal additional 
processing effort) at minimal risk to overall understanding.  Typically, such elements 
will be ‘given’ rather than ‘new’, ‘topic’ rather than ‘focus’, ‘theme’ rather than 
‘rheme’.  Thus, a relevance-theoretic account should be able to incorporate the results of 
discourse-pragmatic accounts which appeal to these notions. 
As we have seen, the existing data seem to lend themselves to treatments which 
deal with tendencies rather than absolutes.  Rule-based approaches face the problem that 
there are exceptions to each of their proposed rules.  However, relevance theory allows 
us to dispense with many such rules and instead consider the data from the perspective 
of effort versus effect.  As well as causing the speaker a certain amount of productive 
processing effort, an utterance will demand a certain amount of processing effort from 
the hearer.  In return for this, it should yield an adequate range of cognitive effects. 
Ideally, a speaker who is forced to omit some element of the utterance because of 
productive processing constraints should omit those elements which (a) bring the 
utterance within the range of her productive abilities and (b) allow the hearer to infer 
her intended meaning with a minimal expenditure of extra processing effort and 
minimal risk to overall understanding.  Thus, a full account of the child subject-drop 
phenomenon will need to consider both speaker’s and hearer’s processing effort.  On 
this approach, it is therefore necessary to consider what factors contribute to both 
speaker’s and hearer’s processing effort, as well as to hearer’s cognitive effects.  It is at 
this point that I return to the findings from the existing accounts.  
Existing accounts suggest that a number of factors contribute to both effects and 
effort.  We have seen how negation, unfamiliar vocabulary, sentential, VP and subject 
length, metrical complexity and rightward complexity in an utterance increase the 
speaker’s processing effort and appear to make omissions more likely.  However, a 
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its content would be extremely hard for the hearer to infer, and the risk of 
misunderstanding would be correspondingly great. From the hearer’s perspective, the 
most easily dispensable surface elements would be those he is expecting to find anyway, 
which would therefore be particularly easy to infer.  Factors such as a lack of stress, the 
rate of previous mention, given versus new information and topic status, which are 
appealed to in existing discourse-pragmatic accounts, are associated with constituents 
whose content is easily inferable.  The more such factors are present, the more 
vulnerable to omission the elements are likely to be.  Thus, relevance theory provides a 
general framework in which both processing and pragmatic factors can be analysed in 
terms of their contribution to overall relevance. 
2.5.3  Relevance instead of Informativeness 
Bearing in mind this relevance theory approach to the child null subject data, I want to 
return briefly to Allen’s experimental work on child Inuktitut (2000).  Her analysis of 
the data suggests that at least five of her eight informativeness features (NEW, ABSENCE, 
CONTRAST, DIFFERENTIATION IN CONTEXT AND THIRD PERSON) have a significant 
influence on the form of an argument.  However, I have argued that Allen’s feature 
definitions are problematic in several ways.  I now want to suggest that we can explain 
Allen’s effects without running into the same problems, by reinterpreting her features in 
relevance theory terms.   
A subject (or other sentential element) is vulnerable to omission when its content 
is easily inferred.  According to the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure, 
hearers test interpretations in order of accessibility.  We might therefore expect subjects 
to be more vulnerable to omission when the intended referent is the most accessible one 
in the discourse context (or is judged by the speaker to be so), and has no potential 
competitors
 .
15  When this is the case, the hearer will test this interpretation first, and 
because of the lack of competitors, the risk of misunderstanding will be minimised.  
With this in mind, I suggest that Allen’s informativeness features should be viewed as a 
(non-exhaustive) list of factors which are likely to correlate with the accessibility of a 
referent in a given discourse context.
16  Recall that on Allen’s approach, a negative 
specification for a feature contributes to the argument’s overall informativeness and 
therefore makes it more likely to be overtly expressed.  This follows from Greenfield 
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and Smith’s pragmatic principle: ‘omit uninformative arguments’.  How, then, might 
these features be reinterpreted in relevance theory terms? 
According to Allen’s analysis, two of her knowledge features have a significant 
effect on whether or not an argument is explicitly articulated: NEW and ABSENCE.  
Assuming that hearers test interpretations in order of accessibility
17, we would expect 
non-new and non-absent referents to be more accessible than potential referents which 
are new or absent.  Thus, we would predict that null subjects are more likely when the 
referent is non-new and non-absent.  An advantage of this approach is that potential 
referents are assessed for accessibility relative to one another and to the discourse 
context, rather than against a binary criterion defined in somewhat arbitrary terms (e.g. 
by counting preceding utterances), as in Allen’s account.  Given two candidate referents 
which would both count as NEW according to Allen’s feature definition, relevance 
theory allows us to treat one as more NEW, and therefore perhaps less accessible, than 
the other
18.  This relative approach to accessibility is appropriate if we take seriously the 
idea that the hearer will test interpretations in order of accessibility.  How accessible a 
potential referent is at a given point will fluctuate as the discourse progresses and the 
linguistic and physical context change.  A similar story can be told for the ‘confusion’ 
features, including both of the DIFFERENTIATION features.  If there are competing 
potential referents in either the linguistic or the physical context, then the speaker will 
need to use a more explicit form of referring expression in order to distinguish between 
them, and thus minimise the risk of misunderstanding.  If two potential referents are 
competitors, omitting the referential expression entirely is likely to lead to confusion 
and therefore risk putting the hearer to gratuitous effort.   
The final significant confusion feature is CONTRAST.  By definition, an entity that 
scores positively for the feature CONTRAST is not going to be the single most accessible 
potential referent in the context and so, once again, the risk of misunderstanding is 
increased.  As Allen points out, the fact that there is a contrast is often explicitly 
signalled via tone of voice or gesture, and an explicit signal of this sort will have to be 
realised on an overt subject.   In these cases, although the intended referent is in contrast 
with a competing candidate referent, it is explicitly indicated by the speaker, and so 
becomes highly accessible for the hearer. 
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Finally, consider Allen’s ‘search-space’ features.  As discussed above, INANIMACY 
was not found to be significant and could in any case be reinterpreted as a special case 
of DIFFERENTIAL IN CONTEXT.  By contrast, THIRD PERSON was shown to have a 
significant effect.  I have argued that Allen’s definition of this feature seems to overlap 
with that of the feature NEW.  However, even if we disregard this problem, we might 
expect first and second person referents (i.e. the child and her interlocutor) to be highly 
accessible during a discourse.  Both are, by definition, actively involved in the discourse 
and should therefore be highly salient in the discourse context.  If this is the case, then 
they will be highly accessible and the speaker is more likely to be able to pick them out 
successfully by use of a null form. 
Thus, there is a sense in which all of Allen’s factors might be seen as ‘search-
space’ factors.  A hearer is testing interpretations in order of accessibility, and the 
speaker is constructing her utterance with this in mind.  Each of the informativeness 
features singles out a factor that is likely to affect the accessibility of a referent.  It is not 
the features themselves that are significant, but the effect they are likely to have on the 
overall accessibility of the intended referent.  The higher the ‘informative’ score for an 
intended referent, the more unlikely it is that it will be the most accessible entity in the 
discourse context.  The information carried by the subject may provide important clues 
to the speaker’s intended referent, and so leaving the subject null is more likely to affect 
overall relevance.  As a result, the chance that the subject will be fully articulated is, 
therefore, increased.   
To sum up, we might view Allen’s informativeness features as indicating the 
degree to which a certain referent is likely to be accessible in a given context.  When it 
is not highly accessible, the speaker will, if possible, tend to avoid the use of nulls in 
order to provide the information necessary to constrain the search space so that the most 
accessible referent is the intended one.  This is not to say that Allen’s list of informative 
features is in any way exhaustive (I discuss further factors in 5.3.2) but merely that we 
can explain her experimental results within the relevance theory framework appealing to 
the notion of accessibility. 
2.5.4  Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have considered various approaches to the phenomenon of child null 
subjects in non-pro-drop languages.  Neither the competence, processing or pragmatic 
accounts surveyed can fully explain the data.  However, I propose that an analysis 
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a more comprehensive and explanatory account, and I suggest that adopting the 
framework of relevance theory allows us to do just that. 
During the null subject stage the child is operating under processing limitations 
which have an impact on her abilities.  As a result, she produces an utterance which is 
the most relevant one compatible with her abilities, and the elements which are 
articulated will be those least likely to affect the overall relevance of the utterance.  
Thus, the null subject phenomenon is a result of the speaker aiming for optimal 
relevance while constrained by processing limitations, and as such should fit into a 
relevance theoretic account of the use of referring expressions in general.  I have argued 
that the accessibility of the intended referent in the discourse context interacts with the 
abilities of the speaker (most significantly in this case, the processing limitations of the 
child speaker) to make certain elements of an utterance vulnerable to omission.  In the 
next chapter, I consider how we might characterise what it means to be accessible, and 
how this might fit into a more general theory of the use of referring expressions.  In 
chapters 4 and 5, I develop my approach to referring expressions, and in chapter 7, I 
return to the issue of child null subjects in the light of my relevance theory account of 
null subjects in chapter 6.83 
Chapter 3:  Referring and Accessibility 
3.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapter I argued that in child language, processing constraints can result 
in the omission of certain elements from the surface form of the utterance, and that the 
items which are most vulnerable to omission are those which contribute least to the 
overall relevance of the utterance.  Since relevance is a function of cognitive effects and 
processing effort, the accessibility to the hearer of the intended referent (and hence of 
the intended interpretation) is a crucial factor for the speaker constructing an utterance.  
From this perspective, null subjects are simply one in a range of possible means by 
which a speaker can achieve reference.  With this in mind, I will devote this chapter to 
some existing pragmatically-orientated accounts of referring expressions.  In particular, 
I consider two accounts which focus on the relation between the form of a referring 
expression and the accessibility or givenness of the intended referent, by Mira Ariel 
(1990; 1994; 2001), and by Jeanette Gundel and her colleagues (Gundel, Hedberg, & 
Zacharski, 1993; Gundel & Mulkern, 1998; Gundel, 2003). 
3.2   Contextual accounts 
Existing pragmatically-orientated analyses of referring expressions investigate links 
between the form of a referring expression used and the nature of the context from 
which the hearer is to identify the referent.  Clark and Marshall (1981) treat context as 
involving ‘mutual knowledge’ between speaker and hearer.  Mutual knowledge, as 
defined by Schiffer (1972), is an infinitely regressive form of shared knowledge in 
which speaker and hearer must not only share certain assumptions, but know that they 
share them, and know that they know that they share them, and so on ad infinitum
1.   
According to Clark and Marshall, mutual knowledge of a certain assumption may be 
established via three routes: membership in a community which shares this assumption, 
co-presence in a physical environment which provides evidence for it, or co-presence in 
a linguistic environment which provides evidence for it, and the context for utterance 
comprehension is drawn from such knowledge.  Clark and Marshall’s central claim is 
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that each of these types of mutual knowledge is associated with a certain type of definite 
reference: 
Deixis corresponds to physical copresence; anaphora corresponds to 
linguistic copresence; and proper names correspond to community 
membership (Clark & Marshall, 1981, p. 42). 
Mira Ariel classifies the associated forms of referring expressions as ‘Linguistic 
Givenness Markers, Physical Givenness Markers, and Knowledge Givenness Markers’ 
respectively (Ariel, 1990, p. 6, see also Ariel 1985).   
Approaches of this type rely on what Ariel terms ‘geographic context-form 
correlations’, where the form of referring expression used is directly tied to the context 
type to which it points.  Whilst such accounts seem to make correct predictions in many 
cases, Ariel (1990) argues that ‘we cannot establish a one-to-one correspondence 
between form and function according to the context-type’ (1990, p. 7).  To illustrate, she 
discusses the ‘stringent requirements’ that Clark and Marshall (1981, p. 44) treat as 
applying to the use of pronouns which in their view require the linguistic co-presence of 
the intended referent.  Ariel (1990, p. 8) provides examples showing that, while this 
may often be the case, pronouns may, in fact, relate to any of the three context types: 
(1)  a.  Encyclopaedic Knowledge: 
Sherlock Holmes to Watson:  The butler did it (the murder, eliminating 
incriminating evidence, etc) 
b.  Physical Context (drinks have been poured out). 
Sherlock Holmes to Watson:  The butler did it (the pouring of the drinks). 
c.  Linguistic Context:  
What a cruel murder.  The butler did it (the murder, not the eliminating of 
incriminating evidence). 
In (1c) the pronoun ‘it’ is interpreted as co-referential with the ‘cruel murder’ 
already mentioned in the linguistic context.  In (1a) this linguistic context is 85 
missing and the pronoun is identified via the hearer’s encyclopaedic knowledge.  
The referent of the pronoun in (1b), uttered after drinks have been poured, is 
identified via the physical context and is taken to be the act of pouring drinks.  
The fact that this range of interpretations is possible suggests that analyses based 
purely on ‘geographic’ context-form correlations will be unable to account for the 
full range of data.  Ariel concludes that ‘any theory that attempts to simply 
correlate between linguistic markers of Givenness and context-types cannot be 
maintained’ (1990, p. 10).   
Taking this position as her starting point, Ariel goes on to develop an account of 
referring expressions which she calls Accessibility theory
2.  Accessibility theory moves 
away from the idea that choice of referring expression is driven by context type, and 
instead proposes that referring forms encode information about the Accessibility of the 
intended referent, which is therefore not just a matter of pragmatics, but ‘forms part of 
the grammar of natural languages’ (1990, p. 100).  In the next section I provide an 
overview of Ariel’s theory, and outline some associated implications and problems. 
3.3  Accessibility theory 
3.3.1  Overview of Accessibility theory 
Accessibility theory (Ariel, 1985; 1988; 1990; 1991; 1994; 2001) provides an account 
of referential choice and interpretation in which the degree of Accessibility of the 
mental representation of the intended referent is marked in the grammar.  In this view, 
all referring expressions are seen as broadly anaphoric: as Ariel puts it, Accessibility 
theory does ‘away with the referential-anaphoric distinction’ (1990, p. 7).  When a 
speaker uses a referring expression, she is signalling to her hearer how accessible she 
believes the mental representation of the intended referent (the antecedent) to be for that 
hearer in that particular context.  Referring expressions are therefore viewed as markers 
which function by ‘cueing the addressee on how to retrieve the appropriate mental 
representation in terms of degree of mental accessibility’ (Ariel 2001, p. 31). 
According to Ariel, Accessibility is the ‘determining principle which accounts for 
the choice of referential forms’ (1988, p. 69); she defines it as a complex ‘graded 
psychological notion’ (1994, p. 37) which results from the interaction of several 
different factors.  Properties of both the mental representation of the referent itself and 
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the relationship between the anaphor and the antecedent contribute to the overall degree 
of Accessibility, and therefore to the choice of referring expression (Ariel 2001).  
Broadly speaking, these properties fall into four categories: saliency (i.e. whether the 
referent is salient  or not, ‘mainly whether it is a topic or non-topic’), competition (i.e. 
‘the relative saliency of an entity when compared with other potential referents’), 
distance (i.e. the distance between the antecedent and the anaphor) and unity (i.e. 
whether the antecedent is within ‘the same frame/world/point of view/segment or 
paragraph as the anaphor’) (Ariel, 1990, pp. 28-29).  Of these, the first two relate to the 
representation of the intended referent, and the latter two to the relationship between the 
referent and its antecedent.  On this account, the status of the antecedent as a global 
topic, local topic or non-topic will affect its salience, and hence its Accessibility, as will 
the number of representations competing for the role of antecedent.  Similarly, degree of 
Accessibility will be affected by the distance between the anaphor and its antecedent, 
and by any coherence relations that may exist between the two.   
Memory plays a crucial role in determining how Accessible a mental 
representation will be, and Ariel adopts a Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) model 
of memory (McClelland, 1994).  This model allows for ‘indefinitely many distinctions 
in degree of activation’ (Ariel 1990, p.15), which in turn allows indefinitely many 
degrees of Accessibility.  Degree of activation in memory is a crucial factor in how 
easily the intended mental representations will be retrieved.  According to Accessibility 
theory, referring expressions act as ‘price tags’ (1990, p.16) indicating to the hearer how 
much processing effort he should expect to expend on retrieving the intended 
representation.   
3.3.2  A scale of Accessibility 
Accessibility theory treats referring expressions as ‘guidelines for retrievals’ (1988, 
p.68), which signal to the hearer how Accessible he should expect the intended referent 
to be.  Although Ariel moves away from a geographic notion of context, she formulates 
her theory in relation to the same three context types: general knowledge, physical 
environment and linguistic material.  Whereas in previous approaches referring 
expression types were seen as directly associated with one of the three context types, 
Ariel treats referring expressions as encoding different levels of Accessibility, which are 
in turn related to different context types.  Information in the immediately preceding 
linguistic discourse has the highest level of Accessibility, and will be quickly and easily 
available to the hearer.  Information drawn from the physical environment is associated 87 
with mid-level Accessibility, and finally, general knowledge shared between the speaker 
and hearer is associated with low levels of Accessibility.  Thus, the context types form a 
hierarchy, and the association between context type and referring expression proposed 
by the ‘geographic’ accounts is seen as ‘an adequate description of unmarked usage in 
initial retrievals’ (1990, p.69).  However, by introducing the concept of Accessibility, 
Ariel claims she can also account for marked and non-initial uses.  As shown by the 
examples in (1) above, the link between context type and referring expression does not 
necessarily hold in all cases.  Still, Ariel claims that ‘the very same graduation of 
marking is maintained’ in all cases (1990, p.71).  The relative degree of Accessibility 
signalled by the different referring forms stays constant across uses, and from this Ariel 
derives her Accessibility marking scale.  It should be noted that although Ariel often 
talks of referring expressions as markers of low, mid or high accessibility, this is an 
acknowledged simplification of a much more complex and fine-grained Accessibility 
scale. 
 
Full name + modifier  Low Accessibility 
Full (‘namy’) name  ↓ 
Long definite description   
Short definite description  ↓ 
Last name   
First name  ↓ 
Distal demonstrative + modifier   
Proximal demonstrative + modifier  ↓ 
Distal demonstrative (+NP)   
Proximal demonstrative (+NP)  ↓ 
Stressed pronoun +_ gesture   
Stressed pronoun  ↓ 
Unstressed pronoun   
Cliticized pronoun  ↓ 
Extremely High Accessibility Markers   High Accessibility 
Table 1: Accessibility Marking Scale (English) (Ariel 1990, p.73) 88 
Ariel’s formulation of Accessibility is intended as both universal and language specific.  
Whilst the claim that referring expressions are hierarchically ordered markers of relative 
Accessibility is considered a universal, each language is seen as making the association 
between Accessibility and its particular inventory of referring expressions in its own 
way.  The Accessibility scale for English is given in Table 1.  Thus, according to 
Accessibility theory, when speakers of English use an unstressed pronoun, they are 
signalling that the intended antecedent should be highly Accessible to the hearer.  If, 
however, they choose to use a long definite description, they would be signalling that 
the hearer should be retrieving a referent with relatively low Accessibility. 
The fact that the scale is both universal and also language specific is seen as 
falling out naturally from Ariel’s next important claim regarding Accessibility.  
According to the theory, while the degree of Accessibility is conventionally encoded as 
part of the meaning of the referring expression, the correlation between Accessibility 
and the associated form is not arbitrary.  Rather, it is driven by the interaction of three 
factors: the informativity of the referring expression (i.e. the amount of lexical 
information it carries), its rigidity (i.e. how close it is to ‘pointing to one entity 
unequivocally in a potentially ambiguous context’) and its attenuation (i.e. its 
phonological size).  Ariel sees informativity as the most important of these factors, and 
claims that the ‘more informative, the more rigid and the least attenuated the form, the 
lower Accessibility it marks’ (1991, p. 449).  In her view, the combination of these three 
criteria can largely motivate the scale in table 1.  Stressed and unstressed pronouns, for 
example, are distinguished by degree of attenuation.  Although a stressed pronoun 
encodes the same semantic information as an unstressed pronoun, it is a less attenuated 
form, and is therefore associated with lower Accessibility.  Whilst the interaction of the 
three factors is designed to demonstrate how the relation between form and 
Accessibility is not entirely arbitrary, Ariel acknowledges that for some of the 
distinctions. a certain amount of arbitrariness is inevitable.  For example, the difference 
between the distal demonstrative ‘that’ and the proximal demonstrative ‘this’ cannot be 
accounted for via Ariel’s three factors alone.  Both terms are equally rigid, equally 
attenuated and, according to Ariel, equally informative.  She therefore treats the relative 
positions of ‘this’ and ‘that’ on the English scale as reflecting an arbitrary, language-
specific distinction.
3  
 
                                                
3 In the next chapter I will discuss how this observation forms an important part of Ariel’s justification 
for Accessibility theory, and how relevance theory might offer a different perspective on the data. 89 
3.3.3  Accessibility theory and relevance theory 
Ariel positions Accessibility theory firmly within the relevance theory pragmatic 
framework, and claims that neither Accessibility theory nor relevance theory alone can 
fully account for the use and interpretation of referring expressions.  Accessibility 
theory is presented as ‘a very helpful facilitating device’ (1990, p. 182) which functions 
as a ‘useful tool serving Relevance assessments’ (1990, p. 86).  The principles of 
relevance are needed to ‘select among equally accessible potential referring 
expressions’ (2001, p. 38), and so Accessibility theory on its own is insufficient.  
According to Ariel, the converse is also true, and relevance theory ‘cannot account for 
the distribution of referring expressions without the mediation of Accessibility theory’ 
(1990, p. 84).  She briefly acknowledges the possibility that her three defining criteria 
(informativity, attenuation and rigidity) could potentially be ‘replaced by a Relevance 
theory account, possibly rendering Accessibility theory redundant’ (1990, p. 82).  
However, she argues that certain pairs of referring expression forms are 
‘indistinguishable as to the amount of information they impart’, and that as a 
consequence ‘the accounts given by Relevance and Minimization
4 are at a lost to 
explain why the more costly version is ever used’ (1990, p. 85).   
According to Ariel, relevance theory, with its twin factors of effort and effects, is 
unable to distinguish between definite descriptions and their corresponding 
demonstratives, as in (2)-(3), between distal and proximal demonstratives, as in (3)-(4), 
or between stressed and unstressed pronouns, as in (5)-(6).  
(2)  The plane flew everyday from Miami to New York. 
(3)  This plane flew everyday from Miami to New York. 
(4)  That plane flew everyday from Miami to New York. 
(5)  Janei kissed Maryj and then shei kissed Harry. 
(6)  Janei kissed Maryj and then SHEj kissed Harry. 
                                                
4 The Minimization principle (Levinson, 1998) is a general ‘least effort’ strategy which drives the 
speaker to produce the shortest possible form of an utterance. 90 
Accessibility theory, on the other hand, can motivate the differing interpretations by 
claiming that ‘conventionalised Accessibility markings exist’.  Discussing this proposal, 
Reboul (1997), suggests that Ariel’s argument rests entirely on the premise that, in each 
of these pairs, both forms convey exactly the same information (apart from 
Accessibility information).  If we accept this premise, then (in Reboul’s view) Ariel’s 
conclusion would indeed follow, and a strong case would be made for some form of 
Accessibility marking.   
However, Reboul points out that by accepting this premise, we are committing 
ourselves to the view that, for example, (7) and (8) convey exactly the same 
information. 
(7)  This cat is hungry. 
(8)  That cat is hungry. 
For Ariel’s argument to hold, the only difference in the information conveyed by (7) 
and (8) must be about the Accessibility of the intended antecedent.  But as Reboul 
points out, this does not seem to be the case: the demonstrative determiners encode 
information about ‘the relative distance between the speaker and the object designated’, 
and she argues that this spatial information ‘cannot be equated with Accessibility’ 
(Reboul 1997, p.11).
5  If this is the case, then, contrary to Ariel’s claim, the forms in (7) 
and (8) can be distinguished in terms of the information they convey, and relevance 
theory may have something to say about their distribution.  Although this argument 
does not entirely rule out the possibility that referring expressions are conventionalised 
markers of Accessibility in the way that Ariel suggests, if we can account for their 
distribution without appealing to the extra machinery of an Accessibility scale, then 
such an account should be preferred.  In the next chapter, I reconsider Ariel’s arguments 
against the possibility of a relevance-only account of referring expressions, and argue 
that by treating referring expressions as encoding procedural meaning that is not itself 
analysable in terms of Accessibility, we can do away with Accessibility theory entirely. 
 
 
 
                                                
5 In the next chapter I look more closely at how this information might be characterised. 91 
3.3.4  Problems and limitations 
Apart from questioning the assumptions on which Ariel builds her argument for the 
introduction of Accessibility theory, Reboul (1997) discusses some further problems 
with the Accessibility approach. 
As noted above, Ariel treats all referring expressions as broadly anaphoric, 
claiming that ‘in all cases an addressee looks for antecedents which are themselves 
mental representations’ (1990, p. 6).  As a result she overlooks the fact that they ‘can 
indeed refer and do so fairly frequently’ (Reboul 1997, p. 10).  This leaves her with 
little to say about cases where, for example, demonstratives are used to refer to 
something in the physical context which the hearer has not yet noticed, and it also raises 
questions about how her account might deal with indefinites.  Reboul concludes that 
Ariel’s notion of Accessibility is ‘simple and monolithic’ (1997, p.17), and she develops 
this point by looking more closely at the data which Ariel uses to support her theory.  
Although Ariel describes Accessibility as a function of four factors (saliency, 
competition, distance and unity), her empirical analysis is based on only one of these: 
distance between antecedent and anaphor in a text.  Furthermore, her examples are 
drawn from a corpus that contains only single-speaker, written sources, such as 
newspaper articles and short stories.  Reboul questions whether Ariel would have got 
similar results if she had included transcripts of spoken discourse in her sample.  She 
concludes that ultimately what is missing from Ariel’s account of referring expressions 
is reference itself. 
Finally, both Ariel and Reboul seem to have overlooked a major factor which 
distinguishes different types of referring expression, and which is available to relevance 
theory: the amount of effort required to process these expressions.  On the assumption 
that stressed pronouns require more effort to process than unstressed pronouns (Sperber 
& Wilson, 1986/95, pp. 202-217; Wilson & Wharton, 2006), we have a means to 
distinguish utterances (5) and (6) (‘Jane kissed Mary and then she/SHE kissed Harry’).  
Similarly, the higher frequency of use of ‘the’ compared with ‘this’ or ‘that’
6 should 
mean that it requires less effort to process, and so provides a means to distinguish 
between examples (2) and (3) (‘The/this plane flew everyday from Miami to New 
York’).  Processing effort will play a crucial role in my relevance-based account of 
these examples, and also in my analysis of diary-style null subjects. 
                                                
6 A search of the British National Corpus returns 6055159 instances of ‘the’, compared with 1119443 
instances of ‘that’ and only ‘457821’ instances of ‘this’.  The contrast is more striking, given that the 
search did not exclude non-demonstrative uses of ‘that’ (e.g. introduction of a relative clause). 92 
3.3.5  Special uses and special problems 
3.3.5.1  Special uses 
Accessibility theory treats the level of Accessibility encoded by a referring expression 
as correlating with the Accessibility of the intended referent in a given discourse 
context.  However, Ariel concedes that this relation is not always simple, and she 
acknowledges that there are examples which ‘on the face of it seem to pose counter-
examples to Accessibility theory’ (1990, p.198).  On some occasions, a speaker will 
appear to ignore the Accessibility of the intended referent, and choose a referring 
expression which marks a higher or lower level of Accessibility than is associated with 
the intended referent at that point in the discourse.  According to Ariel, such uses 
‘encourage an addressee to derive specific additional contextual implications’ (1990, p 
199), and she defines three categories of such uses.   
First, there are cases which Ariel terms ‘insincere’, where the speaker treats a 
‘non-accessible entity as if it were accessible’ (Ariel, 1990, p. 199)
7.  Consider the 
contrast between the distal demonstrative and the definite description in (9) and (10) 
respectively. 
(9)  That holiday we spent in Cyprus was really something, wasn’t it? 
(10)  The holiday we spent in Cyprus was really something, wasn’t it? 
According to Ariel, the sense of ‘here and now’ associated with the use of the 
demonstrative in (9) creates a vividness effect.  The speaker ‘makes an appeal to some 
shared experience, attempting to bring the past to life’ (1990, p. 199).   
Second, the speaker may use a referring expression which marks low accessibility 
when the intended referent is highly accessible in the discourse context.  To illustrate, 
consider examples such as (11), where a definite description is used when a pronoun 
would have been acceptable. 
(11)  When John came home this afternoon, the son of a bitch broke all the windows. 
                                                
7 It is not clear what Ariel means by ‘non-accessible’ here, or how example (9) would work at all if the 
intended referent were ‘non-accessible’.  It is also not clear why Ariel distinguishes between cases where 
non-accessible entity is treated as accessible, and cases where the speaker ignores the low accessibility of 
an entity and refers to it using a relatively higher marker.  In my view these would seem to be slightly 
different versions of the same strategy. 93 
(Ariel, 1990, p. 202) 
According to Ariel, such uses are ‘aimed at focusing on some particular aspect of the 
referent’ (1990, p. 201). 
Finally, there are cases where the referring expression used is associated with a 
higher level of Accessibility than might perhaps be expected.  According to Ariel, use of 
high accessibility markers such as pronouns can result in an ‘empathy effect’.  She goes 
on to propose that the Accessibility scale is also a scale of empathy, and that high 
accessibility forms imply a level of closeness or intimacy.   
Alongside these cases, there are also occasions where the use of a high 
Accessibility marker is ‘unjustified’.  Ariel claims that such uses carry negative 
connotations.  She illustrates this with a discussion of what she terms ‘conventional 
Accessibility raising devices’ (1990, p. 204).  For example, a proper name may be 
prefaced with a demonstrative determiner, as in (12). 
(12)  This Henry Kissinger really is something! 
In Ariel’s view, this has the effect of ‘cancelling the familiarity assumption associated 
with names’ (1990, p. 205).  When this is unjustified - in other words, when the referent 
cannot reasonably be assumed to be unfamiliar - a negative, derogatory effect is 
generated. 
3.3.5.2  Special problems 
Ariel’s discussion of the special uses of referring expressions is on the whole rather 
vague.  However, she touches on something that I will explore further in the next 
chapter: the idea that referring expressions may contribute more to what is 
communicated by an utterance than just a referent.  I will consider examples of the type 
discussed by Ariel, and argue that they do indeed contribute to the derivation of 
implicatures.  However, Ariel’s treatment of these examples raises some problematic 
issues about her proposal to analyse referring expressions as Accessibility markers, and 
about the role they play in reference resolution.   
The special effects outlined by Ariel are the result of a departure from the normal 
correspondence between the Accessibility marker and the representation of the intended 
referent.  It follows, therefore, that, in these cases, the hearer must make a crucial 
decision when processing the referring expression.  In some cases, the intended 94 
interpretation will be derived if the hearer proceeds normally, and takes the expressions 
as providing ‘no more than guidelines for retrievals’ (Ariel 1988, p.68).  In others, he 
must override these guidelines, and retrieve some alternative effect instead.  It is unclear 
how the hearer decides which strategy to follow.  Although Ariel refers to acceptable 
and unacceptable uses of Accessibility markers, she gives only one hint as to when the 
speaker might judge a use unacceptable: this is when ‘the local context make(s) it 
manifest that the unusual referring expression to some extent follows from it’ (1990, p 
201).  However, she gives no further details on how the context would guide the hearer 
in this way, and it remains unclear how the hearer is to judge that a referring expression 
is to be treated as unusual in some cases, and when he should take it as purely and 
simply a signpost to the intended referent.   
Once the hearer has decided that extra effects are intended, he may still face 
potential problems. According to Ariel, use of a higher than expected Accessibility 
marker may lead to empathy effects, or it may produce negative connotations.  Ariel 
claims that the interpretation depends on whether the use is ‘unjustified ‘or not.  
However, she gives little indication of how the hearer should judge a use as 
unjustifiable, except to say that it happens ‘when a speaker cannot plausibly be assumed 
to be unfamiliar with the referent (1990, p. 207).  So, whilst on the one hand Ariel is 
arguing for a treatment of referring expressions as ‘guidelines for retrievals’, on the 
other hand, her account relies on the hearer already knowing how accessible the 
intended referent is: otherwise, he will be unable to decide on the correct interpretation 
of the expression.  But if the hearer needs to know how accessible the referent is in 
order to interpret the referring expression, then the level of accessibility does not need 
to be signalled. 
In the next chapter, I will argue that these problems can be overcome by 
developing an analysis of referring expressions which is fully integrated into the 
relevance theory pragmatic framework.  On this account, rather than having to decide 
whether a particular use is appropriate or justified, the hearer simply follows the 
relevance theoretic comprehension procedure, and tests interpretations in order of 
accessibility until his expectations of relevance are met. 
 
 
3.4  Gundel and colleagues: The Givenness hierarchy 
3.4.1  Overview 95 
Like Ariel, Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (1993), (henceforth GHZ), attempt to 
explain why speakers choose certain referring expressions in certain discourse contexts, 
and how hearers identify the intended referent from those expressions.  Whereas Ariel 
claims that levels of Accessibility are encoded as part of the conventional meaning of 
referring expressions, GHZ base their approach on the cognitive status (involving 
‘information about location in memory and attention state’ (1993, p. 274)) of the 
intended referent.  They propose that different forms of referring expressions ‘signal 
different cognitive statuses...thereby enabling the addressee to restrict the set of 
potential referents’ (1993, pp. 274-5), and they identify six cognitive statuses which 
form a Givenness hierarchy, reproduced here in Table 2. 
 
In focus     
> 
Activated         
> 
Familiar    
> 
Uniquely 
identifiable 
> 
Referential  
 > 
Type 
identifiable 
{it} 
this 
that       
this N  
{that N}  {the N} 
{indefinite 
this N} 
{a N} 
Table 2: The Givenness Hierarchy (Gundel et al 1993, p. 275) 
 
Each cognitive status is associated with a different form or forms of referring 
expression, and the table shows the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
appropriate use of those forms.  For a referent to satisfy the condition of being ‘type 
identifiable’ the hearer need only be able to access a representation of the type of object 
involved.  An intended referent will count as‘referential’ if the hearer is able to retrieve 
an existing representation of that referent, or construct a new representation of it.  If the 
hearer is able to ‘identify the speaker’s intended referent on the basis of the nominal 
alone’, then it is said to be ‘uniquely identifiable’.  Continuing up the scale, if the 
intended referent is represented in the hearer’s memory then it is said to be ‘familiar’, 
and if it is ‘represented in current short-term memory’, then it is ‘activated’.  The 
‘activated’ status is necessary and sufficient for the use of the bare demonstratives ‘this’ 
and ‘that’ and the proximal complex demonstrative ‘this N’.  Finally, an intended 
referent which is not only in current short-term memory, but is also the current centre of 
attention is said to ‘in focus’ (1993, p. 276-230).   
On the surface, this approach seems very similar to Ariel’s.  According to GHZ, 
however, it is the nature of the relationship between the various statuses on the 96 
hierarchy that makes their approach different.  These cognitive statuses are in a one-way 
implicational relationship, so that satisfaction of the conditions for a particular status 
entails satisfaction of the conditions for all the statuses further down the scale.  Thus, if 
an intended referent is ‘activated’, then it is by definition also ‘familiar’, ‘uniquely 
identifiable’, ‘referential’ and ‘type identifiable’.  By contrast, satisfying the conditions 
for being ‘activated’ does not entail that the referent also satisfies the conditions for 
being ‘in focus’, and so on. 
It follows from this approach that a form associated with a relatively low 
cognitive status may be used to refer to an intended referent which satisfies the 
conditions for a higher status.  Consider (13), taken from Gundel et al (1993, p. 296). 
(13)  Dr Smith told me that exercise helps.  Since I heard it from A DOCTOR, I’m 
inclined to believe it. 
At the point where the phrase ‘A DOCTOR’ is processed, the doctor in question is 
represented in current short-term memory, and is arguably the current centre of 
attention.  So, at the very least, the conditions for the ‘activated’ status are met, and it 
might also be claimed that the referent is ‘in focus’.  However, according to GHZ, use 
of the indefinite article is perfectly acceptable in this example, even though it is 
associated in the Givenness hierarchy with ‘type identifiable entities’.  This is because, 
as noted above, the speaker intending to refer to an ‘activated’ referent may choose a 
form associated with ‘activated’ or with any status below ‘activated’ on the scale.  By 
comparison, consider the conditions that would need to be satisfied for (14) to be 
uttered appropriately. 
(14)  That dog next door kept me awake last night. 
The use of the term ‘that dog’ indicates that the referent is at least ‘familiar’.  According 
to GHZ, this means that the addressee has a representation of that particular dog in long-
term memory.  If (14) were to be uttered in a discourse context where the hearer does 
not know that the speaker’s neighbours have a dog, then GHZ’s account predicts that 
the utterance will, at the very least, seem odd.  In such a discourse context, the referent 
would fail to satisfy the necessary conditions for a ‘familiar’ entity, and replacing ‘that 
dog’ with the referring form ‘the dog’ from one step down the scale feels much more 
appropriate. 97 
The Givenness hierarchy, like Accessibility theory, is claimed to be both universal 
and language specific.  According to a survey carried out by GHZ, cross-linguistic 
application of the approach reveals that the six identified statuses are sufficient, 
although not always necessary, for describing referring expression use in the languages 
included in the study.  English was the only language in the group which required the 
status ‘referential’, and Japanese, Russian and Chinese were found only to require four 
of the remaining five statuses.  This cross-linguistic survey also revealed that the 
correlation between linguistic form and cognitive status was not arbitrary: the forms at 
the top of the scale, and therefore associated with ‘in focus’ entities, tended to have the 
least phonetic content in all the languages studied. 
In sum, the Givenness hierarchy makes predictions about the ‘highest’ form of 
referring expression that may be used to pick out a particular entity in a given discourse 
context.  In many cases, this will leave the speaker with several choices of referring 
expression.  Theoretically, whenever an entity is ‘in focus’, the speaker has the full 
range of referring expressions to choose from, since conditions for all these statuses will 
automatically have been satisfied.  Conversely, when a hearer processes an indefinite 
description, he could, in theory, take it to apply to anything that satisfies the nominal 
part of the description:  
‘a dog’...is appropriate only if the addressee can be assumed to know the 
meaning of the word ‘dog’ and can therefore understand what type of thing 
the phrase ‘a dog’ describes (1993, p. 276). 
Despite this apparent flexibility, GHZ argue that the choice between possible referring 
expressions is not random.  They propose that an interaction between the Givenness 
hierarchy and Grice’s conversational maxims (Grice, 1975; 1989) can explain why any 
particular form is selected on any given occasion.  In this way, they claim to be able to 
fully account for the distribution of referring expressions in language use.  
3.4.2  The Givenness hierarchy and Grice 
As noted above, the implicational nature of the Givenness hierarchy means that there 
will often in principle be several choices of referring expression available to the 
speaker.  If an entity is in focus, it can be picked out by using any of the referring 
expression types.  Similarly, any potential referent could be picked out by use of an 
indefinite article.  Sitting at the bottom of the scale, and requiring only that the hearer 
can identify what type of thing is being referred to, indefinite articles should be 98 
available in all instances.  However, GHZ’s survey of the distribution of referring 
expression forms confirms that the choice between the various available forms is not 
random, and that certain clear patterns emerge.  For example, although theoretically 
available in all instances, indefinites tend to occur only when the referent is, at most, 
‘referential’.  Similarly, whilst ‘in focus’ entities may be referred to using any type of 
expression, discourse analysis reveals that they are usually picked out using forms 
associated with the more restrictive cognitive statuses.  GHZ argue that these patterns 
result from interaction between the Givenness hierarchy and Grice’s maxims of 
quantity, given here in (15). 
(15)  a.   Make your contribution as informative as required. 
b.  Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. (Grice, 
1989, p. 26). 
Since each cognitive status on the Givenness hierarchy entails the statuses below it, as 
we move up the hierarchy the cognitive statuses become more restrictive, and there will 
be fewer and fewer entities in a discourse context that satisfy the necessary conditions.  
Thus, the referring expressions associated with statuses higher up the scale can be said 
to be more informative, since they narrow the set of potential referents further.  It 
follows from Grice’s first quantity maxim (Q1), given in (15a), that when linguistic 
terms form a scale of this sort, use of a particular term generally implicates that 
conditions for the use of higher terms are not met.   
Scalar implicatures of this sort arise and have been much discussed in the Gricean 
pragmatic literature (Levinson, 1983; 2000, Horn, 1984; Carston, 1997; Noveck & 
Sperber, 2007; Geurts, 2010).  Examples (16) and (17) illustrate the implicature 
standardly associated with the <some, all> scale. 
(16)  Some of my friends are softballers. 
(17)  All of my friends are softballers. 
Utterance (17) is more informative than (16).  According to Q1, if the speaker is in a 
position to use the more informative version, then she should do so.  As a result, if a 
speaker utters the less informative (16), she implicates that (as far as she knows) (17) 99 
does not pertain.  The hearer is then entitled to infer that not all of the speaker’s friends 
are softballers.  Crucially, this is not is a logical entailment of (16), since it can be 
cancelled without contradiction, as in (18).   
(18)  Some of my friends are softballers, in fact, all of them are! 
According to GHZ, similar effects arise with the Givenness hierarchy, and some of the 
distributional facts described above can be explained by appeal to Grice’s first quantity 
maxim.  Thus, use of an indefinite article typically implicates that the referent is not 
uniquely identifiable.  Gundel and Mulkern (1998, p. 25) discuss the following example 
(19), which I have abbreviated for reasons of space. 
(19)  From Minneapolis to Mankato I was sitting next to a black woman. 
According to the Givenness hierarchy, the indefinite article in (19) signals that the 
referent is at least type identifiable. The speaker should therefore expect at least to be 
able to access a representation of the type of entity under discussion: in this case ‘a 
black woman’.  Furthermore, via Q1, (19) conversationally implicates that the intended 
referent is not uniquely identifiable.  The hearer should therefore not expect to be able 
to assign a unique representation to the woman. 
The statistical correlation found in GHZ’s survey between ‘in focus’ referents and 
use of stressed pronouns and zeros is also predicted by the interaction between the 
Givenness scale and Q1.  If an entity is in focus, then the most informative way to refer 
to it is by using a form which restricts the set of potential referents accordingly.  This 
leads GHZ to argue that instances of what they call focus shift can be explained via the 
Givenness hierarchy.  Consider the example in (20) (Gundel, Hedberg, & Zacharski, 
1993, p. 298). 
(20)  ...going on back from the kitchen then is a little hallway leading to a window, 
and across from the kitchen is a big walk-through closet.  On the other side of 
that is another little hallway... 
At the point when the demonstrative ‘that’ is uttered, both ‘the kitchen’ and the ‘closet’ 
are activated.  However, only ‘the kitchen’ is in focus.  According to GHZ, 
‘demonstratives not only don’t require the referent to be in focus, but often implicate 100 
that the referent is not currently in focus’ (1993, p. 299).  As a result, the hearer is 
guided to a referent which is activated but not in focus.  If we replace ‘that’ with ‘it’, 
then ‘the kitchen’ is the only possible referent, since it is the only ‘in focus’ entity. 
However, GHZ also point out that use of a particular form associated with a 
certain cognitive status doesn’t always implicate that conditions for higher statuses are 
not met.  They demonstrate this by comparing definite descriptions with complex 
demonstratives.  Not only does use of a definite determiner not implicate that a 
demonstrative determiner would not have been appropriate, but when conditions for 
both statuses are met, the lower form is used in the majority of cases.  GHZ argue that 
this is due to the influence of second quantity maxim (Q2) (‘Do not make your 
contribution more information than is required’).  Definite noun phrases - unlike 
pronouns - contain descriptive material, which, according to GHZ, is often enough by 
itself to identify the intended referent.  As a result, explicit signalling of a more 
restrictive cognitive status would be superfluous, and a speaker complying with Q2 
should avoid it.  They go on to claim that ‘since most references which are uniquely 
identifiable in a discourse are also at least familiar, explicitly signalling a status higher 
than uniquely identifiable would be more informative than required’ (1993, p. 300). 
3.4.3  Limitations of a Gricean analysis 
Whilst interaction between the Givenness Hierarchy and Grice’s maxims of quantity 
may go some way towards explaining the selection and interpretation of referring 
expressions, I want to suggest that this approach is limited in its explanatory power, and 
overlooks certain important properties of referring expressions and the contribution they 
make to overall utterance interpretation. 
Reconsider (13) (‘...since I heard it from a doctor, I’m inclined to believe it’).  
GHZ appeal to this example to illustrate their claim that use of a relatively low form 
does not necessarily implicate that conditions for higher forms are not met.  Whereas 
use of the expression ‘a black woman’ in (19) is seen as implicating that the speaker 
does not know the woman in question
8, non-identifiability is not part of the encoded 
meaning of an indefinite descriptions.  Thus, for instance, the indefinite noun phrase ‘a 
doctor’ in (13) does not entail that the doctor in question is not uniquely identifiable, 
familiar and so on.  According to GHZ, since what is relevant in this utterance is the 
                                                
8 I will go on to argue that in such examples lack of knowledge is only one possible explanation for the 
speaker’s under-informativeness.  It may be the case that the speaker knows, but does not wish to 
disclose, further information , or it may be that she simply does not judge the extra information as likely 
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property of being a doctor, rather than the identity of the doctor, an indefinite 
description is acceptable.  I believe that with this observation they are touching on an 
important point.  Consider the alternative utterance in (21). 
(21)  Dr Smith told me that exercise helps.  Since I heard it from him, I’m inclined to 
believe it. 
It might be argued that ‘a doctor’ in (13) and ‘him’ in (21) are used to pick out the same 
person, namely Dr Smith.  However, the two utterances clearly communicate very 
different overall meanings.  As GHZ point out, in (13), the speaker suggests that she 
believes Dr Smith because he is a doctor.  In (21), however, she suggests that she 
believes him because of the particular person he is.  Since (21) is acceptable, we know 
that the referent is ‘in focus’, and hence, according to the entailment relations of the 
Givenness scale, any referring expression type lower on the scale should also be 
acceptable.  However, whilst both versions are acceptable, they convey different overall 
meanings.  The Givenness scale gives us no way of explaining why this should be.  
According to the GHZ analysis, utterance (13) will not carry Q1 implicatures because it 
is the property of being a doctor rather than the identity of the doctor that is relevant.  I 
suggest that the fact that the hearer is being encouraged to consider the property of 
being a doctor as relevant is itself an important part of what is communicated by (13).  
According to relevance theory, overall utterance interpretation involves 
constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the contextual assumptions the hearer is 
expected to use.  In order to understand the clause ‘Since I heard it from a doctor’ in 
(13) as explaining why the speaker believes that exercise helps, the hearer must 
construct a hypothesis about the intended contextual assumptions.  For utterances (13) 
and (21), the beliefs attributed to the speaker, and used as contextual assumption will be 
along the lines of (22) and (23), respectively. 
(22)  All doctors give good advice. 
(23)  Dr Smith gives good advice. 
Since assumption (23) is a special case of (22), utterance (13) provides an explanation 
for the speaker’s decision to believe Dr Smith, whilst also communicating that she trusts 
doctors in general.  However, (23) does not entail (22).  Although it too provides an 102 
adequate explanation, it would be perfectly possible for the speaker to trust Dr Smith, 
but to have no opinion about the trustworthiness of doctors in general.  Hence, (13) and 
(21) are qualitatively different in what they communicate.  GHZ overlook this point.  
They fail to explain how the speaker of (13) conveys (22), whilst relying on it to explain 
the absence of a Q1 implicature in this case. 
As this example illustrates, GHZ claim that, whilst the Givenness hierarchy may 
interact with Grice’s Q1 and Q2 maxims to yield quantity implicatures, such 
implicatures do not necessarily arise in all cases.  In their view, Q2 implicatures 
frequently arise when definite descriptions are used to refer to an entity that is 
‘familiar’.  Although definite descriptions signal that the entity need only be ‘uniquely 
identifiable’, GHZ’s analysis relies on the assumption that ‘most references which are 
uniquely identifiable in a discourse are also at least familiar’ (1993, p. 300).  Using the 
‘familiar’ form, ‘that N’, would therefore be more informative than is required.  
However, if the difference between ‘uniquely identifiable’ and ‘familiar’ so often fails 
to be exploited, then there appears to be little justification for positing two different 
levels on the hierarchy in the first place.  Indeed, GHZ’s definitions of these two levels 
are similar: in both cases the intended referent may be identified via a representation of 
it in the hearer’s memory.  In addition, ‘uniquely identifiable’ entities may be identified 
by the ‘descriptive content...encoded in the nominal itself’ (Gundel, Hedberg, & 
Zacharski, 1993, p. 277).  It follows from the Givenness hierarchy that when something 
is familiar, it is also uniquely identifiable.  According to GHZ, the nature of uniquely 
identifiable entities means that they are also usually familiar.  Thus, the two statuses 
overlap considerably and it becomes unclear how or why the two levels should be 
distinguished at all.   
Furthermore, if, as GHZ claim, Q1 implicatures do not arise automatically in all 
cases, and Q2 implicatures may arise when certain forms are used in certain contexts, 
then we need some explanation for how a hearer judges when it is appropriate to derive 
an implicature and when it is not.  It seems that by appealing to Grice’s maxims, the 
Givenness account tacitly acknowledges that its own treatment of the cognitive 
processes underlying the speaker’s choice of referring expression does not go far 
enough. 
Apart from these problems the Givenness/Gricean account is also fairly limited in 
its explanatory power.  The only inferences allowed under the GHZ (1993) account are 
those relating to cognitive statuses, and therefore to reference resolution.  I will argue in 
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a wide range of other inferential effects, and that these cannot be explained by appeal to 
cognitive status alone.  
3.4.4  The Givenness hierarchy and relevance theory 
As noted above, the GHZ framework as originally presented in 1993 relies on 
interaction between the Givenness hierarchy and Grice’s maxims of quantity.  I have 
argued that this account leaves many questions unanswered about how hearers 
recognise which implicatures to derive and when.  In later work, Gundel and Mulkern 
(1998) demonstrate that the GHZ account also falls short of explaining the full range of 
data and judgements.  For example, according to the Givenness hierarchy, the use of the 
definite article ‘the’ signals that the referent should be at least uniquely identifiable.  In 
discourse, however, the definite article tends to be used for entities that are represented 
in short term memory, and are therefore at least ‘activated’.  Consider (24), from 
Gundel and Mulkern (1998, p. 29). 
(24)  I closed the bedroom door.  Later, I noticed that the door was open. 
In (24), the definite description ‘the door’ is most naturally interpreted as referring to 
the previously mentioned bedroom door.  Whilst this door is indeed uniquely 
identifiable, it is only one of many doors that are likely to be uniquely identifiable to the 
hearer.  The GHZ framework has no obvious way of explaining why the previously 
mentioned door should be selected in preference to any other uniquely identifiable door.  
What is needed, they conclude, is some explanation of how the intended interpretation 
is chosen from all those with the appropriate cognitive status.  Here, they turn to 
relevance theory and find that it offers an explanation of how this might take place: 
...in processing an utterance an addressee will assign the most easily 
accessible interpretation that provides adequate contextual effects.   This 
theory would therefore predict that in determining the intended 
interpretation of a referring expression, the addressee would choose the 
interpretation from the most accessible context, as long as this is consistent 
with the meaning directly encoded in the form itself (Gundel & Mulkern 
1998, p.32). 
An explanation along these lines might seem to open up the possibility that relevance 
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appeal to the notions used in the Givenness hierarchy, and in later chapters, I will argue 
that it does.  However, like Ariel, Gundel and Mulkern argue that relevance theory on 
its own is inadequate to deal with the full range of data, since in their view, it has 
‘nothing to say about differences in the way particular forms (e.g., ‘a’, ‘the’, ‘this’, 
‘that’, ‘it’) constrain possible interpretations of referring expressions’ (1998, p. 33).   
Consider the referring expressions in (25) and (26), and the associated 
judgements.  
(25)  A restudy of pareiasaurs reveals that these primitive reptiles are the nearest 
relatives of turtles. 
(26)  ??A restudy of pareiasaurs reveals that the primitive reptiles are the nearest 
relatives of turtles. 
Gundel and Mulkern (1998) and Gundel (2003) discuss these examples, and argue that 
the Givenness hierarchy explains the data in a way not available to a relevance only 
approach.  In (26), the definite description ‘the primitive reptiles’ is judged 
unacceptable on a reading where ‘primitive reptiles’ is coreferential with ‘pareiasaurs’, 
whilst the corresponding complex demonstrative in (25) is judged acceptable.  What 
makes (26) unacceptable in their view is that the most accessible interpretation of the 
definite description ‘the primitive reptiles’ is a group of primitive reptiles that is not co-
referential with (although it may include) the pareiasaurs.  In (25) and (26), the definite 
description and complex demonstrative forms are seen as carrying the same semantic 
information which, according to Gundel, ‘constrains possible interpretations to 
primitive reptiles, but...provides no information about which primitive reptiles are 
intended’ (Gundel 2003, p. 6).  The key to understanding the differences in acceptability 
and interpretation must therefore lie with the determiner.  According to the Givenness 
hierarchy, the demonstrative ‘these’ signals that the referent is at least ‘activated’ in the 
hearer’s cognitive environment.  Gundel and Mulkern claim that the complex 
demonstrative in (25) is acceptable because there is only one potential referent which 
satisfies the ‘activated’ criterion (namely the set of pareiasaurs).   
By contrast, the definite article ‘the’ in (26) signals that the referent should be at 
least ‘uniquely identifiable’.  This cognitive status is lower down the scale of 
Givenness, and is therefore less restrictive.  As a result, there will be more potential 
referents which satisfy this requirement.  According to Gundel, there might well be 105 
other groups of primitive reptiles, including the group of all primitive reptiles, which 
satisfy the condition of being uniquely identifiable.  The referring expression in (26) 
should therefore be more difficult for the hearer to resolve, and, if anything, will lead to 
a different interpretation.   
According to the Givenness hierarchy a referring expression signals that the 
intended referent meets the necessary and sufficient conditions for a particular cognitive 
status.  This restricts potential referents to just those that meet these conditions.  Gundel 
and Mulkern (1998) then introduce the idea that considerations of relevance drive the 
choice between these referents.  According to this modified analysis, neither the 
Givenness hierarchy nor relevance theory can fully account for the data without 
appealing to the other.  In the next chapter, I will consider this claim in more detail, and 
argue that this is not correct.  I will argue that relevance theory, supplemented by 
semantic information which makes no appeal to notions of either Givenness or 
Accessibility, can account for the full range of reference cases, and so there is no need 
to introduce theory-external scales or hierarchies. 
3.5  Against a scalar analysis: the case of names 
The Accessibility and Givenness accounts both depend on the assumption that referring 
expressions form a hierarchy or scale.  Whether they define the points on the scale as 
representing a level of Accessibility or a cognitive status, they share the idea that 
referring expressions encode this information, and signal it to the hearer as a guide to 
reference resolution.  In this section, I present some objections to such scalar accounts, 
and suggest instead that the appropriateness of a referring expression varies with the 
discourse context in which it is used.  Discourse context, I will argue, affects the 
felicitous use of a referring expression much more than its place on a hierarchy or scale.  
The data I discuss will also raise the issue of how considerations of style might 
influence the use of referring expressions.  I will return to this point in much more detail 
in chapters 4 to 7. 
Ariel presents the Accessibility scale in 3.3.2 as a language-specific manifestation 
of universal principles, which is affected by the informativity, attenuation and rigidity of 
referring expressions in English.  As a result of language-specific factors, the scale may 
vary in particular details from language to language.  For example, if a language does 
not use zero forms, the accessibility scale will reflect this, and will differ from the scale 
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In this section, I use the case of proper names in English to argue that a scalar 
approach is inadequate to account for the data.  Leaving aside any cross-linguistic 
differences, the accessibility level associated with the use of names does not remain 
constant even within a single language.  Names occupy four places on Ariel’s 
Accessibility scale for English (Table 1).  ‘Full name + modifier’ sits at the very bottom 
of the scale, closely followed by ‘full (‘namy’) name’.  Moving up the scale, and 
skipping over long and short definite descriptions, we find ‘last name’, followed by 
‘first name’.  According to this scale, then, use of a last name signals that the referent is 
less accessible to the hearer than if a first name had been used.  According to Ariel, ‘last 
names are less ambiguous than first names’ (1990, p. 81), and first names are ‘not such 
good disambiguating tools.  Hence they must refer to relatively highly accessible 
entities’ (1990, p. 40).  At first sight these claims seem quite plausible.  Certainly, for 
the kind of academic works and newspapers from which Ariel draws much of her data, 
they are likely to hold.  However, I will argue that this is not always the case, and that 
the appropriate form will vary not only with the accessibility of the referent, but also 
with the specifics of the discourse context, including social conventions about the use of 
proper names.  By ‘discourse context’, I mean the set of assumptions (‘thoughts treated 
by the individual as representations of the real world’ (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 
2)) accessible in the cognitive environment of the communicator and audience.  Bearing 
this in mind, I will conclude that Ariel’s claim that there is an ‘association of specific 
forms with specific levels of Accessibility’, and that ‘degree of Accessibility dictates 
formal choices’ (1990, pp. 75-76) is too strong. 
Consider the referring expressions in (27)-(30), listed in order of Accessibility 
from lowest to highest, as indicated on Ariel’s scale. 
(27)  The pop singer, Kylie Minogue. 
(28)  Kylie Minogue. 
(29)  Minogue. 
(30)  Kylie. 
Accessibility theory predicts that (27) should be used when the referent is of very low 
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accessibility form in (30).  Now, consider (31) and (32) as headlines on the cover of a 
magazine. 
(31)  Minogue has new boyfriend. 
(32)  Kylie has new boyfriend. 
Assuming that a headline of this sort is taken as a discourse-initial utterance, and that 
the set of potential referents includes all the celebrities and public figures within the 
remit of the magazine’s interest group, we might expect the lower Accessibility marker 
(i.e. ‘Minogue’ to be preferred, since, as Ariel, claims, ‘last names are less ambiguous 
than first names’.  On this account, (31) should be the preferred headline.  However, this 
prediction is not necessarily correct, and I suggest that there are at least two reasons for 
this.   
First, in the given discourse context (based on the world of celebrity gossip), there 
are two candidate referents with the last name ‘Minogue’, but only one with the first 
name ‘Kylie’.  In this discourse context, therefore, it is simply not the case that a last 
name is less ‘ambiguous’ than a first name.  In an alternative discourse context, the 
situation may be reversed.  If, for example, there are two or more girls with the first 
name Kylie in the same school class, an utterance of (32) might well fail to pick out a 
unique referent, and the speaker would have to use a different form.  It is therefore not 
possible to make generalisations about the pragmatic appropriateness of a referring form 
based on Ariel’s notion of Accessibility alone.  Rather, the choice of an appropriate 
referring expression must be made relative to a discourse context, and is driven not only 
by the form of the referring expression itself, but also by properties (e.g. rarity of use of 
the name, number of competing potential referents) of the specific expression which 
vary depending on the discourse context in which it is used.  This type of interaction 
between discourse context and the level of accessibility associated with a referring 
expression is not provided for within Accessibility theory. 
Secondly, stylistic or social factors seem to play an important role in the choice of 
referring expression.  Again, this is something not explicitly allowed for in Ariel’s 
framework.  In certain circumstances, for instance, it seems to be socially appropriate to 
pick out a referent by their last name only (e.g. in academic citation, court reporting  or 
political commentary), whilst in others it would seem odd (e.g. in a discussion amongst 
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formality of the register, this is not always so.  Soccer fans discussing a game, for 
instance, may be likely to refer to the players by their surname only, despite the 
informality of the conversation.   
We can see how the need to distinguish between potential referents might interact 
with stylistic or social conventions in examples (33) and (34).   
(33)  Williams is my favourite tennis player. 
(34)  Venus is my favourite tennis player. 
Although tennis players are, by convention, most often referred to by their last names, 
in the case of two successful tennis-playing sisters, this strategy is likely to lead to 
confusion.  In a discussion of sportsmen and women, the utterance in (33) is unlikely to 
enable the hearer to assign reference to a unique individual.  However, the relative rarity 
of ‘Venus’ as a first name, specifically within a discourse context involving knowledge 
of famous tennis players, means that an utterance of (34) will be likely to be felicitous.  
What this suggests is that each use of a referring expression in discourse depends not 
only on the location of the referring expression on a scale or hierarchy, but on 
interaction between the specific referring expression used and the discourse context in 
which it is uttered. 
By categorising referring expressions by type, and failing to consider their 
appropriateness relative to the discourse context in which they are used, Accessibility 
theory leaves itself unable to account for differing uses of different instances of the 
same referring expression type.  It cannot explain why it is inappropriate to refer to 
people by their first name in some discourse contexts and by their last name in others.  
Just as (31) (‘Minogue has new boyfriend’) would be inappropriate in an informal style 
of publication, so (35) would be inappropriate in an academic journal, no matter how 
accessible the mental representation of Noam Chomsky might be. 
(35)  Noam now writes more often on politics than on linguistics. 
Such examples suggest that treating Accessibility marking as part of the ‘inherent 
definition’ of a referring expression may be too strong.  The resulting treatment does not 
allow for stylistic conventions, differing levels of uniqueness and rigidity, and most 
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they are used.  Ariel concedes that in certain circumstances some referents may ‘possess 
a salient and privileged status for us’ (1990, p. 41).  However, it is not clear how such 
exceptions would fit with the notion of a ‘universal’ scale, or what the role of the ‘scale’ 
would be if the scalar relationships can be so readily disregarded. 
3.6  Concluding remarks 
Accessibility theory and the Givenness hierarchy each attempt to give a pragmatically 
orientated account of the use of referring expressions in natural discourse.  Both claim 
to integrate with the relevance theoretic pragmatic framework, whilst arguing that 
relevance theory alone cannot account for all of the relevant data.   
Both Accessibility theory and the Givenness hierarchy characterise referring 
expressions as encoders of semantic information relating to the status of the intended 
referent in the hearer’s cognitive environment.  For Ariel, referring expressions signal 
level of Accessibility, and for Gundel et al, they signal cognitive status.  Over the next 
two chapters I will develop an account which moves away from the idea that referring 
expressions encode this sort of information.  Rather, I will assume that hearers 
following the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure always test the most 
accessible potential referent in the discourse context first, and that speakers choose 
referring expressions with this in mind.  I will present an account on which referring 
expressions encode procedural and/or conceptual information which restricts the set of 
potential referents to a point where the most accessible interpretation is the intended 
one.  On my account, the contribution of a referring expression is not determined by the 
type of expression used (definite description, pronoun, distal complex demonstrative 
etc), but by the concepts and procedures that it encodes, and in each case the encoded 
content interacts with the specific discourse context to contribute to the overall 
interpretation of the utterance. 
Ariel appears to be moving in a similar direction when, in an overview of her 
work on referring, she explicitly describes Accessibility theory as a ‘procedural 
analysis’(2001, p. 29).  However, I do not take her use of the term ‘procedural’ as 
signalling any development in her overall approach.  She outlines the role of the 
procedure as being to ‘instruct the addressee to retrieve a certain piece of Given 
information from his memory by indicating to him how accessible this piece of 
information is to him at the current stage of the discourse’ (2001, p. 29).  Thus, 
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referent.  Even if we allow that Ariel’s account is procedural, the procedures she is 
proposing differ significantly from the ones I will propose. 
In this chapter, I have outlined problems and limitations associated with Ariel’s 
and Gundel’s scalar accounts.  I suggest that many of these problems stem from the fact 
that these accounts focus almost entirely on reference resolution, and hence on the 
derivation of the explicature (in relevance theory terms).  By focusing on the 
contribution of the referring expression to what is explicitly communicated, they fail to 
consider how referring expressions might contribute to what is implicitly communicated 
(i.e. the intended context or cognitive effects).  They also underestimate the role played 
by the discourse context and stylistic or social considerations in the use and 
interpretation of referring expressions. 
In the next chapter, I will argue not only that relevance theory can account for the 
data without the need for these auxiliary scales and hierarchies, but that in doing so, a 
much richer picture of the role of referring expressions is revealed.  As well as 
contributing to what is explicitly communicated by an utterance, the choice of referring 
expression can affect what is implicitly communicated.  More generally, the speaker’s 
choice of referring expression is driven by considerations of relevance, and will 
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Chapter 4:  Referring Expressions and Relevance Theory 
4.1  Introduction 
4.1.1  Arguments against a relevance-only account 
In chapter 3, I considered two pragmatically-orientated approaches to referring 
expressions which claim to be compatible with relevance theory.  However, whilst 
endorsing the principles of relevance theory, both Ariel (1990) and Gundel (2003) argue 
that relevance theory alone cannot fully explain a speaker’s choice of referring 
expression.  As supporting evidence, they cite a range of data that they claim cannot be 
accounted for in terms of relevance alone.  In the next two chapters, I will try to show 
how these examples can be handled in a purely relevance-based account.   
As a brief reminder of the type of evidence put forward by Gundel and Mulkern 
(1998) and Gundel (2003), consider again the examples introduced in chapter 3, and 
given here again as (1) and (2).  
(1)  A restudy of pareiasaurs reveals that these primitive reptiles are the nearest 
relatives of turtles. 
(2)  ??A restudy of pareiasaurs reveals that the primitive reptiles are the nearest 
relatives of turtles. 
The definite description ‘the primitive reptiles’ in (2) is judged to be less acceptable 
than the complex demonstrative ‘the primitive reptiles’ in (1) when intended to pick out 
the set of pareiasaurs.  According to Gundel (2003), it is harder to resolve reference in 
(2), and ‘the most accessible interpretation here is one that is not coreferential with 
pareiasaurs (though it may be a set that includes pareiasaurs)’ (2003, p. 128).  In other 
examples, however, definite descriptions and complex demonstratives seem to be 
interchangeable.  For instance, (1) is the opening line of an academic paper (Lee, 1993), 
and is immediately followed by (3).  
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(4)  These two groups share numerous derived characteristics. 
As Gundel and Mulkern (1998) point out, the version in (4), where the definite 
description ‘the two groups’ is replaced by the complex demonstrative ‘these two 
groups’, is not only equally acceptable, but also has the same interpretation as (3).  In 
both cases the most accessible interpretation is that in which ‘two groups’ picks out the 
previously mentioned turtles and pareiasaurs.  Any account of the use of referring 
expressions must be able to explain why definite descriptions and complex 
demonstrative are sometimes interchangeable, as in (3) and (4), and sometimes not, as 
in (1) and (2). 
As discussed above, Gundel and Mulkern (1998) argue that relevance theory 
alone cannot account for these data, but that combining the Givenness hierarchy with 
relevance provides an explanation.  Following the GHZ hierarchy, the definite article in 
(2) only restricts the set of potential referents to those which are at least ‘uniquely 
identifiable’.  Recall that according to GHZ, ‘each status on the hierarchy is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for the appropriate use’ of the associated form (Gundel, 
Hedberg, & Zacharski, 1993, p. 275).  On the intended interpretation, the definite 
description ‘the primitive reptiles’ refers to the previously mentioned set of pareiasaurs, 
but there are other sets of primitive reptiles, including the set of all primitive reptiles, 
which are also uniquely identifiable.  As a result, the utterance in (2) does not pick out a 
unique referent, and the intended interpretation fails.  By contrast, the complex 
demonstrative ‘these primitive reptiles’ in (1) requires the referent to be not only 
‘uniquely identifiable’ but also ‘activated’.  Since the set of pareiasaurs are the only 
activated potential referents in the discourse context, (1) is acceptable and 
comprehensible. 
In contrast, the cognitive status ‘uniquely identifiable’ is sufficient to determine a 
unique referent in both (3) and (4).  In these examples, there is only one set of ‘two 
groups’ which is uniquely identifiable, namely the pareiasaurs and turtles, and so the 
definite determiner ‘the two groups’ in (3) is acceptable.  By definition, a referent that is 
‘activated’ is also ‘uniquely identifiable’, and so the use of the complex demonstrative, 
‘these two groups’ in (4) is also acceptable.  Accordingly, Gundel and Mulkern claim 
that the Givenness hierarchy, with its notion of encoded cognitive statuses, explains the 
judgements in (1)-(4), and that without it, relevance theory cannot account for these 
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As noted above, Ariel (1990) sees a similar problem and cites similar data, again 
claiming that relevance theory alone cannot distinguish between certain pairs of 
referring expressions: definite determiners and complex demonstratives, proximal and 
distal demonstratives, and stressed and unstressed pronouns.  In her view: 
Relevance theory…cannot account for the distribution of referring 
expressions without the mediation of Accessibility theory (1990, p. 84). 
In this chapter and the next, I will argue that, contrary to the claims of Ariel and Gundel 
et al, the existing relevance theory framework can fully explain the data in (1)-(4), and 
shed light on the differences between the pairs of expressions identified by Ariel.  
My strategy will therefore be to offer an alternative relevance-based account of 
the data as presented and discussed in the literature.  Before embarking on my analysis, 
however, I would like to enter a caveat:  it is not clear that (1) and (2) bring out a 
genuine contrast between definite descriptions and complex demonstrative forms.  To 
illustrate this point, compare (5)-(8) with the examples in (1) and (2). 
(5)  A restudy of pareiasaurs reveals that the primitive reptiles were mainly found on 
the African mainland. 
(6)  A restudy of pareiasaurs reveals that these primitive reptiles were mainly found 
on the African mainland. 
(7)  A reexamination of the pareiasaur’s bones reveals that the primitive reptile 
consumed calcium-rich food during its lifetime. 
(8)  A reexamination of the pareiasaur’s bones reveals that this primitive reptile 
consumed calcium-rich food during its lifetime. 
Here the versions with definite descriptions seem to be just as acceptable as those with 
complex demonstratives, and this suggests that the contrast between (1) and (2) does not 
depend only on the choice of definite NP type.  In fact, one might go further and argue 
that the classification of (2) as unacceptable on the given interpretation is too strong.  
The use of a definite description as an anaphoric epithet is acceptable in parallel cases, 
such as those in (5) and (7), and I suggest that in certain contexts, it may also be 
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between each of these pairs depends on the inferences that the various forms encourage 
the hearer to draw via the procedural meaning they encode.  However, there does seem 
to be some intuitive contrast in acceptability between (1) and (2), and this needs to be 
explained.  I will therefore begin by setting aside the data in (5)-(8), accepting that there 
is a contrast, and considering how it might be explained in relevance theory terms.  I 
will then return to it at the end of the chapter. 
I want to argue that, far from being unable to account for the alternations and 
contrasts in these examples, relevance theory gives us more insight into the varied 
contributions that referring expressions may make to what is explicitly and implicitly 
communicated.  The vital contribution of referring expressions to implicit content is 
generally overlooked by existing accounts of reference choice, and I will argue that this 
is what explains the judgements in (1)-(8).  Crucially, I claim that the role of referring 
expressions is to guide the hearer, not just to an intended referent, but to an intended 
overall interpretation.   
According to relevance theory (Wilson & Sperber, 2004, p. 615), the construction 
of an overall interpretation of an utterance comprises three distinct sub-tasks, which are 
typically performed in parallel: 
(9)  Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about explicit content (EXPLICATURES) 
via decoding, disambiguation, reference resolution, and other pragmatic 
enrichment processes. 
(10)  Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual 
assumptions (IMPLICATED PREMISES). 
(11)  Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual 
implications (IMPLICATED CONCLUSIONS). 
I will argue that referring expressions may contribute to all three of these subtasks, and 
that as a result they affect not only what is explicitly communicated, but also what is 
implicitly communicated.  I will develop this argument within a relevance theoretic 
framework which incorporates a distinction between procedural and conceptual 
meaning (Blakemore, 1987; 2002; Wilson & Sperber, 1993; Wharton, 2009), and which 
takes seriously the claim that hearers automatically follow the relevance theoretic 
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In defending Accessibility theory, Ariel claims that ‘Relevance accounts assume 
that in reference retrievals a speaker guides an addressee by making sure he picks the 
right antecedent based on eliminating ‘wrong’ choices of competitors’ (Ariel 1990, p. 
85).  I will argue that this is a misconstruction of relevance theory, and that by taking 
the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure seriously, we find that far from relying 
on the elimination of ‘wrong’ choices, the production and comprehension of referring 
expressions is driven by the same principles that drive communication in general.  I will 
start with a brief reminder of some of the basic relevance theory principles and 
definitions introduced in 2.5 above. 
4.1.2  The relevance theoretic comprehension procedure 
According to the communicative principle of relevance, repeated in (12) below, any 
utterance addressed to someone conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance, as 
defined in (13):   
(12)  Every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance 
(13)  An optimally relevant utterance will be: 
a.  Relevant enough to be worth the audience’s processing effort. 
b.  The most relevant one compatible with the communicator’s abilities and 
preferences. 
According to the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure in (14), the way to find 
an overall interpretation is to follow the path of least effort in looking for implications 
and other cognitive effects. 
(14)  a.  Follow a path of least effort in deriving cognitive effects.  Test interpretive 
hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures etc.) in order of 
accessibility. 
b.  Stop when you expectations of relevance are satisfied. 
Having derived enough implications, at a low enough cost, to satisfy his expectations by 
making the utterance not only worth his processing effort, but the most relevant one 116 
compatible with the speaker’s abilities and preferences, the hearer should stop. Thus, 
the first interpretation that satisfies the hearer’s expectations of relevance should (if all 
goes well) be the one the speaker intended to convey.   
Although the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure is explicitly stated in 
the relevance literature, it should be remembered that it does not have to be learned or 
acquired, but follows directly from the Communicative Principle of Relevance and the 
presumption of optimal relevance, and is seen by Sperber and Wilson (2002) as the 
central component of a comprehension module which automatically constructs a 
hypothesis about the speaker’s meaning.  Any analysis that aims to offer a relevance 
theory account of the use of referring expressions must be compatible with the 
comprehension procedure.  What, then, does it mean to say that interpretive hypotheses 
are tested ‘in order of accessibility’?  In the previous chapter I showed how Ariel’s 
Accessibility theory claims that levels of accessibility are encoded by referring 
expression types, and how Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (1993) take a similar code-
based approach to cognitive statuses on their Givenness hierarchy.  I have argued that 
these approaches are problematic, and I now want to claim that they are also 
unnecessary.  The ‘most accessible’ interpretation of an utterance is, by definition, 
simply the first that the hearer comes across on the path of least effort.  If this 
interpretation satisfies his expectations of relevance, then according to the relevance-
theoretic comprehension procedure, the hearer should stop.  It follows that a speaker 
aiming for optimal relevance should do her best to formulate her utterance so that, if all 
goes well, the intended interpretation is the first interpretation the hearer will find that 
makes the utterance relevant in the expected way.  I want to argue that the speaker’s 
choice of referring expression is a vital component in this process, and in the rest of this 
chapter and in the next, I will consider what role each of these choices might play in a 
relevance-based analysis of utterance interpretation. 
4.1.3  The conceptual-procedural distinction and the role of procedural meaning 
Relevance theory takes a largely computational-representational approach to cognition 
and communication (Fodor, 1983; Wilson & Sperber, 1993).  On this approach, 
communication involves the construction and manipulation of a series of 
representations, phonetic, phonological, syntactic and conceptual, which are linked by a 
series of computations.  Thus, the phonetic form of an utterance is seen as undergoing a 
linguistic decoding process to yield a semantic or logical form (or in the case of 
ambiguity, a set of logical forms).  As decoding proceeds, the logical form is enriched 117 
via inferential pragmatic processes, including reference assignment, to yield a fully 
propositional form known as the proposition expressed or (if it is part of what the 
speaker is taken to communicate) the basic explicature.  This basic explicature may 
itself be inferentially enriched to yield a series of higher-level explicatures carrying 
speech-act or attitudinal information. Moreover, as described above, explicatures 
combine with contextual assumptions to provide input to further inferential processes 
yielding a series of contextual implications or implicatures (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95; 
Carston, 2002; 2004). Thus, utterance interpretation involves a complex interaction 
between (linguistic and conceptual) representations and (linguistic and inferential) 
computations.  
A central feature of relevance theory is the claim that while most regular content 
words (e.g. ‘reptile’, ‘pareiasaur’) encode concepts that figure in conceptual 
representations, some expressions are better analysed in procedural terms, as 
contributing to the computational aspect of utterance interpretation.  For instance, 
Blakemore (1987) argued that a range of non-truth-conditional discourse connectives 
(e.g. ‘but’, ‘so’, ‘also’) are best seen as encoding, not information which contributes 
directly to conceptual representations, but information about the type of inferential 
computations the hearer is expected to go through in constructing an overall 
interpretation (Blakemore, 1987). This laid the foundations for an important theoretical 
distinction between conceptual and procedural encoding, which has played a major role 
in relevance-theoretic accounts of both verbal and non-verbal communication 
(Blakemore, 1987; 2002; Wilson & Sperber, 1993; Wharton, 2009).  On this approach, 
conceptual encoding yields conceptual representations that figure directly in the 
explicatures that provide the input to further inferential computation, while procedural 
encoding places constraints on the types of representations to be constructed or the 
computations that are to take place (Blakemore, 1987; 2002; 2007; Wharton, 2003; 
2009; Hall, 2007).  As Blakemore  puts it, expressions that encode procedures ‘do not 
encode a constituent of a conceptual representation (or even indicate a concept), but 
guide the comprehension process so that the hearer ends up with a conceptual 
representation’ (2002, p. 91).   
To illustrate the kind of work standardly claimed to be done by procedurally 
encoded meaning, consider the following example
1: 
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(15)  a. Clare is a vegetarian. 
b. She doesn’t like meat. 
The two utterances could stand in many different inferential relations, but the route the 
hearer is expected to follow can be indicated by use of the non-truth-conditional 
discourse connectives ‘so’ and ‘after all’ as in (16) and (17). 
(16)  Clare is a vegetarian.  So she doesn’t like meat. 
(17)  Clare is a vegetarian.  After all, she doesn’t like meat. 
Most linguists and philosophers who have looked at such examples agree that the truth 
conditions of (16) and (17) (and hence the propositions they express) are the same.  
Both are true if and only if Clare is a vegetarian and she doesn’t like meat.  However, 
the inferences that the hearer is encouraged to draw are constrained by the choice of 
connective.  In (16), the suggested inference is that Clare’s dislike of meat is a 
consequence of her vegetarianism.  However, in (17), the inference is that her 
vegetarianism is in some way a consequence of her dislike of meat.  Thus, although it 
does not contribute conceptual information to the proposition expressed by the 
utterance, the procedural meaning of the discourse connective clearly has an important 
influence on the inferential phase of interpretation and the implicatures the hearer is 
encouraged to derive. 
On the basis of such examples, it might be tempting to see the conceptual / 
procedural distinction as lining up with the distinction between truth-conditional and 
non-truth conditional meaning.  However, Wilson and Sperber (1993) argue that this is 
not the case, and that four distinct categories of meaning emerge: conceptual and truth-
conditional, conceptual and non-truth-conditional, procedural and truth conditional and 
procedural and non-truth conditional.  The first of these categories is the most easily 
illustrated.  Most ‘content’ words, including nouns and verbs, can be assumed to encode 
conceptual meaning which contributes directly to the truth-conditional content of an 
utterance.  Discourse connectives such as those in (16) and (17) are plausibly seen as 
encoding procedural meaning which does not affect the truth-conditions of an utterance.  
According to Wilson and Sperber (1993) and Ifantidou-Trouki (1993), sentence 
adverbials such as ‘seriously’, ‘frankly’ and ‘confidentially’ exemplify a third 119 
possibility.  Although they do not contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterances in 
which they occur, they are best seen as encoding conceptual information. 
(18)  Confidentially, I don’t think Bob will get the job. 
(19)  Seriously, I’m pleased Bob didn’t come. 
Intuitively, utterance (18) is true if and only if the speaker doesn’t think that Bob will 
get the job, and it therefore seems that ‘confidentially’ is non-truth-conditional (in 
relevance-theoretic terms, it carries attitudinal information which contributes to higher 
level explicatures rather than to the proposition expressed).  However, sentence 
adverbials such as ‘seriously’ and ‘confidentially’ seem to share conceptual meaning 
with their manner adverbial counterparts, which contribute to truth-conditional content 
in the regular way: 
(20)  I asked him confidentially if he was pleased. 
(21)  Michael took his role as team captain seriously. 
They are thus different from the procedural connectives such as ‘so’ and ‘after all’ 
described above, which have no synonymous truth-conditional counterparts.  It 
therefore seems reasonable to treat ‘confidentially’ as encoding the same concept in (18) 
and in (20), but to treat it as contributing to the basic explicature in (20), and to higher 
level explicatures in (18). 
The final logically possible combination involves procedural meaning which 
constrains the truth-conditional content of an utterance (as opposed to directly encoding 
a concept which is a constituent of this truth-conditional content).  Wilson and Sperber 
(1993) and Hedley (2007) argue that pronouns can be seen as falling into this category, 
since they ‘guide the search for the intended referent, which is part of the proposition 
expressed’ (Wilson and Sperber 1993, p. 23).  Wilson and Sperber (1993), Powell 
(1998) and Hedley (2007) make reference to Kaplan’s 1989 distinction between the 
content and character of a pronominal.  Consider a simple sentence containing a 
pronoun. 
(22)  She has a big nose. 120 
The utterance in (22) will be true in just those cases where the person referred to by the 
pronoun ‘she’ has a big nose.  In order to evaluate the truth of this utterance we need to 
know who ‘she’ refers to.  It is not the pronoun itself that appears in the proposition 
expressed but the referent of the pronoun.  As Hedley (2005, p. 44) puts it, ‘their 
meaning is computational, not representational’.  For Kaplan, the ‘content’ of a 
pronominal is the individual that is contributed to the proposition expressed, and the 
‘character’ is the rule by which this content is identified in any given context.  In sum, 
pronouns ‘determine the content (the propositional constituent) for a particular 
occurrence of an indexical.  But they are not a part of the content (they constitute no 
part of the propositional constituent)’ (Kaplan, 1989, p. 523).  When this account is 
suitably psychologised to fit with a more cognitive approach
2, it translates into the claim 
that they are both truth-conditional and procedural.   
My analysis of referring expressions is based on the assumption that pronouns are 
not the only examples of this type.  I will argue that other types of referring expressions 
also encode procedural constraints on explicit content.  Although Wilson and Sperber 
(1993) and Hedley (2007) treat the type of procedural information carried by pronouns 
as providing constraints on the derivation of the proposition expressed, I believe that the 
importance of the procedural meaning of referring expressions is underestimated if we 
focus only on the fact that it guides the hearer to the intended referent.  Crucially, the 
role of referring expressions is to guide the hearer not just to an intended referent, but to 
an intended overall interpretation, involving each of the three subtasks in (9)-(11).  In 
the next sections, I consider how the choice of referring expression, with its 
combination of conceptual and procedural information, guides the hearer to the intended 
explicit content, and how it may play a role in the derivation of contextual assumptions 
and implications.  Whilst Ariel and Gundel et al focus on the contribution of referring 
expressions to explicit content, I argue that choice of referring expressions cannot be 
understood fully until we acknowledge and examine their contribution to the other two 
tasks as well. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
2 As Blakemore (2002) puts it, ‘an expression which encodes procedural information encodes information 
which is not a constituent of the conceptual representation over which inferential computations are 
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4.2.  Explicitly communicated meaning  
4.2.1  Determining the proposition expressed 
Although I shall be arguing that the role of referring expressions goes beyond the matter 
of resolving reference, it should not be forgotten that helping the hearer construct a 
representation of the intended referent that will figure in the proposition expressed is an 
important part of their function.  In order to motivate a relevance theory account that 
does not rely on Accessibility, Givenness or similar theory-external constructs, I need to 
show how this takes place.  The relevance theoretic account of referring expressions 
proposed here draws on the conceptual / procedural distinction outlined above and the 
relevance theoretic comprehension procedure.  The way in which the principles of 
relevance are applied is subtly but crucially different from the way assumed in Ariel’s 
and Gundel’s accounts.  According to Accessibility theory and the Givenness hierarchy, 
each referring expression type conventionally (i.e. linguistically) encodes information 
about the accessibility or cognitive status of the intended referent, which guides the 
hearer in finding the intended referent amongst the potential referents in the discourse 
context.  For Ariel, referring expressions are ‘guidelines for retrievals’ (Ariel 1988, p. 
68) and for Gundel they ‘conventionally signal different cognitive statuses’ (Gundel, 
Hedberg & Zacharski 1993, p. 274).  In both cases, it is therefore possible for the 
speaker’s choice of referring expression to direct the hearer to an entity with low 
accessibility or low cognitive status in preference to higher ones.  Ariel clearly states 
that ‘since speakers may wish to refer not to the most salient potential referent, they 
should overtly instruct the addressee to search for a less salient antecedent’ (1994, p. 
20).  Let us consider this point in relation to the relevance theoretic comprehension 
procedure, given in (14) above. 
The idea that the hearer may ignore or jump over highly accessible potential 
referents to reach less accessible ones seems to be directly at odds with the 
comprehension procedure.  A hearer following this procedure will always test potential 
referents and contextual assumptions in order of accessibility, and signalling to the 
hearer that he should ignore a highly accessible referent in favour of a less accessible 
one is therefore in direct conflict with a basic principle of relevance theory.  If a hearer 
really were following the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure, then the main 
effect of such a signal would probably be to cause confusion.  However, as Ariel 
observes, speakers do not always and only refer to the most accessible potential referent 
in the discourse context.  I will argue that we can reconcile this observation with the 122 
relevance theoretic comprehension procedure by re-examining the role of referring 
expressions.  Given that the hearer will automatically follow the comprehension 
procedure in (14), a speaker who wants to be understood must aim to construct her 
utterance so that the first interpretation that satisfies the hearer’s expectations of 
relevance is the intended one.  In terms of reference resolution, this means that the 
intended referent should be the most accessible potential referent capable of yielding an 
overall interpretation that is relevant in the expected way.  If the intended referent is not 
already the most accessible one in the discourse context, the speaker has a large range of 
potential referring expressions to choose from in order to make this the case.  Since, in 
the framework I propose, referring expressions can encode both conceptual and 
procedural information, she may exploit both conceptual and procedural information to 
achieve this end.  Logically, there are two strategies available to the speaker.  She may 
use the referring expression to rule out those potential referents which are more 
accessible than the intended one, or she may use it to increase the accessibility of the 
intended referent.  I will explore both these strategies in the next section, as I consider 
how both conceptual and procedural meaning may play a part in reference resolution. 
In proposing her own, relevance-based account of referring expressions as an 
alternative to Ariel’s and Gundel’s approaches, Reboul (1998; 1999) introduces the idea 
that both conceptual and procedural information may play a role in reference resolution.  
In her framework, referring expressions are interpreted relative to a ‘domain of 
reference’, which she defines as a ‘subset of the set of mental representations for a given 
individual at a given time’ (1998, p. 3).  A domain of reference is constructed for each 
new referring expression in the discourse, with its construction constrained by 
considerations of relevance.  According to Reboul, the referring expression itself may 
provide constraints on the construction of the domain, with both conceptual and 
procedural information contributing to its construction.  Like Wilson and Sperber 
(1993) and Hedley (2007), she treats pronouns as encoding procedural information, and 
analyses each pronoun as restricting the domain of reference to just mental 
representations of a particular gender or number.  Similarly, she treats demonstratives as 
encoding a spatial constraint restricting the domain of reference to either distal or 
proximal representations.  In her framework, conceptual information may also constrain 
domain construction.  For instance, the information encoded by the nominal of a 
definite description will restrict the domain of reference to just mental representations 
with appropriate properties.  On this account, then, a domain of reference is constructed 
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representations in that domain.  For example, the definite description ‘the black cat’ 
constrains the domain of reference using both conceptual and procedural information.  
The definite determiner ‘the’ contributes a procedural constraint which specifies that the 
domain of reference should be ‘a set Q of objects of which one is N while all the others 
are not’, and the conceptual information encoded by ‘black cat’ constrains the domain 
of reference to just those things with the attributes of N: in this case ‘both black and a 
cat’ (1999, p. 8). 
In the account of the use of referring expressions that I present below, I develop 
Reboul’s ideas, but move away from her notion of a constructed ‘domain of reference’.  
Instead, I argue that procedural and conceptual information is used to constrain the set 
of potential referents to a point where the intended referent is the most accessible one in 
the given discourse context. 
4.2.2  Conceptual information and explicit meaning 
The conceptual information (if any) encoded by a referring expression will rule out any 
potential referents that are not compatible with it.  Imagine a room full of cats, and 
consider the many possible ways in which a speaker could refer to a particular cat.   
(23)  The cat looks hungry. 
(24)  The black cat looks hungry. 
(25)  The black cat in the corner looks hungry. 
(26)  The black cat in the corner with the red collar looks hungry. 
In discussing these examples in a cognitive framework such as relevance theory, it is 
important to distinguish between the actual objects which are the intended referents of 
the referring expressions, and the mental representations of those objects which will be 
more or less accessible to speaker and hearer on a given occasion. ‘Accessibility’ in 
relevance theory is a term that applies to mental representations rather than to actual 
objects, and I will try to talk systematically of representations as more or less 
‘accessible’ and of objects as being more or less ‘salient’ in a given environment. 
To refer to a particular cat in the room, the speaker must use a referring 
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cat.  As argued above, a hearer following the relevance-theoretic comprehension 
procedure will tentatively select the most accessible representation which is compatible 
with the linguistically encoded information (and will accept the resulting overall 
interpretation if it is relevant in the expected way).  Thus, utterance (23) would usually 
be infelicitous in a cat-filled room, since it fails to make a representation of one 
particular cat more accessible than the others.  However, the same utterance would be 
perfectly acceptable in a room with eight dogs and only one cat.  Alternatively, if in the 
cat-only room, there is one cat that for some reason is more salient than the others - for 
example, all the cats are asleep, except for one which is worrying for food - then a 
representation of that cat will be more accessible, reference will be tentatively resolved 
on it, and (23) will be felicitous if it leads on to an overall interpretation that is relevant 
in the expected way.  If there is no particularly salient cat in the cat-filled room, but 
only one cat happens to be black, then the speaker may refer to it felicitously using 
utterance (24).  In this case, she uses conceptual information to narrow down the set of 
potential referents to just black cats; and, since there is only one for which a mental 
representation is highly accessible, reference will be tentatively resolved on it.  
Anything not compatible with the conceptual conditions imposed by the referring 
expression - in this case, being both black and a cat - will be excluded from the set of 
potential referents, and could therefore be seen as having zero accessibility
3.  However, 
utterance (24) is likely to be infelicitous if there are several black cats in the room, since 
it would fail to make a representation of one black cat more accessible than the others.  
In this situation, the speaker may be required to further narrow the set, as in (25) or (26), 
and so on. 
Let us compare this account of the role of conceptual information with the 
analyses offered by Ariel and Gundel.  We may refer to a cat using any number of 
descriptions including ‘a cat’, ‘that cat’, and ‘the cat’.  From a common sense 
perspective, these referring expressions share the conceptual information encoded by 
the word ‘cat’.  Analysing referring expressions as encoding conceptual constraints on 
the set of potential referents directly captures this common sense intuition in a way that 
the Accessibility and Givenness scales do not.  In both Accessibility theory and the 
Givenness hierarchy, it is the category of the referring expression (definite description, 
complex demonstrative, indefinite description, etc) that determines its place on the 
scale, and hence the contribution it makes to reference resolution.  Neither account has 
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A metaphorical referring expression may narrow down the set of potential referents without necessarily 
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anything to say about the role that conceptual content may play in reference resolution.  
Furthermore, Accessibility theory distinguishes only between ‘long’ and ‘short’ definite 
descriptions, whilst the Givenness hierarchy treats them all equally as indicating the 
cognitive status of being ‘uniquely identifiable’.  My approach has the advantage of 
offering a potential explanation for how the speaker chooses among the indefinite range 
of options available when constructing a definite description, and it makes clear 
predictions about which will be felicitous in certain discourse contexts, and which will 
not.  In effect, the discourse context can be viewed as including a set of potential 
referents, each of which can be mentally represented in a variety of more or less 
accessible ways, and the referring expression can be seen as a means by which the 
speaker may select a subset of the potential referents, such that a representation of the 
intended referent is the most accessible to the hearer in that subset. 
4.2.3  Procedural information and explicit meaning 
Although the conceptual information carried by descriptive phrases plays a crucial role 
in reference resolution, it is not the only means by which a speaker can constrain the set 
of potential referents.  In a framework with both conceptual and procedural meaning, 
referring expressions may also encode procedural constraints.  In section 4.1.3, I 
mentioned some existing analyses of pronouns as encoding procedural information that 
constrains the truth conditional content of an utterance (e.g. ‘you’ constrains the class of 
potential referents to sets of individuals that include the addressee).  Here I want to 
suggest that the demonstratives and determiners that figure in more complex referring 
expressions play a similar role.   
Perhaps the easiest way to illustrate this point is by considering the role of distal 
and proximal determiners.  Imagine a scenario in which Emily is sitting in a tea shop 
when the waitress brings a trolley with a large cake on it.  The waitress offers Emily a 
slice of the cake, and also explains that if she prefers, she may have a slice of the cake 
on display in the shop window.  As it happens, the cake on the trolley is more to 
Emily’s taste.  Now consider how the following utterances by Emily might be 
understood: 
(27)  I’ll have a slice of the cake. 
(28)  I’ll have a slice of this cake. 126 
(29)  I’ll have a slice of the cake on the trolley in front of me. 
Although utterances (27) and (28) encode the same conceptual information, it is likely 
that reference resolution will succeed in (28) but fail in (27).  In both cases, the 
conceptually encoded meaning (‘slice of cake’) narrows the set of potential referents to 
two– a slice of the cake on the trolley, and a slice of the cake in the window.  Utterance 
(28) succeeds because the procedural information encoded in the determiner narrows 
the set of potential referents still further, to a point where it includes only a slice of the 
cake on the trolley.
4  Utterance (29) would probably lead to reference being resolved on 
the same slice of cake, but would normally be ruled out on effort grounds.  The 
processing of the extra conceptual information in (29) would put the hearer to extra 
processing effort without achieving any extra effects (unless the waitress has given 
evidence of being particularly hostile or slow on the uptake). 
I am therefore suggesting that referring expressions (and in particular pronouns 
and determiners) may encode procedural information which can narrow the set of 
potential referents more efficiently than would be achieved by encoding further 
conceptual constraints.  In following the sections I will consider in more detail what this 
procedural information might look like in specific cases.   
In certain cases, it seems that the conceptual information encoded by a referring 
expression is enough on its own to narrow the field of candidate referents to a point 
where reference resolution can be successfully achieved, and yet we still find a contrast 
in acceptability or interpretation between referring forms which differ only in the 
determiner used.  I will return to this point in section 4.3.2, where I will argue that in 
these cases, the procedural information carried by the determiner contributes not to 
reference resolution but to the implicit phase of comprehension, and guides the hearer as 
to the type of inferences he should draw. 
According to Ariel (1994), a major problem with pragmatic accounts of reference 
resolution is their inability to ‘explain to us how one decides among various potential 
antecedents’ (1994, p. 11).  However, the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure 
does just this.  Any hearer following the procedure will test representations of potential 
referents in order of accessibility, and stop when his expectation of relevance is 
satisfied.  The conceptual and procedural information encoded by the referring 
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these demonstratives encode ‘has to do with the relative distance between the speaker and object 
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expression will constrain the set of potential referents, and it is this constraining role 
that drives the speaker’s choice of a particular referring expression.  Thus, rather than 
uniquely indicating to the hearer which potential referent should be chosen, referring 
expressions narrow the set of potential referents to a point where the relevance-theoretic 
comprehension procedure can successfully complete the task.  As with all cases where 
semantics and pragmatics interact, the kind and extent of constraint required will vary 
with the context, and so the same entity may be referred to in several different ways in 
different circumstances. 
4.2.4  Applying the constraints 
Assuming a model in which conceptual and procedural constraints interact to guide the 
hearer towards the intended interpretation, I will now re-examine the problematic 
examples from (1)-(4) above.  In this framework, the acceptability of a given referring 
expression should be predictable on the basis of the encoded conceptual and procedural 
information and the accessibility of a representation of the intended referent relative to 
those of other potential referents. 
The version which Gundel and Mulkern interpret as conveying that ‘these 
primitive reptiles’ is coreferential with the set of all parieasaurs is repeated here for 
convenience: 
(1)  A restudy of pareiasaurs reveals that these primitive reptiles are the nearest 
relatives of turtles. 
To give a full account of the interpretation of this example, it will be necessary to 
consider the complicated interaction between reference resolution, context construction 
and implicated conclusions.  In this section, I begin by looking at how encoded 
conceptual and procedural information contributes to the retrieval of the proposition 
expressed.  I will argue that the proposition expressed by (1) is the same as that in (2) 
and the proposition expressed by (3) is the same as that in (4).  My suggestion is that the 
apparent difference in the acceptability of the utterances is a result of interaction 
between the proposition expressed and accessible contextual assumptions, on the one 
hand, and of the way the procedural information guides the inferential process, on the 
other.  First, however, I will consider how the explicit content is derived. 
The referring expressions in (1) and (2) both encode the conceptual information 
‘primitive reptiles’, which narrows the set of potential referents to include only (sets of) 128 
things that are both primitive and reptiles.  Given that there is one highly salient group 
of primitive reptiles in the discourse context, it might be tempting to suggest that this is 
all the information the speaker needs to provide in order to convey her intended 
meaning.  However, consider the utterance in (30). 
(30)  A restudy of pareiasaurs reveals that primitive reptiles are the nearest relatives of 
turtles. 
When a bare-NP is used instead of a definite-NP, the interpretation changes 
significantly.  The NP ‘primitive reptiles’ receives a generic interpretation on which it 
picks out primitive reptiles as a kind (as opposed to pareiasaurs as a subset of primitive 
reptiles).  (30) will be true if and only if members of the kind ‘primitive reptiles’ are the 
nearest relatives of turtles.  Contrast this with the interpretation of (1) (and arguably (2), 
on the anaphoric epithet reading discussed above), where the NP ‘these primitive 
reptiles’ is co-referential with the NP ‘pareiasaurs’.  On this interpretation (1) is true 
only if pareiasaurs are the nearest relatives of turtles, and asserts nothing about primitive 
reptiles in general.  Thus, the inclusion of the demonstrative determiner in (1) affects the 
truth conditional content of the utterance.   
As with most procedural information, the procedural information carried by the 
determiner can be difficult to paraphrase in conceptual terms.  According to Wilson and 
Sperber (1993, p. 17) ‘Conceptual representations can be brought to consciousness: 
procedures cannot’.  More generally, conceptual information encoded by familiar 
lexical items is relatively easy to grasp and paraphrase.  However, linguistic elements 
that encode procedural meaning can be notoriously difficult to paraphrase, and the role 
they play extremely difficult to pin down.  Still, in the case of (1), the procedural 
information carried by the demonstrative determiner in the phrase ‘these primitive 
reptiles’ seems to divert the hearer from a generic interpretation, towards one in which a 
definite group of primitive reptiles is picked out.  In a later section, I will consider why 
procedural information in general is so hard to paraphrase. 
As Gundel (2003, p. 130) notes, the definite description ‘the primitive reptiles’ in 
(2) could logically pick out ‘the whole class of primitive reptiles’.  Why, then, is (2) 
judged to be unacceptable or difficult to process on this reading, rather than simply 
being interpreted as a paraphrase of (30)?  I suggest that the answer to this question 
follows from the relevance theory claim that a speaker aiming at optimal relevance will 
not deliberately put the hearer to any gratuitous processing effort.  The conceptual 129 
information carried by (30) narrows the set of potential referents to just those which are 
both primitive and reptiles, and in the absence of a definite determiner (‘the’ or ‘these’), 
the hearer settles on the generic reading.
5  Although the same interpretation could in 
principle be achieved by adding the definite determiner and intending the hearer to 
resolve reference on the definite group of all primitive reptiles, a speaker who chose this 
formulation would be demanding extra processing effort from the hearer, but failing to 
offer any extra reward.  Moreover, if the speaker wishes to refer to all primitive reptiles, 
then she runs less risk of misunderstanding if she uses the bare-NP form.  Whilst the 
bare-NP unequivocally picks out the set of all primitive reptiles, there are many 
different subsets that the definite description could potentially pick out.  If (2) is deemed 
acceptable at all, then it is under the anaphoric epithet interpretation where the explicit 
content is parallel with (1), and not with (30).   
This brings us back to the issue of how the hearer of (1) identifies the particular 
group of primitive reptiles intended by the speaker.  Whilst pareiasaurs are a highly 
salient group of primitive reptiles, it could be possible to identify various other subsets 
within the set of primitive reptiles, for example crocodilians, which might also fit the 
conceptual constraints.  If there are several logically possible groups of primitive 
reptiles that could satisfy the referential constraints, then how does the hearer settle on 
the interpretation where the definite NP is co-referential with the pareiasaurs?  
I suggest that the answer to this question follows from the relevance theoretic 
comprehension procedure.  Recall that a hearer following this procedure will test 
potential referents, and the resulting overall interpretations, in order of accessibility.  
We therefore predict that the hearer will first test the most accessible referent that is not 
excluded from the set of potential referents by the information encoded by this referring 
expression.  The speaker has used conceptual information to narrow the set of potential 
referents to groups of primitive reptiles, and the procedural information carried by the 
determiner narrows the set further to include only definite (i.e. identifiable) groups of 
primitive reptiles.  Whilst other possibilities are logically available to the hearer, the 
subset of pareiasaurs is clearly the most accessible one in the context for both (1) and 
(2).  The hearer will therefore test the hypothesis that ‘pareiasaurs’ and ‘the/these 
primitive reptiles’ are co-referential, and, on finding that this interpretation yields 
enough implications to satisfy his expectation of relevance, will look no further.  A 
similar process is followed in the interpretation of (3) and (4) (‘the two groups’/‘these 
                                                
5 It has been proposed that there is some sort of phonologically null generic operator in such cases. (see 
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two groups’), and the hearer resolves reference on the two-group set of pareiasaurs and 
turtles. 
Having established that some sort of definite determiner is required in these cases, 
we reach the crux of Gundel and Mulkern’s argument against a purely pragmatic 
account, and their justification for introducing their scale of Givenness.  Although my 
account so far explains the contribution of both conceptual and procedural information 
to the proposition expressed, the contrast between ‘the primitive reptiles’ and ‘these 
primitive reptiles’ remains unexplained.  According to Gundel and Mulkern, such an 
explanation is beyond the scope of relevance theory alone, and indeed, I have so far 
provided no reason why a speaker might prefer one version over the other.  In the 
following sections, I will address this issue as I move on from the explicit phase of 
comprehension to discuss the role that both conceptual and procedural information may 
play during the implicit phase.  Acknowledging this role, which is largely overlooked in 
the Accessibility and Givenness accounts, will allow us to develop an analysis which 
captures the subtle differences in acceptability between the utterances in (1)-(4).  I will 
argue that Gundel and Mulkern are wrong to characterise the contrast between (2) and 
(3) as lying purely on the explicit side of comprehension.  In their view, the various 
forms of referring expression contribute to the process of reference resolution, and 
therefore to the proposition expressed.  I hope to have shown in this section that the 
propositions expressed by (1) and (2), and by (3) and (4), are the same.  In all cases, the 
hearer narrows down the set of potential referents to just those which are sets of things 
that satisfy the conceptual and procedural constraints.  The differences in acceptability 
result from interaction between the propositions expressed by the utterances and an 
accessible context, guided by the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure.  I 
propose that the same processes and constraints are in play in (3) (‘the two groups’) as 
in (2) (‘the primitive reptiles’), but that considerations of relevance result in the 
infelicity of (2), and not of (3). 
My claim is that the procedural information carried by determiners can not only 
contribute to the proposition expressed, but can also affect the inferences drawn during 
the implicit phase of comprehension.  I will return to these examples in the next section, 
when I consider how referring expressions contribute to the implicit side of utterance 
interpretation.  However, first I will discuss how the conceptual content of a referring 
expression may contribute to implicit meaning. 
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4.3  Beyond reference  
4.3.1  Conceptual information and implicit meaning 
We have seen how conceptual information can affect the derivation of the explicit 
content of an utterance by guiding the hearer to the intended referent.  However, 
derivation of the explicit content is just one of the sub-tasks involved in utterance 
interpretation.  In order to understand what is implicitly communicated, the hearer has 
to construct ‘an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual assumptions’ and 
‘an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual implications’ (Wilson & 
Sperber, 2004, p. 261).  For the purposes of the discussion to follow, it is important to 
stress that according to relevance theory, all three sub-tasks take place in parallel, and 
the resulting hypotheses may be ‘revised or elaborated as the utterance unfolds’ (ibid).  
Although I discuss each process separately for clarity and simplicity, they should be 
seen as interrelated sub-tasks ‘embedded within the overall process of constructing a 
hypothesis about the speaker’s meaning’ (ibid, p.262). 
To illustrate the contribution that conceptual information can make to 
implicatures, I return once again to the examples in (1) and (2) discussed by Gundel and 
Mulkern (1998) and Gundel (2003).  Compare (1)(‘A study of pareiasaurs reveals that 
these primitive reptiles are the nearest relatives of turtles’) with the utterance in (31). 
(31)  A restudy of pareisaurs reveals that they are the nearest relatives of turtles. 
In both (1) and (31), it is likely that the hearer will resolve the reference  of ‘these 
primitive reptiles’ and ‘they’ in the same way: in both cases, the referring expression 
will be interpreted as co-referential with the antecedent phrase ‘pareiasaurs’.  It 
therefore seems that, despite the discussion in 4.2.2 above, the conceptual information 
‘primitive reptiles’ is unnecessary as far as resolving reference is concerned, since the 
pronoun ‘they’, which does not carry this information, works just as well.  Indeed, I 
predict that a hearer could correctly resolve reference in (31) even if he did not know 
what a pareiasaur was, and had only limited knowledge of primitive reptiles.  This falls 
out naturally from my earlier discussion, since we have seen that the set of pareiasaurs 
is the most accessible potential referent, and so will be tested first.   
However, if the conceptual constraints discussed above are not strictly necessary 
for reference resolution, then why is (1) - which is linguistically more complex than 
(31) - not ruled out by considerations of effort?  Once again, the answer is provided by 132 
the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure and the associated principles of 
relevance.  According to the procedure, the hearer should test interpretive hypotheses in 
order of accessibility, and stop when his expectation of relevance is satisfied.  So far I 
have concentrated on the first clause of the procedure, which stipulates that 
interpretations will be tested in order of accessibility, but the second clause is equally 
important and it will help us gain insight in this case.  The hearer can presume that the 
utterance will be optimally relevant, where optimal relevance is defined as in (13) 
above.  Once again, we must return to the basics of relevance theory to remind 
ourselves what makes an input relevant enough to be worth processing.  The 
interpretation of (1), as compared with (31), involves the same assignment of reference 
to the referring expression, but demands that the hearer process more linguistic material.  
He must also narrow the set of potential referents to just those things that are both 
primitive and reptiles, even though the pareiasaurs are already the most salient potential 
referent in the discourse context.  This extra effort will only be justified if it is rewarded 
with extra cognitive effects.  I claim that that is exactly what happens in this case, and 
that the extra effects that the speaker intends to convey explain the alternative choices of 
referring expression. 
Recall the three types of cognitive effect that contribute to relevance, as discussed 
in chapter 2 above.  The processing of an input in a given context may lead to the 
strengthening of a contextual assumption, it may contradict and eliminate a contextual 
assumption, or it may combine with contextual assumptions to yield implications that 
follow from the input and the context together, but from neither the input nor the 
context on its own.  The greater the effects, and the smaller the effort required to derive 
these effects, the more relevant the input will be (for that person, at that time). 
The effects that will be derived from the additional conceptual information in the 
referring expression ‘these primitive reptiles’ in (1) depend on the contextual 
assumptions available to the hearer.  Consider the following possible contextual 
assumptions and their likely interaction with the input in (1). 
(32)  Pareiasaurs are primitive reptiles. 
(33)  Pareiasaurs are primitive mammals. 
If the hearer of (1) holds the assumption in (32), then the utterance will have the effect 
of strengthening this assumption.  The size of the effect will depend on the strength with 133 
which the hearer held (32) to begin with, and his judgement of the speaker’s expertise 
and honesty.  If the hearer held assumption (33), by contrast, then processing (1) will 
lead to the contradiction and possible elimination of this assumption.  Once again, the 
size of the effect will depend on the hearer’s assessment of the speaker’s abilities and 
honesty (not everything that is communicated is believed).  Both utterances make it 
possible to derive cognitive effects that would not have been derived from the utterance 
in (1).   
Now consider a third possibility.  The hearer holds no assumptions about 
pareiasaurs: he has never heard of them and has no idea what they are.  He will still 
process the utterance in (1) with the expectation that it will be optimally relevant.  
Following the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure, he will test out 
representations of possible referents in order of accessibility.  In this case, since he has 
no full-fledged concept of pariesaurs, he starts, (as children do when processing 
unfamiliar words) from a metarepresentation of the full-fledged concept that he takes 
the speaker to possess.  Recall, as part of the interpretation process, the hearer must 
construct ‘an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual assumptions (in 
relevance-theoretic terms, implicated premises)’ (Wilson & Sperber, 2004, p. 261).  An 
easily accessible contextual assumption in this case would be (34). 
(34)  ‘Pareiasaurs’ are primitive reptiles. 
This implicated premise is likely to be relevant to the hearer in its own right, as a new 
piece of information that may be useful in the processing of later utterances.
6  So (1) 
leads to a cognitive effect that would not have been derived if the utterance in (31) had 
been used in its place.  The extra effort of processing a complex demonstrative rather 
than a pronoun is offset by the extra rewards of accessing the implicature in (34). 
The relevance theoretic approach to communication stresses the importance of 
interpreting utterances in a context. When Gundel (2003) and Gundel and Mulkern 
(1998) discuss the example in (1), they do so without discussing the discourse context in 
which it occurs.  In fact, example (1) comes from a scientific paper (Lee, 1993), and I 
suggest that the author has formulated his utterance so as to produce as many cognitive 
effects in as many readers as possible, as efficiently as possible.  Different readers will 
                                                
6 In many ways, (34) functions similarly to a bridging assumption.  However, I follow the view of 
Matsui (2000) that this is not a genuine bridging assumption since there is an “explicitly mentioned 
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hold different assumptions, perhaps including those in (32) or (33), and so the potential 
for deriving the cognitive effects discussed above is clear.   
However, I suggest that this kind of carefully formulated textbook or academic 
style is not the only way in which conceptual information can affect the implicit side of 
communication.  Consider the utterances in (35) and (36). 
(35)  Johni went into town for his lunch.  Hei was late back to the office. 
(36)  Johni went into town for his lunch.  The rascali was late back to the office. 
In (35), the effort required from the hearer in narrowing of the set of potential referents 
is minimal.  He need only exclude potential referents who are not male
7.  When 
processing (36), however, the hearer is required to do more work.  The referring 
expression ‘the rascal’ limits the set of potential referents to those the speaker considers 
to have the property of being a rascal.  Logically, the hearer has two choices at this 
stage:  he can either treat John as a member of this set, or assume he is not a member.  
Taking the second option would leave him with nothing on which to resolve reference, 
and his expectation that the utterance will be optimally relevant would be disappointed.  
He is therefore likely to try the other option and construct the contextual assumption in 
(37). 
(37)  The speaker thinks that John is a rascal. 
Reference is again resolved on John, since he remains the only potential referent whose 
representation is accessible enough.  However, the extra effort required by this 
formulation is rewarded with extra effects: the hearer now knows that the speaker 
regards John as a rascal.  This may be relevant in its own right as a piece of new 
information, or it might combine with other existing contextual assumptions to increase 
the contextual implications of (36): for instance, it might combine with the assumption 
in (38), to yield the contextual implication in (39). 
(38)  To call someone a rascal is to condemn some aspect of their behaviour. 
                                                
7 It is not clear that even this level of restriction is necessary here, since there are no non-male potential 
referents to be ruled out.  In chapter 6 I discuss similar examples, and consider the significance of gender 
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(39)  The speaker is condemning John’s returning late from lunch. 
I suggest that, in practice, the use of a referring expression such as ‘the rascal’ is likely 
to lead to a whole range of weak implicatures based on assumptions about the nature of 
rascals, and the speaker’s opinion of John.  The speaker has therefore produced a wide 
range of cognitive effects for only a little extra effort.  In this way, the conceptually 
encoded content of the referring expression has contributed to the inferential phase of 
communication, and we can see referring expressions as just one more device by which 
a speaker can achieve optimal relevance.   
However, there is no guarantee that adding extra conceptual content will always 
result in more or different cognitive effects.  Consider (40). 
(40)  ??Johni went into town for his lunch.  The mani was late back to the office. 
The structures in (36) and (40) take the same form.  Both use definite descriptions (‘the 
rascal’/‘the man’) to refer back to John.  However, the result is less acceptable in (40) 
than in (36)
8.  The difference in acceptability of (36) and (40) lies in the relation 
between the processing effort the referring expressions require and the effects that they 
offer in return.  The narrowing required by the pronoun ‘he’ in (35) is minimal.  
Although the referring expression ‘the rascal’ in (36) requires more narrowing, this is 
rewarded with extra cognitive effects.  In (40), the expression ‘the man’ requires more 
effort, but does not provide any obvious extra effects.  The hearer is required to narrow 
the set of potential referents to a sub-set which qualify as ‘men’, but given that John is 
the only potential referent in the discourse context, this is an apparently gratuitous extra 
layer of narrowing, which calls for extra processing effort, and should therefore offer 
extra effects.  However, there are no obvious cognitive effects that can result from 
choosing the referring expression ‘the man’.  The only conceivable contextual 
assumption with which the input could combine is that in (41). 
(41)  John is a man. 
But unless the hearer was under the misconception that John might be a dog or other 
type of non-human, or perhaps a female, it is unlikely that the implicated premise in 
                                                
8 Neither Accessibility theory nor the GHZ framework has anything to say about why this should be.  
Both treat definite descriptions as a unitary set, whose members should be acceptable under the same 
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(41) would contribute to relevance, either by strengthening existing assumptions, by 
contradicting or eliminating existing assumptions, or by combining with existing 
assumptions to yield contextual implications.
9 Thus, the extra effort required by (40) is 
gratuitous, and the result should be stylistically less than optimal. 
4.3.2  Procedural information and implicit meaning 
So far, I have discussed how the conceptual information encoded by referring 
expressions contributes to explicit and implicit content, and how the procedural 
information encoded by pronouns and determiners can affect the proposition expressed, 
and therefore contribute to explicit content.  In this section, I examine the fourth 
logically possible combination: the effect of this procedural information on the implicit 
side of utterance interpretation.  I return to the examples in (1)-(4), and the differences 
in acceptability of the alternations in determiner forms. 
In section 4.2.3, I showed how the spatial information encoded by the determiner 
in a complex demonstrative may exclude certain potential referents and thus help the 
hearer to resolve reference.  As discussed above, this extra layer of narrowing does not 
seem to be necessary for reference resolution in the case of (1).  In both (1) (‘A restudy 
of pareiasaurs reveals that these primitive reptiles are the nearerst relative of turtles’) 
and (2) (‘A restudy of pareiasaurs reveals that the primitive reptiles are the nearerst 
relative of turtles’) ‘pareisaurs’ is the most accessible potential referent for the referring 
expression ‘these/the primitive reptiles’, and in both cases reference will be resolved on 
it.  However, this is not to say that the indication of proximity carried by the determiner 
in (1) plays no role in the interpretation of this utterance.  In processing (1), the hearer 
will still presume that it is optimally relevant, and is therefore entitled to expect that the 
speaker will not deliberately cause him gratuitous effort.  Since the procedural 
information encoded by the complex demonstrative is not necessary for deriving the 
explicit content, he should expect some other effect to justify its use.   
In general, indications of proximity are only appropriate when the spatial location 
of the referent is significant in some way, for example, by distinguishing it from some 
other non-proximal entity.  Thus, use of the complex demonstrative form ‘this/these N’ 
indicates that the intended referent contrasts with some other entity of the same type.  
Both Reboul (1997) and Powell (2002) offer some suggestions about how to capture the 
difference between complex demonstratives and definite descriptions, and both seem to 
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be appealing to this idea of contrast.  I believe it does indeed shed some light on the 
procedures encoded by these forms of referring expression. 
As discussed above, Reboul considers the procedural information encoded by the 
definite article ‘the’, and suggests that it restricts interpretation to ‘a set Q of objects of 
which one is N while all the others are not’(1999, p. 8).  Here, N corresponds to the 
conceptual information encoded by the definite description accompanying the 
determiner. Powell (2002) discusses the difference between definite descriptions and 
complex demonstratives as part of his work on reference.  Complex demonstratives, he 
claims, are ‘communicative tools designed for a particular purpose, that purpose being 
to talk about particular members of the nominal class’
10 (2002, p. 226).  He goes on to 
discuss how complex demonstratives contrast with definite descriptions: ‘the nominal of 
a definite description must be uniquely denoting, that of a complex demonstrative must 
not be uniquely denoting.’ (2002, p. 230), and describes their procedural meaning as 
follows:   
whereas a definite description ‘the F’ exploits, by dint of its linguistic 
meaning, the property of being a unique F in order to guide a hearer to the 
intended interpretation, a complex demonstrative ‘that F’ exploits the 
property of being a non-unique F to guide the hearer to an individual 
concept (2002, p. 230). 
Powell places particular emphasis on the idea that the object picked out by the 
descriptive content of a complex demonstrative is non-unique, and the referent is 
therefore picked out as one instance of an F in contrast to all the other instances of Fs.
11 
I argued in 4.3.1 that for a hearer following the relevance theoretic comprehension 
procedure, the procedural information about spatial relations encoded by a complex 
demonstrative may be superfluous during the explicit phase of communication.  I now 
want to suggest that this information can be exploited during the implicit phase to 
constrain the type of inferences that the hearer is encouraged to draw.  The contrast in 
appropriateness between the resulting inferences should help to explain the differences 
in acceptability between the utterances in (1) - (4).  We must therefore ask what role this 
procedural information plays in the interpretation process, and exactly how the 
                                                
10 By nominal class, Powell seems to mean  the set of things that fall under the concept encoded by the 
complex demonstrative. 
11 Again, I will discuss this notion of ‘contrast’ in relation to demonstratives in more detail in section 
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differences in acceptability of utterances (1) - (4), and the related examples in (5)-(8), 
might be explained. 
As discussed above, a hearer following the comprehension procedure tests 
interpretive hypotheses in order of accessibility.  Given the context made accessible by 
processing the previous utterance (1) (‘A restudy of pareiasaurs reveals that these 
primitive reptiles are the nearest relatives of turtles’), the most salient set of two groups 
for the interpretation of (3) and (4) should consist of the pareiasaurs and the turtles.  The 
conceptual information provided by the phrase ‘the/these two groups’ should be enough 
to ensure that the hearer retrieves the intended referent, just as it was in (1). 
Recall my claim that the procedural information about spatial relations encoded 
by a complex demonstrative is only relevant if there is another potential referent in a 
different spatial relation to the speaker.  By encoding such information, as in (4) (‘These 
two groups...’), the speaker therefore creates a contrast effect.  No such effect is created 
by use of the uniquely-denoting definite description form ‘the two groups’, as in (3).  
Thus, in (4), the two groups under discussion are presented as contrasting with other 
potential groups.  This in turn gives rise to a range of weak implicatures about other 
groups that do not share the same characteristics.  The same implicatures are not derived 
in (3), where the only two groups of any relevance are the turtles and the pareiasaurs. 
On this account, the contrast in acceptability between (2) and (3) results not from 
any encoded level of Accessibility or Givenness, but from the appropriateness of the 
inferences derivable from each version.  Both (4), with its indication of contrast, and 
(3), without it, are equally acceptable in the discourse context.  However, things are 
different with (1) and (2).  As argued above, in (1) ‘these primitive reptiles’ guides the 
hearer to an interpretation where the pareisaurs are set in contrast to other potential 
groups of primitive reptiles.  This is just what the speaker of (1) intends:  it is these 
reptiles, and not others, that are claimed to be the closest relatives of turtles.  Logically, 
only one set of primitive reptiles can be ‘the closest relatives of turtles’, and thus, an 
utterance where the intended referent is set in contrast to others is the most appropriate.  
Noice that if we take away the superlative, then the ‘the/these’ variants become equally 
acceptable, as in (5) -(8).  Add the superlative back in, and we find the same contrast 
arising again, with only a marginal anaphoric epithet reading available, as in (42)-(43): 
(42)  A restudy of pareiasaurs reveals that these primitive reptiles were the largest in 
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(43)  ??A restudy of pareiasaurs reveals that the primitive reptiles were the largest in 
Africa. 
Thus, the role of the demonstrative determiner and the procedural information that it 
contributes to the interpretation of the complex demonstrative is two-fold.  It may help 
to narrow the set of potential referents and guide the hearer to the explicit meaning by 
encoding a procedure which further narrows the set of potential referents, or it may 
guide the hearer in the inferential phase of comprehension.  When the resulting 
inferences conflict with the sense of the utterance, an infelicity effect may occur.  
Once again, it is vital to remember that as determination of explicit and implicit 
content takes place in parallel, the procedural information conveyed by pronouns and 
determiners is ultimately a device by which a speaker can achieve optimal relevance.  
Furthermore, the marginality of the judgement on (2)(‘A restudy of pareiasaurs reveals 
that the primitive reptiles are the nearest relatives of turtles’) seems to suggest that an 
inferential account rather than a pure decoding account may be appropriate.  The fact 
that the acceptability of these utterances can be affected by the context in which they are 
uttered is to be expected if the crucial factor is the role they play in what is implicitly 
communicated. 
4.4  Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have outlined a relevance-based account of referring expressions in 
which the form of the expression is a guide to the hearer in reference resolution and 
different forms may yield different inferential effects.  I have argued that referring 
expressions encode conceptual and/or procedural information which may contribute to 
what is explicitly and/or implicitly communicated.  I have argued that this approach 
provides an explanation for the acceptability judgements on (1)-(4), and this, in turn, 
weakens the case for introducing theory-external notions of Accessibility or Givenness.  
In the next chapter, I apply the same approach to the pairs of referring expressions 
which, according to Accessibility theory, could not be distinguished on a relevance-only 
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Chapter 5: Motivating the distinctions: demonstratives 
and stressed pronouns 
5.1  Introduction 
In chapter 4, I outlined a relevance theory approach to referring expressions which uses 
the conceptual /procedural distinction to show how referring expressions might 
contribute to what is explicitly and implicitly communicated by an utterance.  I worked 
through the examples given by Gundel and Mulkern (1998) to illustrate differences in 
interpretation and acceptability in the use of definite descriptions and complex 
demonstratives, and in doing so, I appealed to the idea that complex demonstratives 
encode information about proximity and convey suggestions of contrast.   
In this chapter, I work out these ideas in more detail and use them to analyse a 
range of examples which Ariel sees as problematic for a relevance-only account.  In 
section 5.2, I consider the distinction between the proximal and distal determiners ‘this’ 
and ‘that’.  I give a brief outline of how the contribution of demonstratives to reference 
resolution has been characterised in previous analyses, emphasising the variety of roles 
they play.  I then consider in more detail what distinguishes ‘this’ and ‘that’ from each 
other, and from the definite determiner ‘the’.  In section 5.3, I take a similar approach to 
the differences between stressed and unstressed pronouns. 
In line with the relevance-theoretic approach outlined in chapter 4, I treat referring 
expressions as encoding conceptual and/or procedural meaning which contributes to the 
speaker’s overall aim of making her utterance optimally relevant, and assume that in 
doing so, they may contribute either to reference resolution itself or to the derivation of 
implicit inferential effects
1.  One advantage of this approach is that it allows us to look 
                                                
1 There has been some debate about whether complex demonstratives are referential or 
quantificational.  Powell (2001; 2002) gives a detailed overview of the various positions, and argues that 
‘complex demonstratives can give rise to genuinely referential or genuinely quantificational truth 
conditions, according to speaker intention’ (2001, p. 69).  In this chapter, I follow Powell in assuming that 
‘complex demonstratives are tools used by speakers to indicate that the thought they intend to express 
contains an individual concept’ (2001, p.67).  On this account, those cases which are typically cited as 
examples of quantificational use, for example (i) and (ii), are analysed as communicating descriptive 
individual concepts. 
 
(i)  That hominid who discovered how to start fires was a genius. 
(ii)  Every father dreads that moment when his eldest child leaves home. 
 
As far as the genuinely referential cases go, ‘referentially-used complex demonstratives contribute 
nothing but their referents to propositional content’ (2001, .p. 71).  141 
beyond the process of reference resolution to consider the contribution of referring 
expressions to other types of effect: for instance, those associated with ‘emotional’ or 
‘metaphorical’ uses of demonstratives mentioned briefly in section 3.3.5.1, which have 
largely been ignored in the formal literature.  I briefly reconsider these so-called ‘special 
uses’ of referring expressions, and conclude that they are not so special after all. 
5.2  Demonstrative determiners 
5.2.1  Existing analyses 
Various attempts have been made to provide a taxonomy of demonstrative terms and 
their uses.  Following Diessel’s (1999) in-depth cross-linguistic study, Levinson (2004) 
proposes the classification in figure 1, and illustrates each category with the examples in 
(1)-(8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A taxonomy of demonstrative terms (Levinson 2004, p. 108). 
(1)  I hurt this finger. (gestural exophoric: requires gesture or presentation of finger) 
(2)  I broke this tooth first and then that one next. (gestural contrastive) 
                                                                                                                                          
In sum, this account of the semantics of complex demonstratives ‘takes a single semantics, a lexically 
encoded meaning which constrains the mapping from linguistics to conceptual representation for all 
complex demonstratives, and leaves the rest, i.e....whether the intended individual concept is de re or 
descriptive etc., to pragmatics’ (2001, p.70). 
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(3)  I like this city. (exophoric symbolic: does not require gesture). 
(4)  He looked down and saw the gun: this was the murder weapon, he realized. 
(transposed) 
(5)  “You are wrong”  That’s exactly what she said. (discourse deictic) 
(6)  The cowboy entered.  This man was not someone to mess with. (anaphoric) 
(7)  He went and hit that bastard. (empathetic) 
(8)  Do you remember that holiday we spent in the rain in Devon. (recognitional) 
Levinson acknowledges that ‘the relations between these uses are probably more 
complex than this taxonomy suggests’, and that there are many ‘borderline examples’ 
and ‘fuzzy borders’ (Levinson, 2004, p. 107).  Both Diessel and Levinson draw on 
earlier work by Lakoff (1974) and Fillmore (1982; 1997), who propose similar 
distinctions, discuss the various categories in more detail and point out many subtleties 
in the interpretation of demonstratives in English which are of particular interest for 
pragmatics.  I will therefore base my discussion largely on Lakoff and Fillmore’s 
accounts, bringing in the developments proposed by Diessel and Levinson as 
appropriate.   
Both Lakoff and Fillmore distinguish three broad categories of use which cross-
cut Levinson’s distinctions in figure 1:  Fillmore identifies ‘gestural’, ‘anaphoric’ and 
‘symbolic’ uses, while Lakoff identifies ‘spatio-temporal’, ‘discourse’ and ‘emotional’ 
uses.  Since the two sets of distinctions are roughly parallel, I will consider them 
together, and use them as the basis for my discussion.  
5.2.1.1  Gestural / spatio-temporal uses 
This is perhaps the most intuitive of the categories.  Fillmore describes gestural uses as 
those which ‘can be properly interpreted only by somebody who is monitoring some 
physical aspect of the communication situation’ (1997, p. 62).  Some physical 
demonstration of the intended referent, by gesture, eye-gaze, head nod or so on, must 
accompany the utterance for the use to be felicitous.  As Fillmore puts it, ‘you will 
expect the word to be accompanied by a gesture or demonstration of some sort,’ (1997, 143 
p. 63).  Lakoff (1974, p. 345) defines her first category as comprising ‘literal “pointing” 
words’, where ‘this’ is used when the object is close to the speaker and ‘that’ when it is 
further away, ‘particularly when contrasted with another closer’ entity.  Although 
Lakoff is not as explicit as Fillmore about the need for a demonstration to accompany 
the utterance, she does specify that this type of use ‘normally refers only to items 
literally in front of the speaker as he speaks’ (Lakoff, 1974, p. 346).  Consider (9), 
uttered by a customer in a bakery.  For the utterance to be felicitous, the objects referred 
to must be physically present and in some way indicated by the speaker (e.g. by 
pointing, eye gaze, head nod, etc.). 
(9)  I’ll take this loaf, that sausage roll and three of those buns. 
Such cases would, be considered ‘gestural’ by Fillmore and ‘spatio-temporal’ by 
Lakoff.  Whilst ‘spatial’ uses seem straightforward enough under Lakoff’s taxonomy, it 
remains unclear what she intends by the associated notion of a ‘temporal’ use.  She 
gives no explicit examples of temporal uses in discussing the ‘spatio-temporal’ 
category, and it is unclear how such uses would differ from the discourse-deictic uses 
described in the next sub-section 
Diessel (1999) classifies these ‘gestural’ and ‘spatial’ uses as ‘exophoric’, and 
argues that they have three distinctive features which set them apart from other uses: 
first, they involve the speaker (or some other person) as the deictic center, 
second they indicate a deictic contrast on a distance scale...and third, they 
are often accompanied by a pointing gesture  (Diessel, 1999, p. 94). 
5.2.1.2  Anaphoric / discourse uses 
Demonstrative determiners may be used to refer back or forward in the discourse, and 
both Fillmore and Lakoff consider examples of this type.  Fillmore (1997) does not limit 
his category of ‘anaphoric’ uses to just those whose referents are explicitly mentioned in 
the discourse, but includes any ‘happening which is observable at the same time by 
encoder and decoder’ (1997, p.104).  So, according to Fillmore, a speaker might use 
‘this’ ‘to refer forward in time to an event or happening, as in (10), or she might use it to 
introduce a subsequent part of her contribution to the discourse, as in (11). 
(10)  This is my imitation of a frog. 144 
(11)  This is my explanation. 
Fillmore draws a distinction here between backward looking reference (anaphora) and 
forward looking reference (cataphora), and makes the general claim that the distal 
determiner ‘that’ is usually associated with anaphora, as in (12), whilst ‘this’ is used for 
cataphora, as in (13). 
(12)  Eat your greens: that’s the solution to your problems. 
(13)  This is the solution to your problems:  eat your greens. 
The distinction in acceptability between forward and backward-looking anaphora is 
complicated by interaction with tense and aspect.  As Fillmore (1997, p.105) points out, 
(14) and (15) are, on the whole, more acceptable than (16) and (17), although both 
involve backward reference.  It seems that the perfect aspect and the perfect continuous 
aspect affect the choice between proximal and distal demonstrative independently of 
whether the reference is backward or forward looking.  I will return to this observation 
later. 
(14)  This has been an interesting course. 
(15)  That was a brilliant lecture. 
(16)  ?This was an interesting course.
2 
(17)  ?That has been a brilliant lecture. 
Lakoff makes a similar observation, pointing out that whilst ‘this’ can refer both 
forwards and backwards, ‘that’ is only available for backwards reference.  Again, the 
distinction between discourse uses and temporal uses remains unclear.  Subsequent 
contributions to the discourse necessarily take place in the future, and previous ones in 
the past.  Whilst for Lakoff discourse and temporal uses are classified as different 
functions of demonstratives, it seems that the borderline between the categories is 
blurred in many cases.  Lakoff also points out some subtle distinctions and nuances 
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at a written list of courses which the speaker has already taken. 145 
associated with discourse uses of demonstratives.  She suggests that whilst ‘that’ 
produces ‘a more colloquial tone’ in some examples, such as (18), it results in a 
distancing effect in others, such as (19) (Lakoff 1974, pp. 349-350).  
(18)  That man’s gonna get his one of these days! 
(19)  Kissinger made his long-awaited announcement yesterday.  That statement 
confirmed the speculations of many observers. 
Diessel distinguishes two distinct categories for demonstratives that refer to elements 
within the discourse: anaphoric and discourse deictic.  In his view ‘anaphoric 
demonstratives are coreferential with a noun or noun phrase in the previous 
discourse’(1999, p. 95), as in (6) (‘The cowboy entered.  This man was not someone to 
be messed with’) above.  By contrast, discourse demonstratives refer to propositions, 
focusing ‘the hearer’s attention on aspects of meaning expressed by a clause, a sentence, 
a paragraph or an entire story’ (1999, p. 101), as in (20): 
(20)  A:  I’ve heard you will move to Hawaii? 
(21)  B:  Who told you that? 
5.2.1.3  Symbolic and emotional uses 
Fillmore and Lakoff diverge considerably more in their description of the third and final 
category of demonstrative use.  For Fillmore, this covers ‘symbolic’ uses, which he 
defines as those requiring the hearer to ‘know...certain aspects of the speech 
communication situation’ in order to understand the utterance correctly.  He gives the 
example of a lecturer at a university using the phrase ‘this campus’ as part of an 
utterance (1997, p. 63).  The lecturer provides no explicit demonstration of the referent 
in this case, and so the use cannot be termed gestural.  However, the meaning is taken to 
be ‘the campus in which I am now located’, and Fillmore classes this use of the 
demonstrative as ‘symbolic’ of the speaker’s meaning.  Diessel (1999) and Levinson 
(2004) describe these uses as ‘symbolic exophoric’. 
Lakoff’s final category contains what she terms ‘emotional’ uses.  In these cases, 
the use of a demonstrative, and the choice between distal and proximal forms, creates 
effects that go beyond simply securing reference.  Lakoff divides this category into 146 
three subcategories.  The first contains uses of ‘this’ which are associated with a 
‘camaraderie’ or ‘closeness’ effect, or are used to create a sense of ‘vividness’ (Lakoff 
1974, p. 347).  Consider (22): 
(22)  A:  I see there's going to be peace in the mideast. 
B:  This Henry Kissinger really is something! 
According to Lakoff, such cases occur when ‘the speaker wishes to allude to something, 
or someone, already mentioned, but outside the discourse proper...its most natural use 
seems to be with proper names that the speaker expects the hearer to be familiar with’  
(Lakoff 1974, p. 347).   
Lakoff’s second category of ‘emotional’ demonstratives involves cases where 
‘this’ seems to stand in the place of the indefinite article ‘a’, as in (23).   
(23)  There was this travelling salesman, and he... 
She describes this as a colloquial use which produces a ‘vividness’ effect.  It has been 
analysed more recently as a case of ‘specific indefinite’ use, in which the speaker 
indicates that she has a specific individual in mind and expects the hearer to treat that 
individual as a discourse referent (Maclaren, 1980). 
Finally, Lakoff presents examples which combine emotional and discourse deixis.  
In these cases, ‘a person has been referred to in one sentence, and the next provides 
additional information about him pertinent to the subject-matter of the prior sentence’.  
The examples she gives from this category all use the demonstrative in its bare form, for 
instance (24). 
(24)  ‘Don't lie to me,’ said Dick.  This was a man who had twice been convicted of 
perjury. 
Again, she suggests that a sense of closeness is associated with use of the proximal 
demonstrative, and that this is understood as reflecting the closeness or relevance of the 
second sentence to the first. 
According to Lakoff, whereas ‘spatio-temporal’ uses of ‘this’ and ‘that’  have 
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Uses of ‘this’ to convey camaraderie are paralleled by uses of ‘that’ which appear to 
create a sense of intimacy.  Consider (25) and (26) as spoken by a doctor to a patient. 
(25)  How’s that throat? 
(26)  How’s your throat? 
Lakoff suggests that despite the use of the distal demonstrative, (25) conveys a sense of 
closeness or intimacy, and that had the doctor chosen to utter (26) instead, she would 
have been drawing attention to the fact that the ailment is not hers, and thus creating a 
distance between herself and her patient.  According to Lakoff ‘that’ may also be used 
to evoke ‘emotional solidarity’ (p.352) between speaker and hearer by implying that 
they both share the same view of the discourse subject matter.  As she points out, this 
unifying effect arising from the use of a demonstrative usually associated with distance 
is perhaps unexpected.   
These ‘emotional’ uses are categorised as ‘recognitional’ by Diessel (1999), who 
treats them as signalling that information is ‘discourse new’, ‘hearer old’ and ‘private’.  
‘Private’ information is ‘information that speaker and hearer share due to common 
experience in the past’, as opposed to ‘general cultural information’ that is shared by all 
members of the speech community (Diessel, 1999, p. 106).  According to Diessel, this 
use of demonstratives suggests that the speaker and hearer share the same viewpoint, 
and therefore indicates ‘emotional closeness, sympathy and shared beliefs’ (p. 107). 
Cornish (2001), following Strauss (1993), Cheshire (1996) and Glover (2000), 
also treats some ‘emotional’ (or ‘empathetic’, as he and Diessel term them) uses of 
‘that’, such as (27), as creating a ‘solidarity’ effect:   
(27)  ...‘Do we want machines which are more intelligent than humans, or should we 
call a halt to it?’ he asked.  ‘We are still a long way from that decision but I 
think...’ (The Guardian)  (Cornish, 2001, p. 303) 
According to Cornish, ‘the speaker is tacitly instructing the addressee to place the 
referent outside his/her discourse-cognitive sphere’, and thus casting the hearer as ‘a 
potential ally in the speaker/writer’s argumentative stance’ (Cornish, 2001, p. 304). 
At this point in his discussion, Cornish suggests that we view these interpretive 
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rather than it being a basic motivating principle determining its use’ (Cornish, 2001, p. 
305).  So we move away from simply identifying various uses of ‘this’ and ‘that’, and 
towards an account where an underlying meaning interacts with the discourse context to 
yield more and different effects.  This move will prove to be pivotal in the development 
of my relevance-based analysis. 
5.2.1.4  Towards a unified approach 
Lakoff’s and Fillmore’s descriptions of the effects that result from the choice of 
demonstrative seem, for the most part, intuitively correct.  However, neither gives a 
systematic explanation of why these effects should arise, and how they fit into an 
overall account of utterance interpretation.  Both seem to be more concerned with 
providing a descriptive taxonomy rather than considering the semantic and pragmatic 
functions of demonstrative determiners. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the boundaries between the categories they 
propose seem at times blurred and arbitrary.  It is unclear how Fillmore’s temporal cases 
fit into the taxonomy, and the generalisations made appear to have many exceptions.  
Lakoff makes the interesting suggestion that in some cases the contribution of the 
demonstrative goes beyond merely securing reference.  However, her category of 
‘emotional’ uses amounts to little more than a bundle of disparate examples.  In 
analysing these uses and their effects, she appeals to unanalysed notions of ‘vividness’, 
‘closeness’ and ‘camaraderie’ which are standard in rhetorical accounts of stylistic and 
poetic effects.  Relevance theory has tried to go beyond such vague notions, and aims to 
offer an explanation based on the relation between indirectness, effort and effect 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, pp. 217-224; Blakemore, 1993; 1994).  I will return to 
these examples in developing my own analysis of demonstratives, and consider how 
relevance theory might approach them. 
Both Diessel (1999) and Cornish (2001) provide accounts which seek to link the 
various uses of demonstratives.  Diessel argues that the exophoric use is ‘basic and 
unmarked’ (p. 114), and that the other uses are derived from it.  By contrast, for 
Cornish, it is the ‘modal’ or ‘empathetic’ use that is basic, and the other uses which are 
derived (Cornish, 2001, p. 312).  The central claim of my account will be that 
demonstratives encode procedures, and that these procedures interact with the discourse 
context to yield the various uses and interpretations.  Like Diessel and Cornish, I 
assume that we must move beyond the traditional characterisation of the difference 
between the distal demonstrative ‘that’ and its proximal counterpart ‘this’ as relating 149 
only to the relative spatial distance between the speaker and the entity to which she is 
referring (Lyons, 1977; Levinson, 1983; Anderson & Keenan, 1985; Halliday, 1985).  
Much evidence suggests that this ‘static’ characterisation is inadequate (Strauss, 1993; 
Janssen, 1995; Maes, 1996; Cornish, 2001; Strauss, 2002).  Both Lakoff and Fillmore 
treat ‘distance’ as going beyond the purely spatial dimension to encompass cases of 
symbolic, metaphorical and emotional distance, although neither offers a truly unified 
account of the data.  Indeed, Lakoff is fairly pessimistic about the prospect of providing 
a unified account, and comments that whilst the task of uniting spatial, discourse and 
emotional uses is the ultimate aim, ‘How this is to be done remains mysterious’ (Lakoff 
1974, p. 355).   
However, there have been various attempts to bring demonstratives within the 
scope of more general analyses of referring expressions such as those proposed by Ariel 
and Gundel, which treat different referring expressions as signalling different types of 
cognitive status.  As discussed in chapter 3, Ariel’s Accessibility Theory (1990) treats 
demonstrative pronouns as marking intermediate accessibility, and claims, more 
specifically, that ‘more accessible entities are referred to by the proximal marker.  Less 
accessible ones will be referred to by the distal ones’ (1990, p. 51).  She endorses 
Fillmore’s suggestion that ‘“that” requires identifiability by both speaker and addressee, 
whereas “this” sometimes refers to objects accessible only to the speaker’ (1990, p.53).  
And, like Fillmore and Lakoff, she also discusses the subtler effects that choice of a 
demonstrative determiner can have on utterance interpretation.  Consider the examples 
in (28) and (29). 
(28)  That holiday we spent in Cyprus was really something. 
(29)  The holiday we spent in Cyprus was really something. 
According to Ariel, use of the demonstrative rather than the definite description in (28) 
has the effect of raising ‘into consciousness “livelier pictures” of the said holiday’ 
(1990, p. 54), presumably because of the higher level of Accessibility signalled by this 
form. 
Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (1993) offer a slightly different analysis of 
demonstrative determiners.  According to the Givenness hierarchy, use of a definite 
article signals that the intended referent is ‘uniquely identifiable’, use of a distal 
demonstrative signals that the referent is ‘familiar’, and use of a proximal determiner 150 
signals that the referent has the even higher cognitive status of being ‘activated’
3.  Thus, 
the choice of determiner is seen as guiding the hearer to the speaker’s intended referent. 
Along similar lines, Strauss (2002) analyses the different forms of demonstrative 
as signalling different levels of ‘focus’, where focus is defined as ‘the force with which 
the hearer is instructed to seek the referent’ (Strauss 2002, p. 135).  Use of ‘this’ signals 
that the speaker regards the information as important, and as therefore deserving a high 
degree of focus.  Use of ‘that’ signals ‘medium focus’, and ‘it’ signals low focus.  On 
this account, a speaker’s choice of referring expression is based on ‘spontaneous, 
contextually grounded interactional factors between the various participants involved in 
the talk’ (Strauss, 2002, p. 133), including the relationship between speaker and hearer, 
the amount of information they share, and the relative importance of the referent to the 
speaker.  
Although these three approaches differ in their details, all three seek to place their 
account of demonstratives within a cognitively-orientated analysis of referring 
expressions in general, and move away from physical notions such as the referent’s 
proximity to or distance from the speaker.  They share the idea that the hearer is 
directed to a representation of the intended referent from amongst the set of candidate 
referents via information encoded by the various referring expression forms. 
Continuing this theme, Reboul (1997) situates her analysis more directly within 
the relevance-theoretic framework, and introduces the idea that demonstratives might 
encode non-truth conditional meaning that influences interpretation.  Unlike Ariel, 
Gundel and Strauss, however, she suggests that the difference between ‘this’ and ‘that’ 
has ‘to do with the relative distance between the speaker and the object designated’ 
(Reboul 1997, p. 11), thus reintroducing the traditional appeal to proximity or distance. 
However, she remains rather vague about how this difference might be developed 
within a full account.  In the next section, I take Reboul’s proposal that demonstratives 
encode non-truth conditional meaning as a starting point, although like Strauss and 
Cornish, I will move away from the idea that demonstratives encode purely physical 
notions of proximity and distance relating to the ‘geographical location of their referents 
in relation to the speaker’ (Cornish, 2001, p. 306), and go for a more abstract proximity-
based account.  My main aim is to show how demonstratives can be analysed in terms 
of encoded procedures.  By applying these procedures to the data, I will try to provide 
evidence that the uses of demonstratives fall into two broad categories which cross-cut 
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hierarchy, bare demonstratives, both the distal ‘that’ and proximal ‘this’, signal that the intended referent 
is ‘activated’.  See Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (1993) for further discussion. 151 
the tripartite distinctions proposed by Lakoff and Fillmore, and unify the various uses 
identified by Diessel and Cornish.   
First, I will consider some cases where the choice of a distal as opposed to a 
proximal form changes the way that reference is likely to be resolved.  I will then 
examine some examples where it does not.  When the choice of determiner does not 
affect reference resolution (and therefore does not affect the derivation of explicit 
content), we must ask what role the encoded procedure might play.  I will argue that the 
range of different uses discussed above are, in fact, a result of the same underlying 
procedure interacting with different discourse contexts to yield a wide range of 
inferential effects.  This is a development of Diessel’s and Cornish’s ideas , and Lakoff 
(p.346) herself makes a suggestion that seems to be moving in this direction: 
we may want to consider this [spatio-temporal] use as exemplifying the 
‘basic’ demonstrative, with the others perhaps to be derived from it by a 
process of metaphorization, or abstraction  (Lakoff, 1974, p. 346). 
The cognitively-orientated accounts of Ariel, Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski, Strauss 
and Reboul take us closer to a unified analysis, but still fail to address the full range of 
data.  In the following sections, I will try to develop such a unified analysis using the 
relevance-theoretic notion of procedural meaning, and show how the inferential effects 
of the various uses of demonstratives might be derived via interaction between 
procedural meaning, discourse context and the relevance comprehension procedure.   
Before embarking on this, however, I will look briefly at some observations by 
the philosopher David Kaplan (1989) on the treatment of demonstratives and their role 
in reference resolution, which raise important questions about the value of cognitively- 
and communicatively-oriented analyses of the type I have been considering here. 
5.2.1.5  Kaplan: Pure indexicals, true demonstratives and intentions 
Kaplan (1989) distinguishes between what he terms ‘pure indexicals’ and ‘true 
demonstratives’.  A true demonstrative requires some sort of accompanying 
demonstration to make reference.  For pure indexicals, on the other hand, no 
demonstration is required to establish reference, and ‘any demonstration supplied is 
either for emphasis or is irrelevant’ (p.491).  Some expressions can function both as 
pure indexicals and as demonstratives, and Kaplan provides the examples in (30) and 
(31) to illustrate. 152 
(30)  I am here. 
(31)  In two weeks, I will be here. [pointing at a city on a map] 
For Kaplan, ‘here’ in (30) is a pure indexical, whereas in utterance (31) it functions as a 
demonstrative, and reference will only be resolved if there is an accompanying gesture 
or other clue to the speaker’s intentions.  This aspect of his theory is summarised in the 
principle in (32). 
(32)  The referent of a pure indexical depends on the context, and the referent of a 
demonstrative depends on the associated demonstration. 
I will return to this distinction between indexicals and true demonstratives when I 
consider the uses of demonstrative determiners and their contribution to explicitly 
communicated meaning. 
In Afterthoughts (1989), Kaplan revisits these ideas and discusses true 
demonstratives in more detail.  Although he repeats that demonstratives must be 
accompanied by a demonstration of some kind, he argues that what determines 
reference in these cases is the speaker’s intention rather than the external gesture or 
indication.  The demonstration is there, he claims, ‘only to help convey an intention’ 
(pp. 583-584), and we should ‘regard the demonstration as a mere externalization of this 
inner intention,’ which itself determines the referent (p. 582).  This shift in emphasis 
from an external demonstration to the intention of the speaker brings us closer to 
pragmatically-orientated approaches such as relevance theory. 
In relevance theory, speakers’ intentions are seen as playing a much greater role in 
reference resolution than is envisaged in many formal semantic accounts.  As a result, 
there is no need for a theoretical distinction between ‘true demonstratives’ and ‘pure 
indexical’ uses of demonstratives.  Instead, all referential uses of ‘this’ and ‘that’ are 
seen as dependent on the speaker’s intentions, whether or not they are accompanied by 
extra, external clues.  Indeed, in a footnote, Kaplan himself states that he views 
‘demonstrations as playing the same role for true demonstratives as does pointing at 
oneself when using the first-person pronoun’ (n35, p.582).  Since the first-person 
pronoun is one of the clearest examples of a pure indexical in Kaplan’s sense, this move 
towards recognising the role of intentions blurs the boundaries of Kaplan’s original 153 
distinction, and brings us closer to an analysis where all referential uses ultimately 
depend on the speaker’s intentions.   
Bach (1992), who defends and discusses Kaplan’s view on intentions, argues 
explicitly that the referential intention is part of the wider communicative intention: it 
‘isn’t just any intention to refer to something one has in mind but is the intention that 
one’s audience identify, and take themselves to be intended to identify, a certain item as 
the referent by means of thinking of it a certain identifiable way’ (Bach, 1992, p. 143).  
Moreover, the communication of this intention does not happen ‘by magic’, and having 
the intention in one’s mind does not guarantee that it will be successfully recognised.  
Rather, ‘you decide to refer to something and try to select an expression whose 
utterance will enable your audience, under the circumstances, to identify that object’ 
(1992, p. 145).  Thus, the recognition of intentions is all-important to reference 
resolution, and the speaker should give whichever linguistic or non-linguistic clues are 
needed to secure it.  To consider in more detail how this plays out in terms of utterance 
interpretation, I return again to the framework of relevance theory, and in particular, to 
the notion of procedural meaning. 
5.2.2  A procedural analysis of demonstratives 
Since the idea of procedural meaning was first developed by Diane Blakemore (1987) 
there have been various attempts to characterise the individual procedures encoded by 
different forms of expression (Blakemore, 2000, 2002; Wharton, 2003; Iten, 2005; Hall, 
2007; Hedley, 2007).  As Wilson and Sperber (1993) point out, this is no easy matter, 
since ‘We have direct access neither to grammatical computations nor to the inferential 
computations used in comprehension’ (1993, p. 16).  As a result, procedural meaning is 
very hard to pin down. Still, it is now quite widely assumed in relevance theory that 
personal pronouns can be analysed in procedural terms, so that the pronoun ‘she’, for 
instance, facilitates the retrieval of female (or grammatically feminine) candidate 
referents (see Wilson and Wharton 2006).  In the following sections, I will argue that 
demonstratives should also be analysed as encoding procedural information, and 
consider what this procedural information might look like.   
According to relevance theory, procedural information guides the inferential 
phase of comprehension, and inference may play a role on both sides of the 
explicit/implicit divide.  Assuming this model, I consider how the same underlying 
procedure might play a role not only in reference resolution, but also in the derivation of 
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of demonstrative forms.  Bearing in mind the wide range of uses identified by Fillmore, 
Lakoff and Levinson, I begin by considering in more detail how traditional notions such 
‘proximal’ and ‘distal’ might fit into the framework, and how a speaker’s conception of 
relative proximity or distance might influence their choice of demonstrative.  In this, I 
depart from Ariel’s and Gundel’s accounts, in which such traditional notions appear to 
play no role. 
Reboul (1997) argues that there is a clear difference in acceptability between 
examples (33) and (34), although they refer to the same plane, express the same 
propositions, and should therefore share their truth conditions. 
(33)  A plane crashed yesterday in New York.  This plane flew every day from Miami 
to New York. 
(34)  ?A plane crashed yesterday in New York.  That plane flew every day from 
Miami to New York. 
Since the two examples differ only in the choice of demonstrative determiner, ‘this’ or 
‘that’, this difference in acceptability must be linked to the choice of determiner.  And 
since the same proposition, with the same truth conditions, is expressed in both cases, 
the difference does not seem to be a conceptual one, and we are left with the possibility 
that the demonstrative determiners ‘this’ and ‘that’ differ in the procedural information 
they encode. 
What might this procedural information look like, and how might a speaker use it 
to optimise the relevance of her utterance?  I take as my starting point the traditional 
distal/proximal distinction often used to characterise the difference between ‘this’ and 
‘that’, and explore how we might generalise the notions of proximity and distance to 
apply to a much wider range of cases. 
Powell (1998, p. 18), who proposes a procedural approach based on the traditional 
distal/proximal distinction, suggests that ‘this’ and ‘that’ encode related, but different, 
two-step procedures.  ‘This’ encodes the procedure, ‘find the speaker and then find an 
object near the speaker,’ and for ‘that’, the procedure is the same except that the hearer 
expected to find an object far away from the speaker.  This analysis is then extended to 
the plural forms, with ‘these’ encoding the procedure, ‘find an object near the speaker 
and then find a plural referent relating to it’, and mutatis mutandis for ‘those’.  Powell’s 
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speaker.  This approach highlights the important point that proximity/distance are 
relational terms.  A candidate referent will be proximal or distal relative to some point 
of reference.  Here, proximity and distance are not properties inherent in the referent 
itself, but depend on the context in which the utterance is processed, and will vary as 
elements of the discourse context vary.  This is particularly evident in an exchange such 
as (35)-(37). 
(35)  Natasha :  Pass me that book. 
(36)  Marya :  This book? 
(37)  Natasha :  Yes, that book. 
In this case, each speaker assesses the proximity of the book relative to herself, and 
from her own point of view, so that the same entity is referred to using both the distal 
and proximal forms.  Once the book has been passed to Natasha, she may then utter (38) 
and still be understood as referring to the same item. 
(38)  Natasha : I love this book. 
From a relevance-theoretic perspective, drawing attention to the relative proximity 
of an entity to a speaker will be relevant if it reduces the effort involved in reference 
resolution, either by adding an extra layer of activation to the hearer’s mental 
representation of the intended referent, or by ruling out any non-intended competitors.  
If the relative proximity to the speaker of the intended referent sets it apart from the 
other potential referents in either of these ways, then providing such proximity 
information is likely to be an efficient strategy for the speaker to follow. 
A spatially-based notion of proximity where ‘this’ is used to refer to objects close 
to the speaker and ‘that’ is used to refer to objects far from the speaker may seem 
intuitively attractive in these examples.  However, it has been argued using evidence 
from psychology that this approach is over-simplistic and problematic.  Kemmerer 
(1999) presents evidence that our perceptual assessments of proximity to and distance 
from ourselves do not fit well with the way that distal and proximal demonstratives are 
used cross-linguistically.  Perceptually, a basic distinction is drawn between objects that 
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use of proximal and distal demonstratives does not correspond to this distinction.  
Rather, according to Kemmerer, the spatial distinctions conveyed by the use of 
demonstratives, are much more abstract and relative.   
Consider examples (39) and (40) (Kemmerer 1999, p. 52, taken from (Talmy, 
1988)). 
(39)  This speck is smaller than that speck. 
(40)  This planet is smaller than that planet. 
The specks referred to in (39) may be tiny, close together and within the speaker’s 
reach, whilst the planets in (40) will be huge, far apart and remote from the speaker.  In 
both cases, however, ‘this’ and ‘that’ may be used felicitously to refer to the individual 
specks and planets, respectively.  Just as ‘smaller’ is a relative notion dependent on the 
discourse context and the nature of the items it describes, so the proximity information 
conveyed by the demonstratives is also relative.  According to Kemmerer, ‘the proximal 
demonstrative this means simply “closer to the deictic center than that” and, conversely, 
the distal demonstrative that means simply “further from the deictic center than this’ 
(1999, p. 52).  So a story begins to emerge where ‘this’ and ‘that’ are to be interpreted 
not only relative to a context and a deictic centre (e.g. a speaker), but also relative to one 
another.  This suggests that ‘this’ and ‘that’ are fundamentally contrastive in nature.  
Use of a demonstrative may be seen as adding an extra layer of activation to the hearer’s 
representation of the intended referent by setting it in contrast with similar, but 
different, competing representation(s).  
Kemmerer sums up by saying that demonstratives involve ‘semantic 
representations rather than concrete spatial representations; and the remarkable 
pragmatic flexibility of demonstratives is due to the fact that they are essentially deictic 
terms that cannot function apart from specific discourse contexts’ (1999, p. 56). This 
notion of relativity and the importance of the role played by discourse context will be a 
central theme in my relevance-based account. 
As mentioned in passing above, a further objection to analysing demonstratives in 
terms of purely spatial notions of proximity is that the contrasts they evoke are not 
restricted only to the spatial domain.  As Lakoff and Fillmore point out, an entity may 
be distinguishable by its relative proximity to the speaker in place, time, thought or 
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instance, a referent may be seen as proximal in discourse terms if it is the current focus 
of the exchange, although it may be distal in spatial terms.  Take, for example, a case of 
so-called deferred reference, as discussed by Nunberg (1995; 2004).  A customer hands 
a car key to a car park attendant and utters (41).  
(41)  This is parked out back. 
Here, the speaker uses the demonstrated object (the key) as a proximal clue to the 
intended referent (the car), which itself is distal.  The hearer’s recognition of the 
speaker’s intention to refer to the car (via the clue provided by the key) brings the 
mental representation of the intended referent into the current focus of the exchange.  A 
representation of the intended referent (the car) is thus proximal in thought and 
discourse, although the object itself remains spatially distant. 
Thus, assigning reference to a demonstrative expression requires identification of 
the deictic centre, on the one hand, and of the dimension in which a contrast is to be 
drawn, on the other.  Identification will proceed, as always, via the relevance-theoretic 
comprehension procedure.  We therefore predict that a speaker aiming at optimal 
relevance will construct any demonstrative expression so that the hearer can test 
interpretative hypotheses in order of accessibility, and stop when his expectations are 
satisfied.  Although the deictic centre will typically be the present time, location or 
status/role of the speaker, this is not necessarily the case.  For example, consider the 
exchange in (42)-(43). 
(42)  Dentist:  Does this one hurt? 
(43)  Patient:  Yes, it’s that one. 
Fillmore (1997, p.123) notes that the speaker may use a distal form for something 
relatively close to her in order to present it from the hearer’s perspective.  As the tooth 
in question is in the patient’s mouth, a speaker-based account of proximity relations 
would predict that the dentist should use the distal form and the patient the proximal 
form.  However, in this discourse context, it is the viewpoint of the dentist, who has 
presumably used a gesture of some sort to identify the intended tooth, that is relevant, 
and so both interlocutors represent the situation from the dentist’s point of view, and 
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My argument so far might be summarized as follows.  Reference is resolved via 
recognition of the speaker’s intentions.  Demonstratives are used when the nominal part 
of the referring expression (if there is one) is not uniquely denoting in the discourse 
context.  The speaker may then exploit procedural information encoded by the 
demonstrative to guide the hearer to the intended referent (i.e. indicating to which 
instance of ‘N’ she intends to refer)
4.  This procedural information relates to the 
proximity/distance of the intended N to a deictic centre, as compared to competing 
instances of Ns.  The effect should be to single out the intended referent and add an 
extra layer of activation to its representation so that it will be the most accessible one in 
the discourse context.  ‘This’ is used when the intended referent is ‘closer to the deictic 
center than “that”’ (where ‘that’ would be used to refer to a competing instance of N).  
‘That’ is used when the intended referent is ‘further from the deictic center than “this”’ 
(where ‘this’ would be used to refer to a competing instance of N).  Proximity and 
distance may be assessed on various dimensions, e.g. in spatial, temporal, emotional, 
thought or discourse terms.  The hearer determines the deictic centre and the appropriate 
dimension of assessment in the same way as with other pragmatic processes:  by 
following the path of least effort and stopping when the expectations of relevance raised 
by the utterance are satisfied. 
Although in some cases the choice of a demonstrative determiner directly affects 
reference resolution, in other cases it appears to contribute instead to the implicitly 
communicated meaning.  In the remainder of this section, I consider examples of both, 
and try to show how they are all analysable in terms of the procedure encoded by 
demonstratives and the overall aim of satisfying expectations of optimal relevance.  
5.2.3  Demonstrative determiners and explicatures 
5.2.3.1  ‘This’ and ‘that’. 
According to relevance theory, ‘an assumption communicated by an utterance U is 
explicit [hence an “explicature”] if and only if it is a development of a logical form 
encoded by U’ (Carston, 2004, p. 635).  In this section I consider cases where choice of 
demonstrative determiner affects the reference resolution process.  As reference 
assignment involves a development of the encoded logical form, the choice between 
                                                
4 She may also use conceptual information to do this – e.g. uttering ‘the black cat’ rather than ‘the cat’ 
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‘this’ and ‘that’ directly affects what is explicitly communicated in such cases.  
Consider the examples in (44)-(47). 
(44)  I’ll have a slice of this cake. 
(45)  I’ll have a slice of that cake. 
(46)  We went for a lovely walk this afternoon. 
(47)  We went for a lovely walk that afternoon. 
If (44) and (45) are uttered in the same discourse context where the speaker has been 
offered the choice of two cakes, we can imagine that reference might well be resolved 
differently in each case.  Similarly, the resolution of the complex demonstratives in (46) 
and (47) will be different.  In both pairs, the only difference is the form of the 
determiner, and in both cases, substitution of the complex demonstrative with a 
corresponding definite description will be infelicitous, as in (48) and (49). 
(48)  ? I’ll have a slice of the cake. 
(49)  *We went for a lovely walk the afternoon. 
Although (48) is not ungrammatical in itself, it will be infelicitous in a discourse context 
where there are two cakes whose representations are equally accessible, since reference 
will not easily be resolved.  However, whilst in examples (44)-(47) the demonstratives 
clearly contribute to the explicitly communicated meaning, they do not necessarily 
function in exactly the same way.  Utterances (44) and (45) are only likely to be 
felicitous if accompanied by a gesture indicating the intended referent.  This is not the 
case for (46) and (47).  These judgements recall Kaplan’s distinction between pure 
indexicals and true demonstratives, as outlined in section 5.2.1.5.  Taking this 
distinction as a starting point, I consider how the interpretations and judgements in (44)-
(49) might be accounted for.
5 
                                                
5 Following the discussion in section 5.2.1.5, I am not committing to the view that there are pure 
indexicals which are assigned reference independently of the speaker’s intention.  However, there are 
some cases where the hearer may not need any additional clues beyond the information encoded in the 
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5.2.3.2  Demonstrative uses 
I begin by considering examples where the use of the complex demonstrative is what 
Kaplan would consider to be truly demonstrative.  Consider again examples (44) (‘I’ll 
have a slice of this cake’) and (45) (‘I’ll have a slice of that cake’) in a discourse context 
where there are two cakes.  Here, representations of both cakes may be activated and 
highly accessible, and yet the hearer must determine which of them the speaker intends 
to pick out.  In such a case, ‘this’ and ‘that’ function as true demonstratives.  They are 
only appropriate when the intended referent is in the physical context, and their 
utterance is only likely to be felicitous if there is some other clue to the speaker’s 
intention, such as a physical demonstration of where the speaker’s attention is focused.  
Whilst such a demonstration may be as explicit as a pointing gesture, it may also be a 
subtle cue such as eye gaze direction or directional nodding.  As Kaplan notes, the 
demonstration itself is ‘a mere externalization of the perceptual intention’ (1989, p. 
583), and it is this intention that determines the referent.  In these cases, however, 
something beyond the linguistically encoded meaning is required to convey this 
intention. 
The contrast evoked by the use of a proximal/distal form as opposed to a definite 
description sets the intended referent apart from competing referents.  Whilst the extra 
layer of activation is added to its representation as a result of the speaker’s indication of 
where her attention is focused, use of a demonstrative form encourages the hearer to 
take this attention into consideration.  As Neale (2007, p. 103) suggests, using a 
demonstrative form to refer to an item φ draws ‘attention to the fact that not any old φ 
will do.’  By drawing attention to a particular entity in the physical environment, the 
speaker increases the accessibility of its representation, so that the hearer will test it first 
as a potential referent.  The speaker’s choice between ‘this’ and ‘that’ again comes 
down to the underlying procedures encoded by the terms, and the clues they give the 
hearer as to how inferential comprehension should proceed.   
Taking the speaker as the deictic centre, use of ‘this’, in this type of example, will 
encourage the hearer to expect a referent that is, in some salient way, relatively 
proximal to the speaker compared to another competing candidate referent.  
Accordingly, a hearer would be confused if the speaker were to utter (28) (‘I’ll have a 
slice of this cake’) whilst indicating a cake that was further away from her than some 
other salient cake.  Thus, in those examples that Kaplan would call truly demonstrative, 
the proximity information encoded by the demonstrative determiner is a clue to where 161 
the speaker’s attention is likely to be focused, and therefore what her referential 
intention is likely to be.  However, in these cases, as Kaplan points out, extra-linguistic 
clues are also needed. 
5.2.3.3  Indexical uses  
The contribution of demonstratives to reference resolution, and hence to the explicitly 
communicated meaning, is not limited to Kaplan’s true demonstrative uses of ‘this’ and 
‘that’.  Examples such as (46) and (47), or (50) and (51), are perfectly felicitous without 
any accompanying gesture or further clue to the speaker’s intention.  Under Kaplan’s 
original definition, they are pure indexicals.   
(46)  We went for a lovely walk this afternoon. 
(47)  We went for a lovely walk that afternoon. 
(50)  In this section we will continue the argument. 
(51)  In that section we will continue the argument. 
In examples of this type, there is invariably more than one potential referent, since 
neither ‘afternoon’ nor ‘section’ is uniquely denoting.  However, in both cases involving 
the use of ‘this’, there is only one instance of each type that is likely to be considered 
proximal relative to the deictic centre of the speaker at the time of utterance.  In both 
cases, too, the relevant type of proximity is likely to be temporal or discourse-related 
rather than spatial;  ‘this afternoon’, will generally refer to the afternoon of the current 
day, and ‘this section’ will generally refer to the section in which the current utterance 
occurs
6.  Utterances of this type can occur discourse initially, since there is no need for 
any further contextual information. 
The situation is slightly different for indexical uses of the distal demonstrative 
‘that’, as in (47) and (51).  Whereas there is only one afternoon or one section which is 
likely to count as proximal, there will be more than one which could count as distal.  
‘That afternoon’ could refer to any afternoon on another day than the day of utterance, 
and ‘that section’ could refer to any section apart from the current one.  Following the 
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analysis outlined in section 5.2.2, I predict that ‘that’ will be used when the intended 
referent is further from the deictic centre than another candidate which could have been 
picked out by use of ‘this’.  As we have seen, ‘this’ picks out the current day or section, 
so ‘that’ could be used to refer to any other day or section.  However, interpretation 
proceeds in the usual way with the set of potential referents being narrowed to include 
only those which are relatively further away from the deictic centre than the current 
instance
7.  In effect, this rules out the afternoon of the present day, and the current 
section, respectively.  The hearer then follows the path of least effort, testing potential 
interpretations in order of accessibility.  Thus, for an utterance of (47) (‘We went for a 
long walk that afternoon’) to be felicitous, there should be one non-proximal afternoon 
whose representation is more accessible than those of the others
8.   
Consider (52) and (53). 
(52)  We are going on holiday this week. 
(53)  We are going on holiday that week. 
Utterance (52) should be felicitous in any discourse context.  The use of ‘this’ 
constrains the set of potential referents to just those which are proximal to the deictic 
centre relative to competing candidate referents.  Other things being equal, the only 
member of this set will be the week of the utterance.  By contrast, (53) will only be 
felicitous when there is a particular non-proximal week whose representation is more 
accessible than those of any others.  Use of the distal demonstrative in effect rules out 
the current week, but in doing so, it still leaves all other weeks as possible referents.  
For (53) to be felicitous, a representation of one of these candidate referents must be 
more accessible than those of the others.  Utterance (53) might, for example, be 
appropriate if the speaker and hearer have been discussing when they might meet up 
next, and the hearer has suggested a particular date.  In that case, a representation of the 
week which includes that date will be more accessible than those for other non-proximal 
weeks.  Whilst acceptable in such a discourse context, (53) would be very strange as a 
discourse initial utterance. 
                                                
7 Alternatively, we might view this as adding an extra layer of activation to the representations of the 
non-current instances.  However, the result is the same and it’s not clear how the two possibilities might 
be empirically distinguished. 
8 Or a highly accessible contextual assumption that combines with one potential referent more easily 
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This pattern in the use of demonstratives has been acknowledged in the various 
different analyses of ‘that’, and strikingly similar conclusions have been drawn about 
when it may be used felicitously.  According to Fillmore (1997, p. 105), ‘that’ is used 
when both interlocutors are aware of what is being talked about.  For Ariel (1990, p. 53) 
‘that’ requires identifiability by both speaker and addressee, and Gundel, Hedberg and 
Zacharski (1993) capture a similar intuition by associating ‘that N’ with the cognitive 
status ‘familiar’.  Such generalizations fall out naturally from a relevance theory 
approach where interpretations are tested in order of accessibility.  On such an 
approach, what makes the use of ‘that’ felicitous in these discourse contexts is not the 
fact that both interlocutors necessarily know what is being talked about.  Rather, the 
felicitous use of ‘that’ depends on one representation’s being more accessible to the 
hearer in the discourse context than its competitors.  Discourse contexts of this type are 
highly likely to coincide with those where the intended referent fits the theory-specific 
definitions of ‘familiar’, ‘identifiable’ and so on.   
In sum, and having considered both ‘true demonstrative’ and ‘pure indexical’ uses 
of complex demonstratives, it seems that both categories may contribute to the explicit 
content of an utterance.  Kaplan’s distinction boils down to a difference in the nature of 
the clues that the speaker provides to help the hearer retrieve the explicit content.  In the 
pure indexical cases, the nature of the intended referent and the discourse context are 
such that the linguistically encoded meaning is enough.  In the true demonstrative cases, 
however, the linguistic meaning is not sufficient, and further non-linguistic clues are 
needed.  In a relevance-based account, however, these are just different means to the 
same end.  The speaker intends the hearer to pick out a certain referent, and provides 
whatever linguistic or non-linguistic clues are necessary to achieve this aim. 
5.2.4  Demonstrative Determiners and Implicatures 
5.2.4.1  Explicit or implicit: a test 
In the previous section, I argued that choice of demonstrative determiner can affect what 
is explicitly communicated by an utterance.  In the cases considered, the choice between 
‘this’ and ‘that’, or between a complex demonstrative and a definite description, affects 
the proposition the speaker is taken to have expressed.  However, there are other 
utterances where this does not seem to be the case.  In such examples, substituting a 
complex demonstrative form for a definite description, or a proximal for a distal 164 
demonstrative, or vice versa, does not affect the way that reference is resolved.  
Consider examples (54)-(55) and (56)-(59). 
(54)  Tartan was very popular in the 19th century.  Prince Albert helped this trend by 
developing his own Balmoral tartan. 
(55)  Tartan was very popular in the 19th century.  Prince Albert helped the trend by 
developing his own Balmoral tartan. 
(56)  This section focuses on what that procedural information might look like. 
(57)  This section focuses on what this procedural information might look like. 
(58)  This section focuses on what the procedural information might look like. 
(59)  This section focuses on what such procedural information might look like. 
The use of ‘this’ rather than ‘the’ in (54) does not appear to affect the explicit content of 
the utterance.  Version (55) is not only also acceptable, but reference is resolved in the 
same way as in (54).  This case contrasts with those in (44)-(45) above (I’ll have a slice 
of this/that cake), where replacing the demonstrative with ‘the’ in a multi-cake 
discourse context leads to infelicity.   
It seems, then, that replacing a demonstrative determiner with the definite article 
might provide a test for whether or not the demonstrative adds anything to the explicit 
content of an utterance that could not equally well have been conveyed by ‘the’.  
Consider utterance (60), taken from Powell (2001). 
(60)  That dog with three legs is called ‘Lucky’. 
As Powell points out, the role played by the complex demonstrative ‘that dog’ in (60) 
depends on the context in which is it uttered.  If (60) is uttered whilst ‘standing in a 
room full of dogs, all but one of which have the standard canine allocation of legs’ 
(Powell 2001, p. 62), then the demonstrative determiner can be replaced by the definite 
article without affecting the felicity of the utterance, as in (61). 165 
(61)  The dog with three legs is called ‘Lucky’. 
However, if the speaker is standing in a room full of three-legged dogs, then the 
substitution leads to infelicity and probable reference failure.  In the first discourse 
context, the conceptual information encoded by the nominal is sufficient to narrow the 
set of potential referents to a point where a representation of the intended referent (i.e. 
the dog with three legs) is the most accessible one.  In the second discourse context, 
where there are several three-legged dogs, this is not the case, and further clues, in the 
form of information about relative proximity, probably combined with some type of 
non-linguistic demonstration, will be required
9. 
Examples (56)-(59) show that in certain discourse contexts the speaker may have 
an even wider range of options available when constructing her referring expression.  
Again, in these cases, the substitution of one determiner for another does not seem to 
affect the way that reference is resolved, suggesting that the encoded conceptual 
information alone is enough to guide the hearer to the explicit content of the utterance.   
5.2.4.2  Demonstratives and inferential effects 
Given the data in (54)-(59), how can we account for the various acceptable forms, and 
what effect might the choice of determiner ultimately have on interpretation in such 
cases?  To address these questions, I once again return to the relevance theoretic 
comprehension procedure, as discussed in chapter 4.   
A hearer following the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure should test 
interpretations in order of accessibility, and stop when his expectation of (optimal) 
relevance is satisfied: that is, when he has enough cognitive effects to make the 
utterance at least relevant enough to be worth processing, and the most relevant one 
compatible with the speaker’s abilities and preferences.  Although the interpretation 
process involves identification of explicit content, this is not the full story.  Recall that 
according to Wilson and Sperber (2004, p. 615), overall utterance interpretation 
involves three subtasks: identification of explicit content, intended contextual 
assumptions and intended contextual implications.  So far, I have focused on the first of 
these subtasks, but in analysing interpretation of examples such as (54)-(59), we must 
consider the remaining two.  These two tasks result in the derivation of implicatures, 
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and therefore contribute to the implicit side of comprehension.  As I have shown, the 
speaker may exploit procedural information to guide the hearer along the intended 
inferential path.  If demonstratives encode procedural meaning, we would expect them 
to be used in this way to guide inferential processes contributing to both explicit content 
(i.e. reference resolution), and implicit content (i.e.implicatures).  By applying relevance 
principles to the case of demonstratives, we can therefore incorporate into the analysis 
the role they may play in the inferential identification of implicatures.  This is a role 
which has been largely overlooked in previous accounts, which have, for the most part, 
concentrated on the issue of how reference is resolved.  
Consider again examples (54) and (55) (‘Tartan was very popular in the 19th 
century.  Prince Albert helped this/the trend by developing his own Balmoral tartan’).  
Although reference resolution is crucial to comprehension, a representation of the 
intended referent is already highly accessible in these cases, having been mentioned in 
the immediately preceding utterances.  In both examples, the trend of wearing tartan is 
the most salient trend in the discourse context, and will therefore be tested first as a 
candidate referent by a hearer following the relevance theoretic comprehension 
procedure.  This will happen regardless of whether or not encoded information about 
(discourse) proximity is provided.  Since the identity of the intended referent is already 
taken care of, the speaker has available the option of using information about proximity 
encoded in the demonstrative determiner to create extra or different effects (so long as 
this does not interfere with correct assignment of reference).  In cases of this type, the 
extra effort required to process the procedural information provided by the speaker is 
justified only if it yields an adequate range of additional inferential effects.  
We then need to consider what form these additional effects might take.  To avoid 
any suggestion that ‘this’ and ‘that’ are ambiguous, we want the procedural information 
encoded by each demonstrative to remain constant in all cases.  Applying my earlier 
analysis, then, utterance (54) (‘this trend’) indicates that the trend of wearing tartan is 
closer to the deictic centre (in spatial, temporal or discourse terms) than some other 
competing trend.  Although there is no competing trend in the discourse context, the 
hearer still presumes that the speaker is aiming at optimal relevance, and will infer the 
existence of a potential competitor or competitors from the use of the demonstrative 
form.  Thus, while the nominal part of the referring expression is uniquely denoting in 
the discourse context, use of the demonstrative encourages the hearer to treat the 
intended referent as non-unique.  This in turn evokes an implicit contrast effect which 
yields a wide range of weak implicatures.  Such tacitly contrastive uses of 167 
demonstratives might be analysed along similar lines to the stylistic effects resulting 
from repetition of words or phrases, as discussed by Sperber and Wilson (1986/95, pp. 
219-221; Blakemore, 1992; 2008).  Whilst some such uses contribute directly to the 
explicit content, others achieve relevance by increasing inferential effects, conveying 
suggestions of attitude or the speaker’s degree of commitment to or involvement with 
the propositional content.   
In this case, the contrast implicit in the use of a demonstrative stylistically 
highlights the wearing of tartan as one particular trend amongst many.  Specific effects 
will depend on interaction between the implicit contrast and the wider discourse 
context, and may be affected by other factors such as intonation and tone of voice.  For 
example, the speaker may be implicating that the fondness for tartan was just one of 
many trends (as opposed to serious preoccupations).  Alternatively, it may just be a 
means of conveying a sense of continuity, indicating to the hearer that the subject matter 
has not changed and the focus remains on the same topic.  Similar weak inferential 
effects are conveyed by examples (56)-(59).  Here, both ‘this’ and ‘that’ are acceptable, 
because it is not the relative proximity of the referent itself that is relevant, but the 
implicit contrast with alternative possible referents.  The choice of a demonstrative form 
over the definite article perhaps carries a tacit acknowledgement that the discussion 
focuses on one particular type of procedural information, where other types may be 
possible.  The choice between ‘this’ and ‘that’ in such cases is likely to be driven by a 
variety of such subtle and interacting factors.   
These subtle differences and apparent borderline cases support the hypothesis that 
the information about proximity encoded by the determiner can vary along several 
dimensions. They also reinforce the claim that proximity should not be characterised as 
an inherent property of an entity itself.  Rather, it should be viewed as something that is 
computed from moment to moment, assigned to the referent online and subject to 
change as the discourse and discourse context develop.  Proximity is a matter of degree 
which can vary as the physical, temporal and discourse contexts vary, leading to the 
wide range of contrast effects that we see in these examples
10. 
5.2.5  Revisiting the demonstrative categories 
Recall that both Fillmore and Lakoff approached the issue of demonstratives by 
dividing the uses up into three board categories: gestural/spatio-temporal, 
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anaphoric/discourse, and symbolic/emotional.  I have suggested that these categories are 
both blurred at the edges and theoretically uninteresting, and argued that demonstratives 
should be analysed instead as encoding procedural information about relative proximity, 
broadly construed.  I have tried to show how this procedural meaning may guide the 
hearer in resolving reference, and so contribute to the explicit content of an utterance, or 
it may contribute to the derivation of implicitures and other inferential effects.  In this 
section, I reconsider the various uses identified by Fillmore and Lakoff, and show how 
they might fit into this relevance theory approach.   
First, the examples classified by Fillmore and Lakoff as spatial / gestural involve 
use of the encoded procedural information to guide the hearer during reference 
resolution, and hence in the derivation of explicit content.  The speaker indicates to the 
hearer that she expects him to pick out a certain referent from among two or more 
competitors, using the demonstrative form, perhaps accompanied by a physical 
demonstration, as a clue to her intended meaning.  In these cases, substitution of a 
definite determiner for the demonstrative will be infelicitous.   
With the discourse/anaphoric cases such as (12) and (13) (‘Eat your greens: that’s 
the solution to your problems’  ‘This is the solution to your problems:  eat your 
greens’), application of the substitution test might seem to indicate that these function in 
a similar way.  As with the gestural cases, substitution of the definite determiner for a 
demonstrative is unacceptable, as in (62).  However, the cases are not really parallel, 
since (62) is not merely infelicitous but ungrammatical. 
(62)  *Eat your greens:  the is the solution. 
As has often been noted, the definite determiner differs from the demonstrative 
determiners in its inability to stand alone.  Whilst ‘this’ and ‘that’ can function as either 
complex or bare demonstratives, ‘the’ must be accompanied by conceptual information 
or replaced by ‘it’, as in (63). 
(63)  Eat your greens:  it’s the solution. 
Since in these cases, unlike the spatial / gestural ones, this substitution does not affect 
reference resolution, we can conclude that here the procedural information encoded by 
the demonstrative does not contribute to explicit content.  Rather, use of the 
demonstrative in (12) introduces a contrast effect, and underlines the fact that the 169 
solution is eating your greens, as opposed to doing anything else.  Whilst the explicitly 
communicated meaning is the same in (63) (‘Eat your greens: it’s the solution’), the 
absence of a demonstrative leads to a loss of this extra, contrastive effect.   
In discussing the data on demonstratives, Fillmore drew attention to the 
interaction between demonstrative forms and the tense of the utterance, as illustrated in 
examples (14)-(17) (‘This/that has been an interesting lecture’  ‘This/that was an 
interesting course’).  Notice that substituting the definite article for the demonstrative in 
these cases, as in (64) and (65), does not affect the explicit meaning: 
(64)  The course has been interesting. 
(65)  The course was interesting. 
My analysis therefore predicts that the demonstrative will contribute to the implicitly 
communicated meaning in these cases: for instance by tacitly contrasting this particular 
course with other possible courses.  Whilst in these examples substitution with the 
definite determiner is acceptable, the further choice between ‘this’ and ‘that’ is 
significant and directly affects the acceptability of the utterance.  Again, this falls out 
naturally from the procedural analysis of demonstratives.  A speaker who wishes to 
create an emphatic or contrast effect will choose a demonstrative form over a definite 
description.  In many cases, it is the contrast effect that is relevant, and the choice 
between the demonstratives is marginal.  In examples (56) and (57), for instance, (‘This 
section focuses on what that/this procedural information might look like’) both 
demonstratives are equally acceptable, and the choice between them might come down 
to subtle stylistic factors (e.g. the desire to avoid a repetition of ‘this’).  The speaker 
must choose one or other demonstrative determiner, but the choice itself may not be 
significant.  However, in examples (14)-(17) the nature of the encoded procedure is 
significant since it interacts with the rest of the utterance.  The use of the perfect 
continuous in (14) (‘this has been...’) maintains a connection with the present.  As a 
result, the proximal form which indicates relative closeness to the deictic centre will be 
most appropriate, as it too implies a connection with the here and now.  The use of the 
perfect aspect in (16) (‘this was...’) situates the event under discussion (i.e. the course) 
firmly in the past, and the distal form ‘that’ is more appropriate.  These judgements 
support the hypothesis that demonstratives encode specific information relating to 
proximity, rather than just a vague instruction to draw a contrast.  The contrast effect 170 
arises from the interaction of the proximity information with the rest of the utterance 
and the discourse context.   
A final challenge for any account of demonstratives is to shed some light on the 
wide range of disparate examples that fall under Lakoff’s category of ‘emotional’ uses.  
Recall that Lakoff identified several types of ‘emotional’ use: for example, to create a 
sense of camaraderie or closeness, to replace the indefinite ‘a’, or to provide extra 
information about the subject of the previous utterance (see section 5.2.1.3, above).  
One advantage of a relevance theory approach is that it makes it possible to provide a 
unified account, since a wide range of different effects can arise from interaction 
between encoded meaning and discourse context, guided by the hearer’s presumption of 
optimal relevance.  I have argued that the relative nature of the encoded information 
about relative proximity can result in a contrast effect.  I will now consider how this 
effect can be worked out in different ways in different contexts, to yield different types 
of weak implicatures, stylistic or poetic effects and attitudinal information.  As Stephen 
Neale comments, ‘uses of demonstratives upon which they are no more than stylistic 
variants of definite descriptions are legion’ (2007, p.105). 
Examples (22) and (25) illustrate one of the types of emotional use of ‘this’ and ‘that’ 
discussed by Lakoff (1974).   
(22)  A: I see there's going to be peace in the mideast. 
B: This Henry Kissinger really is something! 
(25)  How’s that throat? 
In both cases, use of a demonstrative form is claimed to create a sense of camaraderie, 
intimacy or vividness.  I want to suggest that this effect results from communication of 
the speaker’s attitude to the referent, a possibility that has been overlooked in previous 
accounts.  In neither case is the procedural meaning encoded by the demonstrative 
needed for reference resolution.  To be optimally relevant, the utterance must therefore 
give rise to extra or different effects from those that would have been achieved in the 
absence of the determiner, as in the non-demonstrative versions in (66) and (67). 
(66)  Henry Kissinger really is something! 
(67)  How’s your throat? 171 
In all these cases, a representation of the intended referent is highly accessible to the 
hearer, and information about the proximity of the referent to the speaker is not required 
for reference resolution.  In (22), the hearer will therefore look for extra or different 
effects to offset the effort of processing this otherwise superfluous linguistic material
11.  
Use of the proximal demonstrative determiner suggests an implicit contrast between the 
intended referent and other potential competitors (e.g. ‘that Henry Kissinger’, ‘the other 
Henry Kissinger’).  Although in this discourse context, ‘Henry Kissinger’ is presumably 
uniquely denoting, the use of ‘this’ is naturally interpreted as implicitly contrasting 
different aspects, conceptions or even time-slices of Henry Kissinger.  In this way, the 
speaker can communicate her attitude towards a particular aspect of Henry Kissinger or 
his behaviour.  Although the attitude overtly indicated by use of the proximal 
demonstrative is one of emotional closeness, (22) may be interpreted as sincere or ironic 
depending on the discourse context, and the speaker’s intonation is likely to guide the 
hearer further on whether the speaker is associating herself with, or distancing herself 
from, the indicated attitude. 
As Lakoff notes, use of the distal demonstrative in (25) (‘How’s that throat?’) 
creates a ‘sense of intimacy’ rather than distance between the doctor and her patient.  
How is this effect to be explained? My procedural analysis of demonstratives again 
suggests that it must be linked to some tacit contrast it evokes.  In the first place, use of 
a demonstrative form sets the throat in question apart as of special interest to the doctor 
(in contrast with other throats), and indicates that both doctor and patient have discussed 
it before.  In Cornish’s terms, ‘“that” functions interactively to create a sort of solidarity 
between discourse participants, establishing common ground’ (Cornish, 2001, p. 305).  
Again we return to Neale’s observation that use of that φ ‘draws attention to the fact 
that not any old φ will do’ (2007, p.103).   
Uses of ‘this’ in place of the indefinite article ‘a’ make up Lakoff’s second 
category of ‘emotional’ uses, with examples such as (23) (‘There was this travelling 
salesman and he...’).  Although cross-linguistic evidence (e.g. Ionin, 2006) suggests that 
indefinite ‘this’ does not necessarily belong in a unified account with definite 
demonstratives, my procedural approach does seem to have something to say in such 
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this utterance (although ‘The Henry Kissinger we know...’ would be fine).  Whilst both definite and 
demonstrative determiners share an encoded procedure that encourages the hearer towards a definite 
reference, this is not needed in and of itself in this case.  However, a determiner of some form is required 
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cases.  If the speaker had merely wanted to identify the intended referent, the most 
straightforward way would have been to use the indefinite article, as in (68).  
(68)  There was a travelling salesman, and he… 
The hearer is therefore entitled to expect more or different effects from the use of the 
proximal demonstrative.  According to Lakoff , this use ‘gives greater vividness to the 
narrative’ and ‘involve[s] the addressee in it more fully’ (1974, p. 347).  On my 
account, this effect can be explained in the following way.   Once again, the intended 
referent is presented as close to the deictic centre.  As a result, despite the fact that the 
travelling salesman is being introduced into the discourse for the first time, the hearer is 
encouraged to see him as emotionally closer or more special to the speaker than other 
potential referents.  What creates the sense of intimacy between speaker and hearer is 
the fact that he is expected, without any further help from the speaker, not only to 
realise that she has a certain range of competitors in mind, but to recognise which of 
them she is talking about.  It is notable that there is no comparable use of ‘that’, and 
indefinite ‘this’ is mainly restricted to casual or informal registers, where implied 
intimacy between speaker and hearer would not be inappropriate.  
Lakoff’s final example of an ‘emotional’ use is illustrated by (24). 
(24)  ‘Don't lie to me’ said Dick.  This was a man who had twice been convicted of 
perjury. 
According to Lakoff, this emotional use ‘provides additional information about [the 
referent] pertinent to the subject-matter of the prior sentence’ (1974, p. 346).  I want to 
suggest that this analysis overlooks an important aspect of such uses.  In utterance (24), 
the content of the direct quotation (‘Don’t lie to me’) is in sharp contrast with the 
description of the speaker that follows.  The fact that Dick has said ‘Don’t lie to me’ 
might lead the hearer to assume that Dick is an honest person who values truth.  The 
next sentence provides information which is not merely ‘additional’, as Lakoff puts it, 
but contrasts strongly with this assumption.  The procedural information encoded by 
‘this’ precisely encourages the hearer to look for such a contrast, and achieves relevance 
thereby.  In this way, the speaker not only guides the hearer towards the intended 
interpretation, but also communicates her own attitude towards Dick and his utterance.  
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as carrying conflicting implications, and that this conflict is relevant enough to be worth 
the hearer’s attention. 
In this section, I have tried to show how the various uses of demonstrative forms 
can be analysed using the relevance theory notion of procedural meaning.  Interpretation 
of utterances containing these items is guided by the relevance-theoretic comprehension 
procedure: the hearer follows a path of least effort, and stops when his expectations of 
relevance are satisfied.  The procedural information encoded by the determiners narrows 
the search space and encourages him to look for inferences in certain directions.  In 
some cases these inferences will contribute to reference resolution, and hence to explicit 
content, and in others to the derivation of implicatures. 
My focus in this section has been on the English demonstrative system.  Various 
other languages, including Greek, Japanese and Spanish, employ a three-way system 
which distinguishes proximal, distal and medial referents, while other systems may 
make still further distinctions (Diessel, 1999; Levinson, 2004).  By treating proximity as 
a relation that is computed online as the discourse progresses, it should be possible to 
incorporate these further distinctions into a procedural approach. 
An advantage of approaching the data using the relevance-theoretic notion of 
procedural meaning is that it becomes possible to provide a unified account of both bare 
demonstratives and complex demonstratives.  The procedure remains the same in both 
cases, and the demonstrative contributes to explicit meaning in some cases, and to 
implicit meaning in others.   
In sum, demonstrative determiners are a means by which the speaker may make 
her utterance optimally relevant.  They may narrow the set of potential referents to a 
point where a representation of the intended referent is the most accessible one for the 
hearer, or they may be highlighting devices used to increase the accessibility of the 
intended referent for the same purpose.  When a representation of the referent is already 
highly accessible to the hearer, the speaker may use a demonstrative form to achieve 
extra or different inferential effects.  This may simply involve highlighting a perceived 
contrast which gives access to a range of implications or implicatures, or it may 
encourage the derivation of weak attitudinal implicatures.  As I have tried to show, these 
effects are varied and wide-ranging.  However, they can all be traced back to the 
encoded proximity information, its interaction with the context, and the speaker’s goal 
of achieving optimal relevance. 
Given my analysis of the ‘emotional’ uses of demonstratives, I turn again, in the 
next section, to the so-called ‘special uses’ of referring expressions identified by Ariel 174 
(1990).  Just as the seemingly disparate uses of demonstratives can be unified under a 
relevance-based account, so too, I will argue, can these special uses.  Then, in the final 
section of this chapter, I will consider how stressed and unstressed pronouns might be 
treated on a relevance-based account of referring expressions.  This will bring me closer 
to my ultimate goal of analysing null subjects in English within a general relevance-
based account of referring expressions and considering how they contribute to both 
explicit content and implicatures. 
5.2.6  ‘Special uses’ revisited 
In chapter 3, I discussed what Ariel (1990) calls the ‘Special Uses’ of referring 
expressions.  These fall into three broad categories, illustrated in (69)-(71): 
(69)  That holiday we spent in Cyprus was really something, wasn’t it? 
(70)  When John came home this afternoon, the son-of-a-bitch broke all the windows. 
(71)  This Henry Kissinger really is something! 
According to Ariel, in (69) the intended referent (a holiday in Cyprus) is treated as 
accessible when it is not; in (70) a highly accessible referent (‘John’) is referred to using 
a low accessibility marker (‘son-of-a-bitch’); and in (71), a referent (‘Henry Kissinger’) 
is picked out using a marker of higher accessibility (‘this’) than might be expected.  
Although Ariel claims that such inappropriate uses encourage the hearer to derive extra 
contextual implications, I pointed out some problems with her analysis.  The most 
crucial problem is the question of how the hearer decides whether to take the level of 
Accessibility signalled by the referring expression at face value, or whether to treat it as 
unusual, and therefore go in search of extra implications.  There is also a question about 
how the hearer decides whether he is expected to derive positive or negative effects 
from the inappropriate use of a particular term.   
Ariel’s illustrative examples in (69)-(71) are parallel to examples already 
discussed in my relevance-based account above, and I revisit them here to briefly 
illustrate how they would be dealt with on my account. 
In all three examples, (69)-(71), the intended referent is the one that is most highly 
accessible to the hearer and will therefore be tested first.  Compare the versions above 
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(72)  The holiday we spent in Cyprus was really something, wasn’t it? 
(73)  When John came home this afternoon, he broke all the windows. 
(74)  Henry Kissinger really is something! 
It seems that, in order to resolve reference and derive the explicit content of the 
utterance, the extra information provided by the demonstrative determiner or anaphoric 
epithet in (69)-(71) is not required.  In each case, the alternative versions in (72)-(74) 
are acceptable and lead to the same assignment of reference and the same explicit 
content.  Hence, the choice of referential expression in (69)-(71) must contribute to the 
implicitly communicated meaning, and my relevance theoretic account helps to explain 
how it does so.  In section 5.2.6.2, I showed how the procedural information encoded by 
‘this’ and ‘that’ can contribute to what is implicitly communicated by an utterance, and 
in chapter 4 I discussed a parallel case to (70) (Johni went into town for his lunch.  The 
rascali was late back to the office).  Thus, such uses need no longer be considered 
special or exceptional, but fall out naturally from my account.  Furthermore, the fact 
that, according to relevance theory, the overall interpretation of an utterance crucially 
depends on the discourse context in which it is uttered, allows us to explain why an 
utterance of (71) might communicate either admiration or derision, depending on the 
contextual assumptions accessible to the hearer (perhaps guided by non-linguistic cues 
such as facial expression or tone of voice). 
To conclude, an advantage of my relevance-based account is that it treats the 
contribution that an expression may make to implicatures (as well as to explicatures) as 
fundamental.  On this approach, the effects described by Ariel are no longer special, but 
simply fall out naturally from the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure, as part 
of the overall interpretation of the utterance.   
In this section I have shown how the distributional differences between definite 
descriptions and complex demonstratives, on the one hand, and distal and proximal 
demonstratives, on the other, can be explained within a relevance theoretic analysis of 
referring expression.  I have also argued that Ariel’s ‘special’ uses are not special after 
all.   
The final distinction that Gundel and colleagues regard as problematic for 
relevance theory is between stressed and unstressed pronouns.  In the next section, I 
apply my analysis to these data, and argue that the use and interpretation of such 176 
expressions falls out naturally from my account, which in turn makes the appeal to 
notions of encoded Accessibility or Givenness superfluous.   
5.3  Stressed and unstressed pronouns 
5.3.1  Relevance and accessibility 
I have argued that we should abandon the idea that information about ‘Accessibility’ or 
‘Givenness’ is an inherent property of referring expression types, which has to be 
linguistically marked or encoded.  Rather, the accessibility of various representations of 
a potential referent depends on a range of factors that vary from context to context.  The 
most accessible representation of a referent is simply the first one that a hearer with a 
relevance-oriented cognitive system comes across when following the path of least 
effort.  According to the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure, hearers will test 
interpretive hypotheses in order of accessibility.  A speaker aiming at optimal relevance 
will therefore use the form of referring expression that should make a representation of 
the intended referent the easiest one to retrieve.  The notion of ‘accessibility’ mentioned 
in the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure does not, therefore, need to be 
defined in terms of distance, competition or cognitive status, along the lines proposed 
by Ariel and Gundel.  Although each of these factors may play a role in the 
interpretation of certain utterances, on certain occasions, they are not essential to the 
working of the comprehension procedure, and do not play a crucial theoretical role.  
Factors which may influence the accessibility of representations of potential referents 
may be found in the physical, linguistic or discourse context, or any combination of 
these.  In section 5.3.2, I briefly consider some factors that have been shown to affect 
accessibility, before returning to the analysis of stressed versus unstressed pronouns in 
section 5.3.3. 
5.3.2  Factors affecting accessibility of interpretations  
Matsui (2000) discusses several factors that may contribute to the accessibility of a 
representation of a potential referent, and cites experimental data from existing studies 
of these factors.  In her view, all these factors should be ‘integrated into one higher level 
factor, namely, processing effort’ (Matsui 2000, p. 52).  This conclusion brings us back, 
to the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure and my argument that use of 
referring expressions is ultimately driven by considerations of relevance.  In this 
section, I will outline some of the factors discussed by Matsui.  To reiterate, this is not 177 
an attempt to define what it means to be accessible, but rather to outline some of the 
factors which have been shown to affect the accessibility of certain interpretations in 
certain contexts. 
5.3.2.1  Order of mention 
Drawing on ‘centering theory’ (Joshi & Weinstein, 1981; Grosz, Joshi, & Weinstein, 
1995; Walker, Joshi, & Prince, 1998), and integrating experimental results from 
Gernsbacher & Hargreaves (1988), Matsui discusses the effect of word order on 
accessibility.  In experimental studies, words appearing earlier in an utterance were 
responded to more quickly than those appearing later in the same utterance.  This result 
persisted even when the grammatical relations and semantic roles were varied.  The 
results of these experiments revealed that first-mention participants were responded to 
faster than second-mention participants, and furthermore that first-mention non-subjects 
were responded to faster than second-mention subjects.  Thus, order of mention seems 
to influence the accessibility of a potential referent, and the ‘higher accessibility of the 
first-mentioned item is not attributable to their subjecthood’ (Matsui 2000, p. 57). 
5.3.2.2  Syntactic position 
Although order of mention seems to affect accessibility regardless of grammatical role, 
the syntactic structure of an utterance does appear to influence the order in which 
potential referents will be tested.  Experimental work by Matthews and Chodorow 
(1988) suggests that ‘there is a left-to-right top-down breadth-first search of the prior 
clause for an appropriate antecedent’ (p.256).  McKoon et al (1993) consider the 
influence of syntactic position from a slightly different perspective, and argue that ‘the 
more affected a discourse entity is by the action of the verb…the more prominent or 
salient will be its position in a discourse’ (p.595).  So, for example, a participant in 
direct object position would be more accessible than one in indirect object position, 
which in turn would be more accessible than a participant presented in a prepositional 
phrase. 
5.3.2.3  Semantics of the main verb 
Caramazza et al (1977), following Garvey & Caramazza (1974) and Garvey et al. 
(1976), introduce the notion of ‘implicit causality’ as a possible factor affecting the 
accessibility of potential referents in a discourse context, and they claim that in certain 
constructions, the semantics of some verbs can bias the interpretation of pronouns 178 
towards either the first or second noun phrase in the sentence as antecedent.  Consider 
the utterances in (75) and (76). 
(75)  John telephoned Bill because he wanted some information. 
(76)  John telephoned Bill because he withheld some information. 
They predict that verbs such as ‘telephone’ bias interpretation of the pronoun towards 
the first noun phrase in the sentence, so that sentence (75), which is plausible on this 
interpretation, will be processed faster than (76), which is not.  Their experiments 
supported this claim.  It was found that verbs such as ‘call, ‘sell’ and ‘join’ pattern with 
‘telephone’, whereas ‘fear’ blame’ and ‘kill’ bias interpretation towards the second noun 
phrase in the sentence. 
I would like to suggest that this sort of bias can be explained in terms of relevance 
theoretic notions, rather than treated as an arbitrary fact about the semantics of the verb.  
The reason for fearing, blaming, killing someone is more likely to lie with the person 
being feared, blamed, killed, whilst calling, selling, joining and telephoning are more 
readily seen as agent driven actions.  Ultimately, the hearer will settle on an 
interpretation which makes the utterance optimally relevant: it is easier to construct a 
context in which Bill’s withholding of information leads John to phone him than one 
where John’s withholding of information prompts the call.  Withholding suggests intent, 
and it is hard (though not impossible) to construct a context where John’s deliberately 
withholding information explains his telephoning Bill. 
5.3.2.4  Parallel function 
Sheldon (1974), again considering the resolution of pronouns, introduces the idea of 
parallel function.  She hypothesizes that ‘In a complex sentence, if coreferential NPs 
have the same grammatical function in their respective clauses, then that sentence will 
be easier to process than one in which the coreferential NPs have different grammatical 
functions’.  Thus, in a sentence such as (77), ‘he’ will usually be interpreted as referring 
to John rather than Bill.   
(77)  John hit Bill and he kicked Sarah. 179 
However, this notion of parallel function seems to interact with stress, as in (78), where 
‘he’ is now naturally understood as referring to Bill. 
(78)  John hit Bill and then HE kicked Sarah. 
There is also evidence that it interacts with the semantics of both the verb and the 
conjunction. For instance, Ehrlich (1980) shows that the ‘implicit causality’ described 
above is affected when ‘because’ is replaced by ‘but’.  Consider (79) and (80). 
(79)  John feared Bill because he talked loudly. 
(80)  John feared Bill but he talked loudly. 
Whilst in (79) the most accessible interpretation for the pronoun seems to be Bill, in 
(80), ‘he’ is more naturally interpreted as referring to John. 
5.3.2.5  Accessibility of contextual assumptions 
A problem with trying to account for reference resolution purely by considering factors 
that influence the relative accessibility of potential referents is that these various 
features interact both with one another and with the discourse context.  Matsui (2000) 
takes the discussion forward by returning to the relevance theory notion of processing 
effort.  Processing effort is affected not only by the accessibility of candidate referents, 
but by the accessibility of contextual assumptions.  She comments that ‘when two 
candidate referents are roughly equally accessible, it is the accessibility of contextual 
assumptions that plays the decisive role’ (p. 88).  I want to take her argument further, 
and suggest that accessibility of contextual assumptions can affect the overall 
interpretation even if the hearer has not reached a stalemate as far as the accessibility of 
the potential referents is concerned.  Consider the following examples. 
(81)  John visited Bill because he wasn’t feeling well 
(82)  John visited Dr Smith because he wasn’t feeling well 
(83)  Dr Jones visited Bill because he wasn’t feeling well 180 
These three utterances differ only in the specifics of the particular proper names used 
(‘John’, ‘Bill’, ‘Dr Smith’, ‘Dr Jones’).  However, even if it is clear that ‘John’ co-refers 
with ‘Dr Jones’ and ‘Bill’ co-refers with ‘Dr Smith’, these proper names provide easy 
access to contextual assumptions which are likely to lead to different assignments of 
reference to the pronoun ‘he’. 
In all three utterances the pronoun ‘he’ could in principle refer to either Dr John 
Jones or Dr Bill Smith.  In (81), both interpretations are compatible with highly 
accessible contextual assumptions: for instance, it is plausible that John visited his 
friend Bill because John wasn’t feeling well and wanted advice or to be cheered up, and 
it is plausible that John visited his friend Bill because Bill wasn’t feeling well
12.  
However, the choice of proper names in (82) and (83) interacts with highly accessible 
contextual assumptions about doctors and the reasons for visiting them, to make 
particular interpretations strongly preferred in these cases.  In each case, the highly 
accessible assumption that people who don’t feel well go to see doctors leads to a 
preferred interpretation where the participant who is feeling ill is the one who is not the 
doctor.  In (83), the influence of factors such as order of mention and syntactic position 
is overridden by the overall search for a relevant interpretation. 
As Wilson (1992, p. 186) puts it, ‘reference assignment does not depend on 
accessibility of referents alone, but is also influenced by the need to obtain an 
interpretation that satisfies some criterion of pragmatic acceptability’.  In each case, the 
use of the connective ‘because’ encourages the hearer to interpret the second conjunct 
as offering an explanation for the first.  Thus, reference will be assigned to ‘he’ in such 
a way as to combine with easily accessible contextual assumptions to offer such an 
explanation. 
5.3.2.6  Referring expressions and accessibility of interpretations 
In this subsection I have discussed some of the factors affecting accessibility outlined 
by Matsui.  These factors have been shown to have a significant influence on the 
relative accessibility of candidate referents.  In combination, these factors affect 
processing effort, and hence the accessibility of interpretations: either by directly 
affecting the accessibility of a mental representation of the intended referent, or 
indirectly by affecting the accessibility of different contextual assumptions, on the one 
hand, and the hearer’s expectations of relevance, on the other.  However, I do not see 
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the above list of factors as by any means exhaustive.  Rather, the factors identified by 
Matsui indicate some of the many ways in which the linguistic form of an utterance can 
affect the processing effort demanded of the hearer.  Processing effort is, of course, not 
the full story when it comes to defining relevance, and my goal is not to define 
accessibility in terms of a list of factors of the type discussed above.  Rather, I start from 
the assumption that at any given point in a discourse, referential candidates will be more 
or less accessible relative to each other, and to the accessibility of contextual 
assumptions in that particular discourse context.  My account of referring expressions 
takes seriously the claim of relevance theory that interpretations are tested in order of 
accessibility.  The speaker must therefore undertake some ‘mindreading’ in order to 
assess the accessibility to the hearer of different candidate referents, and construct her 
utterance accordingly, while monitoring the hearer’s reactions as the utterance proceeds 
and making repairs if necessary.  Of course, mindreading, like utterance interpretation 
itself, is fallible, and it is not surprising that misunderstandings and misinterpretations 
can and do occur.  As Sperber and Wilson put it, what is surprising when people engage 
in ostensive-inferential communication is not failure, but success. 
In sum, a speaker aiming at optimal relevance will construct her utterance so that 
the first satisfactory interpretation to occur to the hearer (i.e. the first one that satisfies 
the expectations of relevance raised by the utterance) will be the intended one.  
Choosing an appropriate referring expression is just one aspect of this process. 
5.3.3  Stressed and unstressed pronouns: a relevance-theoretic account 
Bearing in mind the factors affecting the accessibility of candidate referents outlined by 
Matsui, I return to the examples of stressed and unstressed pronouns from chapter 3. 
(84)  Jane kissed Mary and then she kissed Harry. 
(85)  Jane kissed Mary and then SHE kissed Harry. 
When the pronoun ‘she’ is unstressed in example (84), it is most naturally interpreted as 
referring to Jane.  However, by stressing the pronoun, as in (85), the speaker can change 
the interpretation so that the preferred interpretation is one on which Mary is kissing 
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Considering (84) first, the procedural information encoded by the pronoun ‘she’ 
narrows the set of potential referents to just those that are female
13, i.e. the set of all 
female entities.  Within that set, Jane and Mary are likely to be highly salient by virtue 
of having just been mentioned.  However, in (84), the pronoun ‘she’ is most naturally 
interpreted as referring to Jane, and so, on the assumption that the hearer is following 
the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure, this interpretation must be the more 
accessible of the two.  Matsui’s overview of contributing factors might give us some 
clue as to why a representation of Jane might be more accessible at that point in the 
discourse.  Jane is the subject of the sentence and the first-mentioned candidate referent, 
and both these factors have been shown to contribute to the accessibility of a candidate 
referent.  The accessibility of a representation of Jane may also be boosted by parallel 
function, since both ‘Jane’ and ‘she’ play the grammatical role of subject in their 
respective clauses.  For these reasons, ‘Jane’ is likely to be tested first, and if the 
resulting overall interpretation seems likely to satisfy the hearer’s expectations, he need 
look no further. 
In (85), the same procedure applies.  The hearer follows the path of least effort, 
and stops when he finds an interpretation that satisfies his expectations of relevance.  
However, a stressed pronoun puts the hearer to more effort than an unstressed one.  
According to Wilson and Wharton (2006) ‘if two stress patterns differ in the amounts of 
processing effort required, the costlier pattern should be used more sparingly, and only 
in order to create extra or different effects’ (2006, p. 1567).  If the intended 
interpretation were ‘Jane’, then the speaker could have uttered (84).  The very fact of 
stressing the pronoun will therefore prompt the hearer to search for an alternative 
interpretation to justify the extra effort required.  He therefore proceeds along the path 
of least effort and tests the next, still highly accessible, potential referent – in this case 
Mary.  The different interpretation justifies the extra effort by yielding a different 
explicit content. 
However, as I have shown above, reference resolution and the identification of the 
intended explicit content is only one of the three subtasks in the hearer’s search for the 
intended overall interpretation.  In an example such as (84), both possible interpretations 
(with ‘she’ as co referential with either Jane or Mary) are equally plausible in the 
(limited) discourse context.  When all others things are equal, the type of factor listed by 
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absence or presence of stress, I abstract away from the details of the procedure here. In chapter 6 I will 
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Matsui as affecting the accessibility of potential references may be seen as playing a 
decisive role.  However, consider the more complicated examples in (86) and (87). 
(86)  John criticized Bill because he talks too much. 
(87)  John criticized Bill because HE talks too much. 
As always, the hearer of these utterances will test interpretive hypotheses in order of 
accessibility.  However, although in both utterances the syntactic status of ‘John’ 
(subject position, first mention etc) may seem to make him the most accessible potential 
referent for the pronoun ‘he’, this interpretation of (86) will fail to satisfy the hearer’s 
expectation of relevance.  As noted above, the choice of the connective ‘because’ 
encourages the hearer to expect the following clause to provide some explanation for 
John’s having criticized Bill.  In fact, two different possible explanations come to mind, 
so that (86) may have the interpretation in either (88) or (89). 
(88)  John criticized Bill because John talks too much. 
(89)  John criticized Bill because Bill talks too much. 
I suggest that a context in which Bill’s verbosity results in John’s criticism is likely to 
be much more accessible to a typical hearer than one in which John’s criticism is 
motivated by his own excessive talking.  Whereas in example (84), both potential 
interpretations are equally plausible, and so the first one tested (in this case Mary) is the 
only one that satisfies the hearer’s expectations of relevance, in (86) all other things are 
not equal.  These examples illustrate how the three sub-tasks in overall interpretation 
take place in parallel and can interact with the speaker’s choice of referring expression.  
To take the argument one stage further, consider (90). 
(90)  John criticized Bill because he was in a bad mood. 
Without the use of intonational cues, this comes much closer to being truly equivocal 
between the two readings.  We can easily imagine a context in which Bill’s being in a 
bad mood led to John’s criticism, and we can also imagine that John being in a bad 184 
mood could lead him to criticize anyone who crosses his path – in this case Bill.  Here, 
further contextual assumptions are needed to resolve reference one way or the other. 
As these examples show, stress can contribute to the explicit content of an 
utterance by affecting reference resolution.  However, just as with the other types of 
referring expression discussed above, stress can also contribute to the implicit phase of 
interpretation.  Suppose (91) is uttered at a party as Mary and Jane both notice that Sue 
has walked in. 
(91)  Mary: Nobody told me SHE was coming. 
Here, the procedural information encoded by the pronoun ‘she’ narrows the set of 
potential referents to just those that are female.  However, since the fact that Sue has 
just walked in is mutually manifest to both speaker and hearer, Sue is likely to be more 
salient to them than any other female present, and would probably be the first referent to 
be tested even if the pronoun had been unstressed.  Thus, adding stress to the pronoun 
once again encourages the hearer to look for extra or different effects to justify the extra 
processing effort.  In this case, however, all the other females in the discourse context 
are equally salient, and there is no other potential candidate whose representation is 
accessible enough to be worth testing.  If one of these were indeed the intended referent, 
the speaker would have to narrow the set in such a way as to make this female more 
salient than the others.  The hearer of (91) will therefore have to justify the extra effort 
not by altering the reference of ‘she’, but by deriving extra effects during the inferential 
phase of interpretation.  Thus, by stressing ‘she’, Mary invites the hearer to assume that 
she intends to do more than just secure reference: for instance she may want to 
communicate her own attitude towards Sue.  How exactly the interpretation will go is 
likely to depend on the exact intonation of the utterance, the speaker’s body language, 
facial expression and so on. 
In this section, I have tried to show that my relevance-based account can 
distinguish between stressed and unstressed pronouns.  This provides an answer to 
Ariel’s remaining objection to a relevance-only account of the use of referring 
expressions, and allows us to dispense with the notion that referring expressions encode 
information relating to Accessibility or cognitive status.   
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5.4  Conclusion 
Ariel (1990, p. 82) considers the possibility that her Accessibility scale could be 
‘replaced by a relevance theory account, possibly rendering Accessibility theory 
redundant’, but concludes that considerations of relevance alone cannot distinguish 
between each type of referring expression.  In this chapter I have tried to show that 
Blakemore’s notion of procedural meaning provides us with a means to do just this.   
In discussing the ‘special uses’ of referring expressions, Ariel acknowledges that 
there is also the ‘fascinating subject of what guides speakers in choosing a specific 
expression given a variety of expressions identical in terms of degree of Accessibility’ 
(1990, p. 198).  She concludes that ‘most of these problems should be handled by 
Relevance directly, rather than by Accessibility’ (1990, p. 198).  In this chapter, I have 
built on the ideas introduced in chapter 4 to show that we can take this approach one 
step further and use relevance theory (including the notion of procedural meaning) to 
motivate the distinctions between each of the different forms of referring expression, 
and to account for the so-called special uses without the need for externally motivated 
scales or hierarchies.  In doing so, I have also argued that the different forms of 
referring expression affect the overall interpretation of an utterance in a variety of ways, 
and that this reveals Ariel’s and Gundel et al’s treatments of reference resolution to be 
inadequate. 
As my ultimate goal in this thesis is to provide a cognitively-orientated pragmatic 
account of null subject utterances in English, I aim to show that they are a legitimate 
means of securing reference in certain discourse contexts, and that their use is 
unremarkable when certain conditions obtain.  In the next chapter, I argue that, as with 
other referring expressions, null subjects may contribute not only to reference 
resolution, but to the overall interpretation of an utterance.  Having established a general 
account of referring expressions, I am now in the position to show how null subjects 
might fit into my approach.  In chapter 6, I return to the null subject data to do just this.186 
Chapter 6:  Null Subjects Revisited 
6.1  Introduction 
In the first part of this thesis, I discussed the phenomenon of null subjects in English 
diary-style texts, and in later chapters I presented a relevance-based analysis of referring 
expressions.  In this chapter I combine these two themes to offer a relevance-based 
analysis of null subjects. I begin by considering how zero subjects in English might fit 
into the existing accounts of referring expressions discussed in earlier chapters. In 
section 6.3, I consider how my relevance-based approach to referring expressions might 
be extended to deal with overt pronominal forms.  Finally, in section 6.4, I consider the 
implications of the resulting account for the treatment of null subjects themselves.  I try 
to show that null subjects, like other referring expressions, contribute to the overall 
relevance of an utterance, and that they may do this either by minimising the hearer’s 
effort, or by creating extra or different effects whilst allowing for any constraints 
imposed by the speaker’s preferences and abilities.  As such, they fit naturally into a 
relevance-based account of utterance interpretation in general, and referring expression 
use in particular. 
6.2  Null subjects as referring expressions 
6.2.1  Accessibility and null subjects 
According to Accessibility theory (Ariel, 1990) both pronouns and gaps are markers of 
high accessibility.  Ariel devotes a chapter to looking in more detail at zero subjects. 
She begins by noting that not all zero subjects are alike, and that we should not assume 
that they ‘constitute a unitary phenomenon’ (1990, p. 107).  On the ‘commonsensical’ 
assumption that the subject of a sentence is ‘often interpreted via the AGR element’, she 
suggests that ‘we should examine the nature of the AGR element’ in order to ‘determine 
the degree of Accessibility associated with each AGR type’ (1990, p. 107).   
From this starting point, she goes on to provide an in-depth study of zero subjects 
in Hebrew, and uses this to construct a Hebrew-specific hierarchy which incorporates 
full pronouns, cliticized pronouns and AGR elements.  Turning her attention to AGR in 
English, she claims that it does not differ significantly from the Hebrew present tense, 
which ‘in general rarely allow[s] zero subjects’ (1990, p. 122).  Noting that zeros may 187 
occur when the intended referent (often the speaker or addressee) is particularly salient, 
she concludes that zeros ‘mark extremely high Accessibility’ (p. 130).  This high level 
of Accessibility may be a result of either syntactic or discourse factors: 
The condition imposed on all extremely High Accessibility Markers is that 
the mental representations they evoke be highly accessible to the addressee.  
The source for this status of high Accessibility is irrelevant, although 
languages do differ with regard to what this source may be in the unmarked 
case (Ariel 1990, p. 130). 
Although this approach enables Ariel to incorporate English null subjects into the 
Accessibility theory account of referring expressions, it does little to explain why these 
null subjects should occur in the first place.  In her analysis of Hebrew, Ariel finds that 
third person pronouns and zero subjects ‘occur in perfectly complementary 
distributions’ (p.121).  However, this is not the case in English.  In diary-style examples 
such as (1), overt third person pronouns can be substituted for zero subjects in all cases 
without affecting the acceptability of the utterance, as in (2): 
(1)  Probably wants you to reply to his message. 
(2)  He probably wants you to reply to his message. 
This distributional fact has implications for the treatment of null subjects in English.  
Ariel’s analysis of the Hebrew AGR is partly motivated by the desire to discover what 
governs speakers’ preferences among the various choices of pronominal forms (full 
pronouns, clitics and zeros).  When the variants occur in complementary distribution, as 
in Hebrew, it is reasonable to appeal to a distinguishing factor such as the notion of 
encoded Accessibility to explain the distribution.  However, the English null subject 
data pattern differently.  Whilst Ariel’s claim that the variations in Hebrew speakers’ 
choice of referring expressions ‘are not random’ carries over to the English data, her 
further claim that the variations can be ‘motivated by Accessibility theory quite 
straightforwardly’ (1990, p.116) is not so easily maintained. 
I do think, however, that Ariel’s discussion of ‘special uses’ of referring 
expressions may shed some light on the English null subject phenomenon.  Her 
suggestion is that the higher the Accessibility marker used, the more the speaker 
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could apply to English null subjects too.  This aspect of Ariel’s analysis is compatible 
with the fact that, in English, overt forms can always substitute for the nulls without 
affecting overall acceptability.  It could be argued that by using an extremely high 
Accessibility marker where a high Accessibility marker would have sufficed, the 
speaker is encouraging the hearer to derive extra contextual implications, having to do, 
for instance, with her own attitude of empathy.  In chapter 3, I discussed examples 
where Ariel claims that choice of referring expression contributes to an empathy effect.  
This acknowledgement that choice of referring expression might affect what is 
implicitly communicated by an utterance is crucial if we are to understand the (optional) 
alternations between overt and null referring expressions in the diary-style texts in 
English.  However, the problems raised by an Accessibility theory analysis of these 
special uses (as discussed in 3.3.5) remain.  In section 6.4, I offer a relevance-based 
analysis which eliminates the need for Accessibility theory, and therefore also removes 
these associated problems. 
6.2.2  Accessibility and avoiding pronouns   
Ariel (1990) makes some more general observations about the treatment of null subjects 
in Accessibility theory.  In particular, she argues that Chomsky’s Avoid Pronoun 
Principle (Chomsky, 1981; also see chapter 1, section 1.6.1) – to the extent that it 
applies- ‘naturally falls out from the more general theory of Accessibility’ (Ariel, 1990, 
p. 101).  The principle, repeated here in (3), imposes ‘a choice of PRO over an overt 
pronoun when possible’ (Chomsky, 1981, p. 65).   
(3)  Avoid Pronoun. 
Compare the interpretation of (4) with that of (5), in which the pronoun could equally 
refer to John or to some other contextually salient male.   
(4)  John would much prefer [his going to the movie].  
(5)  John would much prefer [his book].  
Replacing ‘his’ with PRO is an option in (4), but not in (5).  The Avoid Pronoun 
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with ‘John’ (unless stressed).  If the speaker had intended to refer to John, she should 
have used PRO, thus avoiding use of an overt pronoun. 
According to Chomsky, the Avoid Pronoun principle ‘might be regarded as a 
subcase of a conversational principle of not saying more than is required’ (1981, p. 65).  
Ariel argues that treating it as a grammatical principle is problematic.  She explains: 
Given that speakers...opt for Optimal Relevance...if they can achieve the 
same goal with less effort (obviously zero is less of an effort than the 
pronunciation of an overt pronoun), why should they ever produce the overt 
forms?
1 
Since overt pronouns do occur in pro-drop languages, Ariel concludes that the principle 
in (3) ‘cannot be made responsible for the whole phenomenon of pro/pronoun 
distribution’ (1990, p. 103).  In her view, the Avoid Pronoun principle is both 
‘unnecessary and incorrect’ (p. 104), and Accessibility theory can better account for the 
distribution of overt pronouns and gaps.  As discussed above, in Ariel’s framework, the 
speaker is sensitive to the Accessibility of the intended referent in the discourse context, 
and chooses a referring expression which signals the appropriate level of Accessibility.  
Whilst I agree with Ariel’s suggestion that the Avoid Pronoun principle is ‘more 
apparent than real’, once again I want to question why Accessibility theory is needed, in 
addition to the general principles of relevance.   
According to relevance theory, a speaker aiming at optimal relevance will 
formulate her utterance so that the first interpretation the hearer tests and finds relevant 
in the expected way will be the intended one.  As we have seen, hearers test 
interpretations in order of accessibility.  At the point in (4) where ‘his’ is interpreted, 
John is the most accessible potential referent, but if John had been the intended referent, 
a speaker aiming at optimal relevance should have uttered (6) instead: 
(6)  John would much prefer [PRO going to the movie]. 
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crucial type of effort involved in achieving optimal relevance is hearer’s processing effort rather than 
speaker’s production effort.  As noted by Carston (2005), there are many possible factors which may 
‘affect the degree of effort a speaker is willing to expend in encoding her thoughts and articulating 
linguistic forms’.  Although minimizing her own effort may be one such factor, it is likely to be integrated 
with a range of other goals, and is incorporated into the definition of optimal relevance under the heading 
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The choice of the overt pronoun ‘his’ in (4) causes the hearer extra linguistic processing 
effort, and he is therefore entitled to look for more or different cognitive effects to 
justify this extra effort.
2  The easiest way to obtain such effects is to assign reference to 
another salient male in the discourse context.
3  In this way, the disjoint reference 
predicted by the Avoid Pronoun principle falls out naturally from relevance theory.   
Interpretations of the type just described are to be expected if (as I will go on to 
argue in more detail) pronouns encode procedural meaning, and procedural meaning 
saves the hearer effort by narrowing the search space for inferential processes (including 
reference assignment).  Overt realisation of the pronoun would only be worthwhile if 
the procedural meaning saves the hearer from going down the wrong inferential path.  
In example (6), which lacks an overt pronoun, John is already the most accessible 
referent at the point where PRO is interpreted, and will therefore be tested first.  Since 
(6) is fully grammatical, there is no reason to expect the hearer to go to the extra effort 
of processing an overt pronoun.  Indeed, if the overt pronoun form were used, the hearer 
would be likely to assume that the extra effort demanded was not gratuitous, and 
therefore look for alternatives to the co-referential interpretation.  Where the null 
pronoun (PRO) is not a grammatical option, as with ‘his book’ in (5), the overt pronoun 
should have two possible readings, one on which it refers to John, and the other on 
which it refers to some other salient male in the discourse context.  The hearer will then 
settle on the interpretation which most easily combines with accessible contextual 
assumptions to yield an overall interpretation that is relevant in the expected way. 
6.2.3  The Givenness hierarchy and null subjects 
The other major pragmatically-oriented approach to referring expressions, based on the 
Givenness hierarchy, also offers to shed some light on null forms in English.  Gundel, 
Hedberg and Zacharski (1993) examine the distribution of referring forms in five 
languages (Chinese, English, Japanese, Russian and Spanish), and conclude that ‘the six 
statuses on the Givenness Hierarchy are adequate for describing appropriate use’ in 
those languages (1993, p. 284).  Although the status hierarchy itself is intended to be 
adequate cross-linguistically, the correlation between referring forms and cognitive 
statuses is seen as varying between languages. Notably, English is the only language in 
the survey which does not utilize zero subjects as standard.  For each of the other 
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3 If the pronoun is stressed, (John would much prefer HIS going to movie), John again becomes a 
possible referent.  The extra effort to which the hearer is put is justified by a contrastive interpretation. 191 
languages, the zero form is seen as requiring that the referent be ‘in focus’.  How, then, 
might a Givenness hierarchy analysis of referring expressions deal with the diary-style 
zero subjects in English and other non-null subject languages? 
It seems that there are two possibilities.  First, we might treat the zero subjects as 
signalling some sort of ‘super-in-focus’ status to the hearer.  This would enable the 
speaker to distinguish between several competing ‘in focus’ potential referents in cases 
where one is more salient than the others, and so could therefore be classed as ‘super-in-
focus’.  Alternatively, it could be that when zeros alternate with overt pronouns, the 
contrast has nothing to do with the cognitive status of the referent, and instead serves 
some other purpose in the discourse.  
Both options are problematic for a Givenness-based account of referring 
expressions.  According to the first possibility, zero subjects in English would be 
analysed as representing some higher cognitive status not otherwise allowed for in the 
original scale.  This raises important questions about the universality of the approach.  It 
would mean that the six statuses identified by Gundel et al (1993) are not, after all, 
cross-linguistically adequate.  If we take the step of adding this language specific extra 
distinction, might there then be room for further distinctions, and if so, at what point 
does the hierarchy cease to involve language specific manifestations of universal 
principles, and instead just become language specific?  Furthermore, if we introduce the 
idea of a ‘super-in-focus’ cognitive status, we might then ask why this does not seem to 
be needed (or even possible) in languages such as Japanese and Russian, where zeros 
already signal ‘in focus’?  Finally, a ‘super-in-focus’ status could only be justified in 
English if it is needed to allow the speaker to distinguish between competing ‘in focus’ 
candidate referents.  However, in many null subject utterances, there is only one ‘in 
focus’ potential referent in the discourse context.  This is particularly evident in 
examples taken from diaries, such as (4)-(9), where the only ‘in focus’ entity is the 
author of the diary.  It is unclear how the use of a zero subject could aid reference 
resolution in these cases.   
(7)  Walked to Westminster hall  (Pepys, 1985, p. 610). 
(8)  Sat there for ¾ hour  (Woolf, 1985, p. 334). 
(9)  Went to the chemist to discreetly buy pregnancy test  (Fielding, 1996, p. 117). 192 
These examples bring us to a second possibility: that the alternation between overt 
and zero forms relates to something other than the cognitive status of the intended 
referent.  The status ‘in focus’ in English would then be seen as correlating with both 
zero and overt pronouns, and the speaker’s choice of one over the other would be driven 
by some other factor, and would serve some other purpose in the discourse. This is 
exactly the position that my relevance-based account will take, and although it is not 
incompatible with the Givenness hierarchy per se, an approach along these lines would 
bring into question the motivation for the hierarchy in the first place.  As discussed in 
the previous chapter, relevance theory seems able to account for the data that motivate 
each of the distinctions made by the Givenness hierarchy.  Once zeros in English are 
added to the equation, it seems that any analysis of referring expressions must 
acknowledge the importance of factors influencing aspects of interpretation that go 
beyond mere reference resolution.  Again, this is something that I have argued is 
missing from the existing accounts.  It seems that the Givenness approach must appeal 
to a broader pragmatic framework such as relevance theory to do this.  If relevance 
theory (or an alternative pragmatic framework) is needed to fully account for the use 
and interpretation of referring expressions, whilst at the same time being able to account 
for the distinctions made by the hierarchy, then it is unclear what advantage is gained 
from retaining the hierarchy. 
6.3  Relevance theory and overt pronouns 
6.3.1  Overt pronouns as referring expressions 
The null subjects found in diaries and other abbreviated registers seem to have some 
referential content.  As discussed in chapter 1, they alternate with overt pronouns 
throughout the texts in which they occur.  In the previous chapter I argued that referring 
expressions contribute to the overall relevance of an utterance, and that they do this by 
encoding procedural and/or conceptual information which may contribute to the 
explicitly or implicitly communicated meaning.  To understand how null subjects might 
be incorporated into this analysis, it is therefore necessary to consider in more detail 
how overt pronouns contribute to the overall interpretation of an utterance.  It is this 
contribution that is missing in corresponding null subject utterances, and by 
understanding what it is, we can address the issue of why it seems to be optional in 
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6.3.2  Types of pronouns 
Not all pronouns are alike.  In a classic work, Evans (1980) distinguishes four 
categories of pronouns: deictic, anaphoric, bound and e-type.  Deictic pronouns ‘make 
reference to an object...in the shared perceptual environment or rendered salient in some 
other way’, whilst anaphoric pronouns are interpreted as ‘coreferential with a referring 
expression elsewhere in the sentence’ (p.337).  In the remaining two categories the 
pronouns take quantifier expressions as antecedents, bound, as in (10), and non-bound, 
as in (11). 
(10)  Every boy respects his teacher. 
(11)  Every man who owns a donkey feeds it. 
In considering the phenomenon of null subjects, I restrict my analysis to the first two 
categories, which I will group together as ‘referring pronouns’.   
I will also follow Heim & Kratzer (1998) in assuming that ‘there is no difference 
between anaphora and deixis’ (1998, p, 241): 
Anaphora may often be viewed as reference to a contextually salient 
individual...it seems to differ from deixis only insofar as the cause of the 
referent’s salience is concerned (1998, p. 240). 
This echoes Ariel’s (1990) proposal to do away with the referential-anaphoric 
distinction (see 3.3.1), and chooses to treat all referring expressions as anaphoric.  On 
similar lines, Powell argues that ‘a proper theory of indexicals should be able to provide 
a unified account of anaphoric and non-anaphoric uses’ (2002, p. 118).  With this goal 
in mind, I will follow Heim and Kratzer’s approach of assuming that hearers follow a 
general strategy when interpreting all ‘referring pronouns’: 
In disambiguating the pronoun’s reference, listeners assign it to the most 
salient individual that allows them to make sense of the utterance (p.240). 
I will reinterpret this general strategy in terms of a relevance theoretic account which 
distinguishes the salience of objects from the accessibility of mental representations of 
those objects, and in which the use of a referring pronoun is one option available to a 
speaker aiming at optimal relevance. 194 
6.3.3  Pronouns:  procedural and truth-conditional 
In chapter 4, I touched on relevance theory-based approaches to pronouns (e.g.Wilson 
& Sperber, 1993; Hedley, 2005), which treat pronouns as encoding procedural 
information that contributes to the truth-conditional content of an utterance.  In this 
section, I revisit these accounts, and consider what this procedural information might 
look like, and how it might interact with the discourse context. 
Wilson and Sperber (1993) treat pronouns as encoding procedural constraints on 
explicatures.  Following Kaplan (1989), they reject the view that the first person 
singular pronoun ‘I’ encodes the concept ‘the speaker’.  On this analysis, an utterance of 
(12) would express the proposition in (13), and would therefore be necessarily false.   
(12)  I do not exist. 
(13)  The speaker of (12) does not exist. 
Whilst (12) will be false whenever it is uttered, we do not want to say that it is 
necessarily false.  Instead, according to Wilson and Sperber, the pronoun ‘I’ encodes 
procedural information which instructs the hearer to ‘identify its referent by first 
identifying the speaker’ (1993, p. 22).  It is not the pronoun itself that enters into the 
proposition expressed, but a concept that picks out the referent of the pronoun on that 
particular occasion: pronouns ‘guide the search for the intended referent, which is part 
of the proposition expressed’ (1993, p. 23).  For instance, when (12) is uttered by David 
Kaplan, it expresses the proposition in (14). 
(14)   David Kaplan does not exist. 
Hedley (2005) outlines further arguments for treating pronouns as both procedural and 
truth-conditional.  As he puts it, pronouns look ‘distinctly procedural’.  Whilst ‘we 
clearly have a “concept” HAWK...we don’t seem to have a concept “HE”’ (2005, p. 42).  
Instead, the meaning of ‘he’ is context sensitive and in some sense means whatever it 
refers to in a particular utterance.  Furthermore, in order to judge the truth or falsity of 
an utterance, reference must be assigned to any pronouns it contains.   
(15)  He has a big hat. 195 
We cannot evaluate the truth of (15) unless we recognise the intended referent of ‘he’.   
Assuming that pronouns are procedural, then, what sort of procedure might they 
encode? 
6.3.4  A pronominal procedure 
Hedley (2005) proposes an account of pronominals which is broadly compatible with 
the relevance theory approach to referring expressions outlined in this thesis.  On 
Hedley’s account, the procedure encoded by ‘I’, might look something like, ‘find an 
individual concept of the speaker’ (2005, p. 6), while for singular ‘you’, it might be 
‘something along the lines of “find an individual concept of the hearer”’ (2005, p. 8).  
For Hedley, a pronoun is ‘a linguistic device that can be used by a speaker in order to 
aid the process of reference resolution for his hearer, while not expending too much 
time and energy in producing fully specific (and probably repetitive) descriptive noun 
phrases’ (2005, p. 7). 
Although this is largely compatible with my approach to referring expressions, 
there are two respects in which I think Hedley’s account does not go far enough, both of 
which relate to the hearer’s use of the relevance theory comprehension procedure.  First, 
according to Hedley, pronouns ‘achieve relevance by uniquely picking out an accessible 
individual from the context’ (2005, p. 3), and when processing a pronoun the hearer will 
look around for a ‘reasonably accessible referent’ (p.7).  Bearing in mind the content of 
the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure, I suggest that we should go further 
than this.  As I have argued, a hearer following the procedure will always test 
interpretations in order of accessibility, and will therefore look for the most accessible 
referent that seems likely to make the utterance relevant in the expected way.  If this 
yields an overall interpretation which satisfies his expectations of relevance, then he 
will stop.  Thus, the individual picked out by the pronoun should not merely be 
‘reasonably’ accessible:  it should be the most accessible one which leads to a 
satisfactory overall interpretation.  As with the referring expression types discussed in 
chapters 4 and 5, the speaker may use information encoded by the forms to constrain the 
set of potential referents to a point where this is the case.  In this section, I will take a 
closer look at pronouns to consider what sort of information this might be. 
Second, if we take seriously the notion of optimal relevance and the claim that the 
hearer follows the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure, then the motivation 
Hedley suggests for a speaker’s choosing to use a pronoun (‘not expending too much 
time and energy in producing fully specific (and probably repetitive) descriptive noun 196 
phrases’) again appears too vague.  In the first place, as noted with respect to Ariel’s 
analysis (see footnote 1, this chapter), the crucial type of effort involved in achieving 
optimal relevance is hearer’s processing effort rather than speaker’s production effort
4.  
The effort involved in processing longer or more complicated referring expressions 
should be assessed relative to the cognitive effects produced by alternative utterances 
with the same interpretation.  Using a longer, informationally richer term would not 
simply be a more effortful way of achieving the same effects.  Rather, the utterance 
conveys a presumption of its own (optimal) relevance.  Thus, if a speaker uses, say, a 
definite description where a pronoun would have sufficed, the hearer is entitled to look 
for extra effects to justify the extra effort to which he has been put.  As discussed in the 
previous chapters, there are cases where use of an informationally richer (in Ariel’s 
terms, lower Accessibility) form than necessary leads to extra or different effects.  So, 
use of a pronoun as opposed to some other form of referring expression is not simply an 
effort saving device.  Rather it is one means by which the speaker may make her 
utterance optimally relevant.  According to relevance theoretic principles, a speaker 
should use a pronoun when it involves the minimum of linguistic material needed to 
achieve the intended overall interpretation in what, for the hearer, will be the most 
economical way. 
However, a survey of the data reveals that although the overall role played by 
pronouns (and other referring expressions) in achieving relevance remains the same, 
pronouns do not all function in the same way.  As discussed in section 5.2.1.5, Kaplan 
distinguishes pure indexicals from demonstrative uses.  Whereas the pronoun ‘I’ is 
classed as a pure indexical since it does not require any sort of accompanying 
demonstration, the third person pronouns ‘she’, ‘he’ and ‘it’ may be used 
demonstratively to pick out a certain referent.  Certain pronouns also carry specific 
information relating to gender and number, and I consider how we might characterise 
this information, and what role it might play in reference resolution, by turning my 
attention to the third person pronouns in English. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
4 See Carston (2005) and (Wilson & Wharton, 2006) for a discussion of hearer’s effort and speaker’s 
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6.3.5  Third person pronouns 
6.3.5.1  Gender and procedures 
Hedley suggests that the procedure encoded by the masculine third person pronoun in 
English is something like, ‘find an individual concept with the feature ‘male’ (2005, p, 
9).  In my terms, this amounts to suggesting that use of the pronoun of ‘he’ constrains 
the set of potential referents to just those that carry the feature ‘male’.  Thus, consider 
the examples in (16) and (17). 
(16)  Pierre said to Natasha that he should go. 
(17)  Pierre said to Natasha that she should go. 
The only difference between (16) and (17) is the gender of the third person pronoun, 
and yet the interpretations are very different.  In (16), Pierre is telling Natasha that it is 
Pierre (or some highly salient other male) who should go, whereas in (17), Pierre is 
telling Natasha that Natasha (or some other highly salient female) should go.  The sets 
of potential referents from which the hearer will resolve reference are mutually 
exclusive in these two examples.  To follow Hedley’s analysis, in (16) it is the set of 
individuals with the feature ‘male’ and in (17) the set of individuals with the feature 
‘female’ from which the referent should be drawn.  In this section, I will explore the 
role of gender features in more detail, and argue that we should take a slightly different 
approach to the treatment of gender in these examples. 
On Hedley’s account, it is natural to see the gender information encoded by the 
pronouns ‘he’ and ‘she’ as conceptual in nature.  The properties of being male or female 
are, after all, fairly concrete, and could be represented by the concepts MALE or FEMALE 
in a Fodorian conceptual representation system, or ‘language of thought’(Fodor, 1975; 
2008).  This would in turn suggest that the encoded meanings of pronouns should be 
seen as at least partly conceptual in nature.  However, as Hedley argues, it is not the 
concept MALE that enters into the explicature of the utterance, but a representation of the 
referent itself.  As evidence for this claim, he cites Powell’s (2002) discussion of the 
case of Dr James Barry.  Dr Barry was an eminent physician who died in 1865 and was 
discovered, after death, to have been a woman.  Compare utterances (18) and (19) as 
examples of how this situation might be described. 198 
(18)  When he was laid out after he died, they discovered that he was actually a 
woman. 
(19)  ?When she was laid out after she died, they discovered that she was actually a 
woman. 
If the hearer of these utterances believes that Dr James Barry is a male
5, then use of the 
masculine pronoun is the most efficient way to ensure that reference is resolved 
correctly.  Using the feminine pronoun would constrain the set of potential referents to 
just those classed as female, and at the stage in the utterance at which reference 
resolution should take place, Dr James Barry would not (as far as the hearer is 
concerned) be amongst that set.  Thus, Hedley treats the pronoun ‘he’ as encoding a 
procedure that instructs the hearer to resolve reference on an individual concept with the 
feature ‘male’.  He specifies that this feature is ‘pragmatic in nature (in English) rather 
than being categorical or semantic’ (Hedley, 2005, pp. 9, fn14), and later elaborates on 
this: 
Procedural indications like ‘male’, ‘speaker’, ‘plural’ etc in English all 
operate at the level of evidence provided by the speaker for his hearer... 
rather than as semantically constraining factors.(Hedley, 2007, p. 91). 
Thus, Hedley moves away from an analysis where pronouns themselves encode specific 
conceptual information about inherent features of the referent.  Rather, he treats 
pronouns as encoding pro-concepts: placeholders for concepts which must then be 
worked out contextually in determining the explicit content of the utterance.   
Whilst I will follow Hedley in holding that the work done by pronouns is closer to 
being procedural than conceptual, I want to question his treatment of the encoding of 
gender features.  Rather than analysing the gendered pronouns (and pronouns in 
general) as encoding features of the type MALE or FEMALE, which figure as concepts in 
the language of thought, I want to argue that they should be been as encoding 
procedures that operate at a sub-personal level, without invoking personal-level 
concepts such as MALE or FEMALE at all.
6  Before considering in more detail the role that 
                                                
5 Or that the name ‘James Barry’ would generally refer to a male. 
6 Here I follow the personal / sub-personal distinction first introduced by Dennett (1969).  Sub-personal 
explanations of behaviour deal in ‘entities and properties that can be shown to play a causal role in the 
action or behaviour, without necessarily standing in rational or normative relations to it’ (Carston, 2002b, 
p. 131).  See Elton (2000) for an introduction to the distinction. 199 
such procedures might play in reference resolution, I will briefly consider how recent 
approaches to pronominal reference have treated gender, number and person features.   
Adger & Harbour (2008) discuss various syntactic, semantic and morphological 
approaches to what they refer to as j-features (phi-features), which include features 
relating to person, number and gender, as well as those associated with honorification 
and definiteness (see chapter 1, section 1.6.3).  A standard account of these features, 
first proposed by Heim and Kratzer (1998), treats them as carrying presuppositions.  On 
this analysis, referring pronouns are seen as encoding free variables whose 
interpretation is determined by the ‘physical and psychological circumstances that 
prevail’ when they are processed (1998, p. 234).  The j-features are ‘syntactically 
adjoined to pronominals and their...semantic contribution is a presupposition that 
restricts the range of the assignment of values to [the] variables’ (Adger & Harbour, 
2008, p. 14).  According to this account, if a speaker uses a masculine pronoun to refer 
to a female, she has not uttered something false, but merely something potentially 
infelicitous.  Moreover, given the appropriate set of beliefs, the speaker can felicitously 
refer to a female (Dr James Barry) as ‘he’, since by doing so she is expressing the 
presupposition that Dr Barry is male.  As Heim & Kratzer explain (for a scenario in 
which the gender roles are the reverse of those in (18)): 
This is intuitively right.  If the discourse participants mistakenly believe a 
male referent to be female, or if they are willing to pretend that they do, then 
indeed an occurrence of ‘she’ can refer to a man, without any violation of 
principles of grammar.      (Heim & Kratzer, 1998, p. 245). 
Although the speaker of (18) knows that Dr Barry was a woman, the purpose of her 
utterance is to draw attention to a contrast between the actual state of affairs (Dr Barry 
being female) and the supposed state of affairs at the time described (Dr Barry being 
male).  Use of an utterance with a false presupposition is therefore appropriate.  On this 
account, the presupposition may be seen as a contextual assumption which forms part of 
the speaker’s and hearer’s common ground, and it would therefore have to be 
formulated in conceptual terms. 
Adger & Harbour go on to consider an important issue relating to gender, and to 
j-features in general: ‘gender is of two-types: semantically contentful and purely 
grammatical’ (2008, p. 13).  Evidence from German seems to suggest that gender 
agreement is purely syntactic.  For instance, the noun ‘Mädchen’ (‘girl’) is 
grammatically neuter, and this affects the form of the relative pronoun in (20): 200 
(20)  Das     Mädchen,   das /*die     das Buch lieβt. 
The.NEUT   girl    that. NEUT/that.FEM  the book read.PRES 
‘the girl who reads the book.’ 
Here, the feminine relative pronoun would be ungrammatical, which suggests that 
agreement is sensitive to syntactic rather than semantic features.  However, the case of 
collective nouns in British English and certain instances of deferred reference 
complicate the picture.  As noted by Adger & Harbour, both (21) and (22) are 
grammatical in some dialects of English. 
(21)  The committee has voted today. 
(22)  The committee have voted today. 
The agreement on the auxiliary verb depends on the speaker’s intention to pick out 
either a collective action or a series of individual actions, rather than on syntactic 
number features associated with the noun.  The same pattern can be found with a wide 
range of nouns denoting groups.
7  Similarly, consider Adger & Harbour’s example of 
deferred reference in (23) (adapted from Nunberg’s (1979) ‘ham sandwich’ example):  
(23)  The hash browns at table six is / *are getting angry. 
Here, the noun phrase ‘hash browns’, although grammatically plural, is used to refer to 
a customer in a restaurant, and on this interpretation the agreement on the verb must be 
singular.  It has been argued (e.g. by Dowty & Jacobson, 1988), that such examples are 
problematic for analyses which treat agreement as purely syntactic. 
I want to argue that the gender information encoded by the third-person singular 
pronouns in English lacks conceptual content, and should therefore be seen as more 
grammatical than semantic.  Although, the grammatical gender of the pronoun often 
coincides with what we might think of as the ‘natural’ gender of the referent, it does not 
                                                
7 Sauerland & Elbourne (2002, p. 289) provide the following (incomplete) list of examples: ‘cabinet’, 
‘committee’, ‘platoon’, (political) ‘party’, ‘pride’, ‘hive’, ‘team’, ‘regiment’, ‘battalion’, ‘bank’, 
‘government’, ‘group’, ‘family’, ‘faculty’, ‘Senate’, ‘House’ (of Lords, Commons, Representatives), ‘set’, 
‘squad’. 201 
follow that the procedures encoded by gendered terms draw directly on concepts such as 
MALE or FEMALE.  Rather, they may be driven by the vestiges of a grammatical gender 
system, and indeed, we see similar examples with grammatical number features.  For 
instance, there are pairs of nouns which, whilst very similar in terms of their conceptual 
content, vary as to their grammatical number features.  Consider the examples in (24)-
(27).  
(24)  The oats are rotten. 
(25)  The wheat is rotten. 
(26)  The woods are dark. 
(27)  The forest is dark. 
The pairings of oats/wheat and woods/forest are roughly semantically equivalent (or at 
least may be used by some native speakers to refer to the same entities), and yet they 
differ in grammatical number.  Similarly, words like ‘trousers’ and ‘scissors’, which 
pick out a single item, are grammatically plural
8.  The grammatical number feature 
associated with a certain noun phrase may therefore be distinct from any semantic or 
natural number associated with the encoded concept.   
Given this assumption, how might we account for the collective noun and 
deferred references cases in (21)-(23)?  Sauerland & Elbourne (2002) offer a tentative 
solution.  They note that collective nouns behave as if they were ‘simultaneously 
singular and plural’ (p. 290).  For example, in (28) the noun ‘set’ takes a singular 
determiner, but a plural verb. 
(28)  This set are all odd. 
They therefore suggest that we are dealing not with one but with two categories of 
features, both of which take the values singular and plural.  First, there is the standard 
number feature which indicates how many things are being referred to.  In (28), there is 
a single set, and so the determiner must be singular.  (29) is ungrammatical. 
                                                
8 I suspect such examples may be a red herring.  In each case they are objects which normally/usually 
come in pairs.  When prefixed by ‘a pair’ they are syntactically singular, but when this is omitted plural 
agreement is expected, as would be the case with ‘the pair of gloves is...’ and  ‘the gloves are...’  202 
(29)  *These set are all odd. 
In addition, there is a feature system that Sauerland & Elbourne term ‘mereology’, 
which ‘indicates whether or not the entity under discussion is being conceived of as 
consisting of more than one member’.  In their view, verbal agreement can refer to 
either feature, but ‘determiner concord refers only to the Number feature’ (p. 291).  This 
approach provides some insight into what is going on in utterances such as (28), despite 
the apparent clash in number feature between determiner and verb.  However, the 
introduction of the mereology system does not completely counter the argument that 
collective noun cases are problematic for a purely syntactic analysis of number features.  
The speaker often has a choice about which type of feature (number or mereology) to 
use in verbal agreement, and that choice will be driven by subtleties in the interpretation 
that the speaker intends to communicate.
9   
I suggest that collective nouns are, by their nature, exceptional.  As grammatically 
singular nouns that represent a set of individual items, they can be used to refer either to 
the set as a whole, or to all the individual members of the set.  The choice between 
singular and plural agreement is therefore not free, but depends on the intended 
interpretation of the utterance.  Consider (30). 
(30)  The committee were /?was all late for the meeting. 
For use of the word ‘all’ to be relevant in this utterance, the hearer must represent the 
committee as a group of individuals.  Thus, the speaker uttering (30) is understood as 
conveying that all members of the committee were late for the meeting.  Although it is 
underlyingly singular, the interpretation of a collective noun ‘the X’ can always be 
pragmatically adjusted in context to convey ‘members of X’.  In that case, they trigger 
plural agreement, which acts as a clue to the hearer that this is the intended 
interpretation.   
Returning to the treatment of gender, I therefore propose that the gender 
information carried by third person pronouns in English is grammatical rather than 
                                                
9 Deferred cases such as (23) (‘The hash browns is getting angry’) are seen as problematic for a purely 
syntactic account of number features.  However, I suggest that these work differently from the collective 
noun cases.  Whereas the mereology is part of the definition of collective nouns (a collection of individual 
parts making up a collective whole), this is not the case for deferred uses of non-collective nouns.  Rather, 
it seems that in example (23) we have a case of meaning transfer.  The NP ‘hash browns’ is used as the 
name of another entity to which it stands in a ‘salient functional relation’.  See (Nunberg, 2004, p. 346) 
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semantic or conceptual.  The speaker’s choice of a masculine pronoun in preference to a 
feminine pronoun (or vice versa) does not in general take place at a personal level, using 
concepts drawn from the vocabulary of the language of thought.  It is not necessary for 
a speaker to check whether the intended referent falls under the concept MALE.
10  
Rather, a pronoun constrains the set of potential referents to just those belonging to a 
category of items that are identifiable in sub-personal rather than personal terms 
(perhaps using the notion of a ‘phi-feature’ construed as grammatical rather than 
semantic).  The ability to identify items belonging to this same category must play a 
role not only in comprehension, but also in language production: it is just the category 
of items for which that particular pronoun can be legitimately used.  On the approach I 
propose, then, the masculine pronoun ‘he’ encodes both a pro-concept and a procedure 
which restricts the set of potential referents to just those belonging to a category 
identifiable in sub-personal terms as containing items that can be legitimately referred to 
using the pronoun ‘he’.  On this sub-personal approach, speakers might be seen as 
having, as part of their knowledge of the word ‘he’, a detector for items which fall into 
this category.  Typically, detectors operate on the basis of cues which pick out 
stereotypical or prototypical members of a category, but these cues do not amount to a 
definition.
11  Having restricted the set in this way, reference resolution proceeds, as 
described in the previous chapters, with potential referents from this sub-personally 
identifiable category being tested in order of accessibility. 
This move away from semantic/conceptual gender and number features makes it 
easy to account for the Dr James Barry type cases, and also sheds interesting new light 
on other seemingly exceptional examples.  Whilst we might make the broad 
generalisation that the ‘he’/‘she’/‘it’ distinction in English pronouns correlates with the 
distinction between human males, human females and inanimate objects respectively, 
there are many less clear-cut cases.  A ship (or car, or country), for example, may be 
referred to as ‘it’ or ‘she’.  In my framework, this is simply because it is identifiable in 
sub-personal terms as belonging both to the set of things that can be referred to as ‘it’ 
and the set of things that can be referred to as ‘she’
12.  A similar explanation can be 
given for the otherwise messy issue of how to refer to animals using a pronominal form.  
                                                
10 See Corbett (1991) for a discussion of semantic versus natural gender. 
11 A parallel might be drawn with the visual systems of frogs.  According to Letvin, Maturana, 
McCulloch and Pitts (1959), the frog’s fly detector is based on the ability to pick out small black moving 
dots, and so does not pick out all and only flies.  Also see Agar (1993) for further discussion. 
12 There may be individual differences in how acceptable different speakers find these two possibilities, 
and this further supports the sub-personal procedural analysis.  If it is becoming less common to refer to 
ships as ‘she’ (rather than ‘it’), we can see this as a change in the sub-personal categorization rather than 
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A cat or dog may be referred to as ‘he’, ‘she’ or ‘it’ because it may belong to all three 
sub-personally identifiable sets, and not because of the natural gender (if known) of the 
animal itself.  Membership of a certain set is therefore dependent on how the particular 
speaker categorises the particular animal (or how they assume their hearer categorises 
it), and whilst this may be influenced by natural gender, it is far from determined by it.  
Gender sets may overlap, and their membership may vary as the discourse context, 
including the speaker’s assumptions and communicative intentions, vary.  A speaker 
may well refer to a cat as ‘she’, and then change to ‘he’ on discovering that the cat is 
male.  This does not make the original utterance false, or the original act of referring 
necessarily infelicitous.   
Although animals may belong to the set of things that can be referred to using the 
pronoun ‘it’, as in (31), this is not usually the case with humans, even if the gender of 
the referent is unknown, as in (32). 
(31)  I’m going to buy [a dog]i and call iti Rover. 
(32)  *I’ll give this to [whoever wins]j and itj can keep it. 
An exception seems to be the case of unborn babies, where in certain circumstances ‘it’ 
is just as acceptable as ‘they’. 
(33)  If I ever have a baby, it’s going to have the best of everything. 
(34)  If I ever have a baby, they’re going to have the best of everything. 
Until the natural gender of the baby is known, it will belong to the set of things that can 
be referred to using ‘it’, as in (33) or ‘they’, as in (34).  Again we can understand this as 
a reflection of how the speaker categorises an unborn child, rather than of the child’s 
falling under one or other full-fledged concept.  Furthermore, examples such as (34) 
provide evidence that the grammatical number feature on the plural pronoun does not 
necessarily correspond to semantic plurality.  There is no suggestion in (34) that there is 
more than one baby. 
I have argued that pronouns encode procedural rather than conceptual 
information.  However, some recent relevance-theoretic accounts (Hussein, 2008; Zaki, 
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conceptual and procedural information.  The idea behind these accounts is that pronouns 
(and some other forms of referring expression) encode procedures which guide the 
process of reference resolution by activating conceptual information about proximity, 
gender and number.  Hussein (2008, p.72) goes so far as to claim that an utterance 
containing the pronoun ‘he’ ‘would be false if “he” is taken to refer to someone who is 
not “singular” or “masculine”’.  In the previous chapter I argued against attempts to 
treat features such as ‘proximal’ and ‘distal’ as corresponding to full-fledged concepts 
or semantic notions
13, and in this chapter I have tried to do the same with gender and 
number features.  The information encoded by pronouns is no more than a clue to help 
guide the hearer to the intended meaning.  On this account, the gender and number 
information associated with the pronoun does not itself enter into the proposition 
expressed, nor does it act as a presupposition, as proposed by Heim and Kratzer.  
Rather, the choice of pronoun guides the hearer as he resolves reference and it is a 
representation of the referent, rather than a full-fledged concept such as MALE or 
FEMALE, which enters into the explicitly communicated meaning.  From now on, I will 
therefore treat pronouns as fully procedural in nature. 
6.3.5.2  The role of contextual assumptions 
My account of pronouns (and referring expressions in general) relies heavily on the 
relevance theoretic comprehension procedure.  However, it is important to bear in mind 
that this procedure deals with the overall interpretation of an utterance and that the 
hearer must construct hypotheses relating to each of the three sub-parts (explicit 
content, contextual assumptions and contextual implications).  In this framework, it is 
quite possible that the information encoded by a pronoun will not determine a unique 
referent as the most accessible one.  Rather, a speaker aiming at optimal relevance 
should formulate her utterance so that the intended referent is the most accessible 
candidate which can combine with accessible contextual assumptions to yield an 
interpretation that is relevant in the expected way. 
To see why this is important, consider first a simple example of how a procedural 
analysis of third person singular pronouns might go. 
(35)   John went to the shops.  He bought a red jumper. 
                                                
13 On my sub-personal account, a range of factors, including spatial, temporal, discourse and emotional 
factors, will go into the online computation of whether an item falls into the category of things that may 
be appropriately referred to as ‘this’ or as ‘that’.  Hence, use of a demonstrative determiner is not just a 
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In order to derive the explicit content of (35), the hearer must assign reference to the 
pronoun ‘he’.  Assuming that no extra-linguistic referents are available in the discourse 
context, it should be obvious to both speaker and hearer that the most accessible 
potential referent will be ‘John’.  This, tested in a highly accessible context which 
includes the contextual assumption that people go to the shops to buy things, yields an 
interpretation that might be relevant enough to be worth the hearer’s attention in a way 
the speaker could manifestly have foreseen. 
Since pronouns provide minimal constraints on the set of potential referents, my 
account predicts that they will be used when little or no constraint is needed.  In 
example (35), there is only one candidate referent in the discourse context.  However, 
consider example (36), where there are in principle two highly accessible potential 
referents (‘Britney’ and ‘Justin’) for the pronoun in the embedded clause.   
(36)  Britney told Justin that he couldn’t sing. 
I have argued that the pronoun ‘he’ constrains the set of potential referents to a sub-
personally identifiable set of items that can be legitimately referred to by the pronoun 
‘he’.  Human beings with masculine names will generally belong to this set, whereas 
human beings with feminine names will not.  On normal encyclopaedic assumptions 
about the names ‘Britney’ and ‘Justin’, there will therefore be only one candidate 
referent that fits with this constraint, and so reference will be resolved on ‘Justin’.
14 
Now compare (36) with (37) and (38) (adapted from Nieuwland & Van Berkum 
(2006)), ignoring the possibility of non-anaphoric readings: 
(37)  Britney told Justin that she couldn’t sing. 
(38)  Britney told Christina that she couldn’t sing. 
Without any details of the context in which (38) is uttered, it is unclear whether the 
pronoun ‘she’ is intended to refer to Britney or Christina.  Although in (36) and (37) the 
procedure encoded by the pronoun sufficiently constrains the set of possible referents to 
a point where there is only a single highly accessible referent, this is not the case in 
                                                
14 It is of course logically possible that ‘he’ is intended to refer to another male entity; but if this were 
the intended interpretation, we would expect the speaker to narrow the context for resolution using extra-
linguistic means such as gesturing, and/or to demand more effort from the hearer by stressing the 
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(38).  Both ‘Britney’ and ‘Christina’ will belong to the sub-personally identifiable set of 
things that can be referred to by the feminine pronoun.  The procedural constraint 
encoded by the pronoun leaves more than one possible referent.  However, reference 
does not necessarily have to be resolved at this point for the utterance to be optimally 
relevant.  According to the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure, hearers test 
‘interpretive hypotheses’, not just potential referents.  Reference will eventually be 
resolved as a result of combining a possible referent with a possible context.  Thus, the 
speaker need not always constrain the set of potential referents to a single one, as long 
as there is a highly accessible context with which one can combine to yield a relevant 
overall interpretation, while others do not.  The effect of context selection on reference 
resolution is therefore crucial, and is missing from the previous accounts (Ariel, 1990; 
Gundel, Hedberg, & Zacharski, 1993; Reboul, 1997). 
Continuing with the analysis of (38), we can see that choices of context will lead 
to different potential interpretations
15.  Suppose that in context 1, the speaker is 
describing an argument that she has just witnessed between Britney and Christina, while 
in context 2, the speaker is describing a whispered conversation that she has just 
overheard between Britney and Christina.  The contextual assumptions that are likely to 
be highly accessible to the hearer will be different in these two contexts.  Context 1 may 
give easy access to assumptions such as (39) and (40). 
(39)   When arguing, people say insulting things to one another. 
(40)   Telling someone that they cannot sing is an insult. 
Interpretation of ‘she’ as referring to Christina is therefore likely to be preferred in this 
context, since it can combine with these highly accessible contextual assumptions to 
make the utterance relevant as expected.   
These examples illustrate some of the ways in which third person pronouns can interact 
with the discourse context.  In other examples, however, it is not so clear that the 
encoded procedure contributes directly to the reference resolution process at all.  In the 
next sub-section, I will look at some of these. 
 
 
                                                
15 See Nieuwland & Van Berkum, (2006) for neurolinguistic evidence of context influencing pronoun 
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6.3.5.3  Gender-redundant uses 
Consider utterance (41). 
(41)   I spoke to Andrey and he said that all was well. 
If we apply the reference resolution process outlined above, then any specific 
information associated with the masculine pronoun appears to be redundant in this case.  
In the discourse context, there are two explicitly mentioned, and therefore highly 
accessible, potential referents: the speaker of the utterance and Andrey.  Removing the 
pronoun entirely yields a reading where the speaker is the understood subject of the verb 
‘said’, as in (42).   
(42)  I spoke to Andrey and said that all was well. 
By contrast, utterance (41) leads to an interpretation where reference is resolved on 
Andrey.  It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the speaker is the most accessible 
potential referent in the discourse context, and that use of the pronoun in (41) eliminates 
the speaker as a potential referent, leaving Andrey as the first to be tested.  Thus, the use 
of a third person pronoun narrows the hypothesis space for the inferential process of 
reference resolution.   
On this account, the fact that Andrey belongs to the set of things that can be 
appropriately referred to by ‘he’ (as opposed to ‘she’) is irrelevant for purposes of 
reference resolution.  The grammar of English forces the speaker to use an appropriately 
gendered version of the third-person pronoun when referring to humans.  However, 
what is significant is not the encoded gender information but the fact that the third 
person pronoun has been used, since this leaves the intended referent as the most 
accessible one that meets the constraints imposed by ‘he’.  Although a representation of 
the speaker might be generally more accessible than one of Andrey at this point in the 
utterance, the speaker (and likewise the hearer) would not normally be a member of the 
set of things that can be appropriately referred to in the third person.  This rules out an 
interpretation where reference is resolved on the speaker, and the hearer will continue to 
test possible interpretations in order of accessibility.  Andrey is the next most accessible 
interpretation, and he belongs to the set of things that can appropriately be referred to 
using the pronoun ‘he’.  If the resulting interpretation is relevant in the expected way, 
the hearer will accept it as the intended meaning. 209 
As with the gender information discussed above, on this approach, features such 
as ‘first person’, ‘second person’ or ‘third person’ are seen as purely grammatical.  The 
use of a third person pronoun does not carry conceptual information about the intended 
referent but rather indicates that this referent belongs to a category identifiable on a sub-
personal level.  This suggests an explanation for why it is sometimes possible for a 
speaker to refer to herself (or her hearer) using the third person.  In certain discourse 
contexts, the speaker herself will belong to the sub-personally identifiable set of things 
that can be appropriately referred to using a third person pronoun. 
6.3.5.4  Informative uses 
Whilst the procedural information provided by the pronoun is crucial to reference 
resolution in cases such as (16) and (17) above (‘Pierre said to Natasha that he/she 
should go’), on other occasions the speaker may use the choice of pronoun in an 
informative way, to contribute to other aspects of the representation that she is 
encouraging her hearer to build.  Consider (43). 
(43)  I met a friend for lunch and she had the fish. 
In interpreting the first part of (43), the hearer has to construct a representation of the 
speaker’s friend.  Since ‘friend’ is gender-neutral, he may assume that the intended 
relevance of the utterance does not depend on the gender of this friend.  However, in the 
second part of the utterance, the speaker uses a gendered pronoun, and the hearer must 
therefore narrow the interpretation of ‘friend’ to include only things that can be 
appropriately referred to by the pronoun ‘she’.  As discussed above, a speaker is 
constrained by the grammar of English to choose the appropriately gendered pronoun 
for the intended referent in such cases.  Moreover, if the hearer is resolving reference on 
a definite person, knowing the gender of that person is likely to increase the relevance 
of the utterance by giving him access to additional implications (or other cognitive 
effects) at no extra cost.   
Recall, however, that a speaker aiming at optimal relevance need only make her 
utterance as relevant as is compatible with her own preferences and abilities.  There 
may be situations in which the speaker does not know, or does not wish to disclose, 
some information about the gender of the referent that might indeed increase the 
relevance of her utterance.  In such cases, the gender neutral pronoun ‘they’ may be 210 
substituted for ‘he’ or ‘she’ in some dialects.  Thus, imagine (44) spoken by a wife to 
her suspicious husband when she arrives home late. 
(44)  I met a friend for a drink and they talked a lot!
16 
Here, the speaker does not wish to lie, but also does not wish to disclose any further 
information about the gender of the friend.  However, such obvious avoidance of a 
gendered pronoun might well lead the hearer to access certain contextual assumptions 
about what information wives might wish to withhold from their husbands, and thus 
infer that the friend was a male.  The fact that utterance (44) could carry this implication 
suggests that even when irrelevant for the purposes of reference resolution, it is normal - 
and hence less costly for both speaker and hearer in terms of processing effort - to select 
a gendered pronoun when referring to a human being whose gender is known.  
Choosing not to do so may imply (or implicate) something about the speaker’s abilities 
or preferences. 
Whereas in (44) it is the speaker’s preferences that drive her choice of pronoun, in 
(45), as with the unborn baby example in (34), her choice is restricted by her abilities. 
(45)  I’ll give this to whoever wins and they can keep it. 
Here, the speaker does not know whether the winner will belong to the set of things that 
can be appropriately referred to by ‘he’ or the set of things that can be appropriately 
referred to by ‘she’, and so she uses the grammatically plural but gender neutral 
pronoun ‘they’. 
 
 
 
6.3.6  The first person singular pronoun 
The majority of null subject utterances in the diary style registers are interpreted as first 
person singular, and for this reason I turn my attention again to the procedural 
information encoded by the pronoun ‘I’.  In many ways, analysis of this first person 
                                                
16 The fact that in such uses the verb agrees with the (plural) number feature on the pronoun is further 
evidence that such features are syntactic in nature. 
  (i) A friend recommended this. They swear by it. 
  (ii) * A friend recommended this.  They swears by it. 211 
case may seem more straightforward than for the third person pronouns.  We are not so 
easily distracted by the superficially conceptual notion of gender (and to a lesser degree 
number).  As discussed in section 6.3.2, it soon becomes clear that defining ‘I’ as 
meaning ‘the speaker of the utterance’ leads to incorrect predictions about the truth-
values of utterances in crucial cases.  Rather, for Wilson and Sperber, ‘I’ is seen as 
instructing the hearer to ‘identify its referent by first identifying the speaker’ (1993, p. 
22), and for Hedley (2005, p. 7) it is seen as encoding a procedure which tells the hearer 
to find ‘an individual concept of the speaker that is relevant in the particular context’. 
Turning to my account of referring expressions, and following the discussion of 
third person pronouns above, the procedure encoded by ‘I’ will add an extra layer of 
activation to the sub-personally identifiable set of items that can be appropriately 
referred to (in that situation) using the 1
st person singular pronoun.  Obviously, this set 
varies from speaker to speaker, and in most cases will contain just the speaker herself
17.  
To shed further light on the procedure associated with the first-person singular 
pronoun, I will next consider the much discussed examples of answering machine and 
post-it-note utterances.  The so-called answering machine paradox (Sidelle, 1991; 
Predelli, 1998; Corazza, Fish, & Gorvett, 2002; Powell, 2002; Hedley, 2005) involves 
utterances such as (46), recorded on answering machines or left as notes. 
(46)  I am not here now. 
Compare this utterance with (47), which, according to Kaplan, is ‘deeply, and in some 
sense...universally true...it cannot be uttered falsely’ (1989, p. 509). 
(47)  I am here now. 
Following Kaplan’s logic, (46) should be universally false whenever it is uttered.  
However, this goes against the strong intuition that tokens of (46) recorded on 
answering machines or posted on office doors may be both informative and true.   
Corazza et al (2002) propose an analysis designed to deal with such examples, 
which they call ‘the conventional account’ (2002, p. 12).  On this account, speakers and 
                                                
17 However, this analysis might help to explain the sort of deferred reference cases discussed by Powell 
(2002, p. 137): for example, (iii) as uttered by a race-goer who has placed a bet on a particular horse.  
 
(iii) I am in last place 
 
Such examples suggest that not only the speaker, but items that stand in an appropriate relation to the 
speaker, may belong in the category of items picked out by the use of ‘I’. 212 
hearers are aware of certain social conventions relating to the use of answering 
machines, post-it notes, etc, and it is because of this awareness that they can felicitously 
produce and understand utterances such as (46).  According to Corazza et al, ‘without 
such settings and conventions, we would be unable to successfully use and manipulate 
answering machines and other similar devices’ (2002, p. 13).  I find this appeal to 
convention rather unsatisfactory.  Whilst I agree that the discourse context is crucial in 
determining how an utterance will be understood, Corazza et al suggest no explanation 
for how the interpretation of certain utterances in certain discourse contexts should have 
become conventionalised in this way.  Their account raises the question of how the first 
users of answering machines dealt with such utterances.  I suspect that early individual 
users of answering machines would have had no problems communicating and 
interpreting the intended meaning, even though the devices were novel and innovative. 
An added variation (Sidelle, 1991, p. 5) complicates the story still further.  In this 
version, utterance (46) (‘I am not here now’) is not left on an answering machine, but 
posted on the office door of an absent university professor.  However, it was not written 
by the professor herself, but by a university administrator who is aware of the 
professor’s absence, and who has noticed a stream of confused students knocking on her 
door.  Although the professor is the intended referent of the pronoun, she did not 
produce the utterance.  The administrator may have been asked by the professor to write 
the note on her behalf, in which case she is, in effect, quoting the professor.  
Alternatively, the professor may have no knowledge of the note, and so the 
administrator’s act becomes genuinely deceptive, in that she is purporting to speak on 
the professor’s behalf when she is not entitled to do so.   
A relevance-based account of referring expressions and utterance interpretation in 
which contextual assumptions play a central role eliminates the need to appeal to 
conventionalisation, and offers a new perspective on these cases.  Placing the note on 
the door is an act of ostensive communication, which creates a presumption of optimal 
relevance.  The audience will follow the path of least effort when testing possible 
interpretations, and the writer will construct her utterance so that this strategy will lead 
the hearer to the intended interpretation without putting him to any gratuitous effort.  
Given the discourse context, the administrator knows, on the one hand, that the 
audience will be unaware of who actually wrote the message, and, on the other hand, 
that the most accessible referent for them will be the professor.  Moreover, the 
administrator is aware that a scenario in which the owner of an office puts a note on 
their own door relating to their own whereabouts will be highly accessible to the 213 
audience.  Given this highly accessible contextual scenario, the first interpretation the 
audience is likely to test will involve the pronoun ‘I’ being taken to refer to the 
professor.  Since this interpretation will be relevant in the expected way, the audience 
will consider no other possibilities, and will settle on this interpretation
18.  Thus, the 
interlocutors need not rely on conventions, but rather on highly accessible assumptions 
about how humans are likely to behave in certain situations.  Even if a student were to 
see the administrator writing and attaching the note, the assumption that she is doing 
this on behalf of the professor is likely to be much more accessible than a scenario in 
which the administrator attaches a note to someone else’s office to inform students of 
her own absence.  In that case, the administrator will be seen as quoting (or purporting 
to quote) the professor, and the utterance will be understood as such.  As a sophisticated 
understander (Sperber, 1994), the student should be able to recognise that the 
administrator is taking the perspective of the professor, and will therefore look for an 
interpretation that the speaker (in this case the administrator) ‘might have thought he 
would think was relevant enough’ (Wilson, 2000, p. 422).  An interpretation where the 
administrator is taking the perspective of the professor would then be relevant in the 
expected way. 
Examples of this type are not necessarily restricted to written notes or recorded 
messages.  Consider an utterance of (48) in the following discourse context.  Clare is at 
her desk in her place of work.  However, she is not officially at work, but rather 
studying for her evening course during an afternoon of annual leave.  A colleague 
approaches her with a work-related query and she utters (48). 
(48)  I’m not here! 
Although it seems that Clare has said something obviously false, the hearer is entitled to 
assume that her utterance is optimally relevant.  In this case I suggest that the 
proposition expressed is along the lines of (49), where ‘I’ functions in the normal way, 
and [IN THE OFFICE]* is an ad hoc concept expressing something like the narrowed 
meaning: ‘in the office for the purposes of performing my usual duties of employment’. 
                                                
18 The administrator could, of course, have achieved a similar outcome by using a non-first person 
referring expression (iv). 
(iv)  Professor Smith is not here today 
This might, however, lead the hearers to derive certain implications that the administrator might wish 
to avoid.  Perhaps she does not want the students to form the opinion that the professor was careless not to 
leave such a note herself, to realise that the administrator has further information, and so come and pester 
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(49)  Clare is not [in the office]* 
To sum up, I propose that the first person singular pronoun encodes a procedure which, 
in effect, restricts the set of potential referents to just those that the speaker can refer to 
using the term ‘I’ in the discourse context.  An important advantage of such an analysis 
is that it suggests a possible explanation for the less straightforward cases.  In the case 
of the note on the door in (46), the discourse context is such that the professor can be 
referred to by use of ‘I’ even though the utterance was produced by someone else.  In 
cases of deferred reference, something associated with the speaker can belong to the set 
of things to which ‘I’ can be used to refer.  Again, such examples persuade us away 
from a ‘feature’ analysis in which the pronoun is seen as encoding semantic or 
conceptual information.  Rather, the procedures associated with pronouns operate at a 
sub-personal level. 
6.4  Relevance theory and null subjects 
In this section, I will argue that the occurrences of null subjects in non-pro-drop 
languages are not surprising on a relevance-theoretic approach to utterance production 
and interpretation.  Rather, they should be expected to arise spontaneously under certain 
circumstances as speakers aim at optimal relevance.  I will divide the null subjects into 
three categories, and argue that the driving force underlying each category is the balance 
between hearer’s effort and cognitive effects.  Ultimately, on my account, the diary style 
nulls emerge as simply another type of referring expression available to a speaker, 
which will interact with the discourse context to yield an interpretation that makes the 
utterance relevant in the expected way. 
6.4.1  Greater or different effects 
Following the relevance-based approach outlined in chapters 4 and 5, it could be 
tempting to claim simply that in contexts such as diaries and email messages, the 
(usually first person) referent is so accessible that the procedural information encoded 
by the pronoun is no longer needed.  Although I will argue that this is indeed the case, it 
does not on its own fully explain the distribution of null subjects across language use in 
English.  If the accessibility of referents were the only significant factor, then we might 
expect to see null subjects in many more discourse contexts than we in fact do.  We 
might predict that first person null subjects would occur spontaneously whenever the 215 
speaker is the most accessible potential referent.  However, this is not the case.  Rather, 
we find that null subjects are restricted for the most part to informal written (and 
sometimes spoken) registers.  The fact that null subjects in English are on the whole 
associated with casual uses of language will be crucial to my analysis of them as 
relevance-driven referring expressions. 
In section 6.3.5.3, I showed how procedural information associated with the 
gender of a pronoun may in some cases be redundant, and provided evidence that, 
despite this redundancy, the appropriately gendered pronoun is selected.  Outside diary 
contexts, speakers do not normally omit a gendered pronoun (or substitute it with a 
neutral one) simply because the information is not required.  In general, the grammar of 
English requires arguments to be phonologically realised, so even when the intended 
referent is already the most accessible one in the discourse context, an appropriate 
pronoun must be used. 
This brings me back to the question I posed at the end of chapter 1: what are the 
contextual and processing conditions under which this usually strict requirement that 
subjects be overtly articulated might be relaxed in certain registers of non-pro-drop 
languages such as English?  In this section, I will attempt to answer this question by 
arguing that the restrictions may be relaxed in several different sets of circumstances, 
each of which ultimately comes down to the balancing of effects for effort.  Thus, the 
use and distribution of English null subjects is ultimately driven by the speaker’s aim of 
achieving optimal relevance. 
6.4.2  Greater effects and different effects 
6.4.2.1  The informal null 
The informal (usually written) registers in which many instances of English null 
subjects occur tend to have the speaker’s presence explicitly acknowledged elsewhere in 
the text.  Diaries are essentially first person narratives in which the author and her 
activities are by definition the subject matter.  Emails and SMS texts are direct 
messages from one individual to another (or others), and include ‘from’ and ‘to’ fields 
explicitly stating who the speaker is.  Of course, not all diaries, emails or text messages 
utilise null subjects.  As with spoken English, it seems to be the casual, informal nature 
of the texts that triggers use of the null subject option. 
Although, as we have seen, there may be many instances in which the procedural 
information encoded by pronouns is superfluous, by dropping this normally required 216 
information, the speaker overtly indicates that this is indeed the case.  As a result, she 
communicates that the mutual cognitive environment she shares with the hearer is such 
that she can safely relax the normal requirements on formal language use, and still be 
confident that her message will be understood as she intends.   
Sperber and Wilson (1986/95) argue that the style adopted by the speaker may 
communicate how she regards the relationship between herself and her hearer or 
hearers: 
A speaker aiming at optimal relevance will leave implicit everything her 
hearer can be trusted to supply with less effort than would be needed to 
process an explicit prompt.  The more information she leaves implicit, the 
greater the degree of mutual understanding she makes it manifest that she 
takes to exist between her and her hearer (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 
218). 
The use of null subjects (and other omissions and abbreviations) in these informal 
registers communicates that the speaker not only regards the intended referent as the 
most accessible one for the hearer, but is also quite confident in this respect.  As 
Sperber and Wilson note, there is ‘no entirely neutral style’ (1986/95, p. 218).  The 
speaker in the diary null contexts reveals that she assumes a ‘certain degree of 
mutuality’ between herself and the hearer, which makes it possible to trust the hearer to 
infer much of what she wishes to communicate without any overt linguistic prompt.  As 
a result, the use of null subjects contributes to the overall tone of the discourse as 
relaxed, casual and intimate. 
Although the addressee of a null subject utterance has less linguistic material to 
process, since null subjects are ungrammatical in most varieties of English, this option 
is in some sense marked.  Given that marked options in general cost the hearer more 
processing effort, it seems reasonable to assume that subjectless utterances in English - 
at least when first encountered in a text - require more processing effort than than their 
overt subject counterparts.  However, this marked use and the implications that arise 
from it lead to extra effects in terms of the tone and style of the discourse, and justify 
the effort involved.  If null subjects were unmarked in English, as in standard pro-drop 
languages, then we would be unable to explain why the null subject examples correlate 217 
with the informal discourse contexts.
19  It is the very fact that null subject sentences are 
marked in English that prompts the hearer to derive the extra effects relating to the tone 
and style of the discourse.  Formal emails, diaries and text messages exist alongside the 
casual examples in which we find the null subjects.  This is to be expected if we accept 
that there will be cases where, even though the identity of the referent might still be 
highly accessible, the speaker does not wish to create the same degree of intimacy.  
Compare (50) and (51).   
(50)  I am pleased to confirm that the Grant of Probate has now been issued. 
(51)  Forgot to mention, saw my ex-boyfriend Mike at the weekend. 
Both are from personal emails, and in both cases the intended referent of the subject 
referring expression is the most highly accessible given the discourse context
20.  
However, the discourse context and the nature of the relationship between speaker and 
hearer (solicitor and client in (50) as opposed to friends in (51)) means that it is 
appropriate to imply intimacy in (51), but not (50).  The overtness of the pronoun does 
not change what is explicitly communicated in either case, but rather contributes to the 
style and tone of the discourse.  Thus, it is not that informal registers licence the use of 
null subjects, but rather that the use of null subjects is one way in which the speaker can 
set an informal tone for the discourse.   
Bridget Jones’ Diary (Fielding, 1996) features two distinct writing styles.  The 
‘diary style’ sections which feature extensive use of dropped subjects and other missing 
elements are found alongside much more traditional narrative episodes.  Whilst both are 
purportedly extracts from a diary, sections featuring diary-style omissions focus 
strongly on the narrator’s private thoughts, feelings and emotions.  The remaining 
sections describe events and incidents in a more detached and traditional first-person 
narrative style.  Thus, the tone of the writing reflects the subject matter, and directly 
mirrors the level of intimacy with, and empathy for, the narrator that the reader is 
expected to feel. 
                                                
19 This, in turn, predicts that overt subject use in pro-drop languages should create an extra effect of 
some sort.  This seems to be the case.  McCloskey & Hale (1983, p. 491) observe that in such languages, 
‘use of a pronoun subject is associated with emphatic or contrastive focus on the subject’. 
20 Further to this, the form of the copula ‘am’ in (50) makes it clear that the subject is the first person 
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In this section, I have argued that some instances of diary null subjects are driven 
by the informality of the registers in which they occur.  According to clause (b) of the 
definition of optimal relevance, the hearer is entitled to assume that the utterance the 
speaker has produced is the most relevant one compatible with her abilities and 
preferences.  In these cases, the speaker had the ability to produce overt subjects, so the 
hearer must conclude that she chose not to.  This in turn can be interpreted in two ways.  
As discussed, the speaker should not be putting the hearer to any gratuitous effort.  So 
her choice to omit certain elements might imply that she did not judge the information 
encoded by those elements to be necessary given the mutual understanding between the 
interlocutors.  Alternatively, the choice may be driven not by the speaker’s abilities but 
by her preferences.  It could be that the speaker preferred to save her own effort rather 
than go to the trouble of explicitly articulating or writing the omitted elements.  This 
decision to favour her own interests over the hearer’s might play a significant role in 
diaries and note-taking, where the writer is also the intended audience.  If read by 
someone other than the writer, omissions of this type must be in some sense condoned 
as less than stylistically optimal from the audience’s perspective.  These various 
possibilities do not explain all occurrences of null subjects in non-pro-drop languages.  
To account for the remaining nulls, I again turn my attention to the second clause in the 
definition of optimal relevance. 
6.4.2.2  The pressurized null 
As has often been pointed out, many of the null subject utterances in non-pro-drop 
languages occur in discourse contexts where there is a restriction on time or space.  
These include newspaper headlines such as (52), certain internet message boards or 
forums such as (53), postcards such as (7), text messages such as (55), telegrams such 
as (56), “tweets”, such as (57) and note-taking, as in (58). 
(52)  Falluja insurgents say not holding Hassan. 
(53)  Was delivered promptly.  
(54)  Visited the castle yesterday.  Wish you were here. 
(55)  Must have missed one another. 219 
(56)  Impossible attend first night.  Will attend second night if you have one. 
(57)  Just smashed my shin on a big wooden elephant (long story). 
(http://twitter.com/MitchBenn accessed 13th January 2010) 
(58)  Can be integrated.  Needs investigation. (notes for minutes of a meeting to 
discuss updating a database system) 
In such cases, either the length of the utterance is restricted in some way (even to the 
point where only a limited number of characters is allowed, as in some electronic 
formats), or the utterance is produced under pressure or time constraints.  In relevance 
theory terms, the speaker’s ability to produce a fuller version is in some way 
compromised.  Recall that the speaker’s overall aim is to produce an utterance which 
yields enough cognitive effects to justify the effort required of the hearer, and which 
will be the most relevant utterance compatible with the speaker’s abilities and 
preferences (including any constraints on her production abilities).  Relevance itself is 
‘a positive function of effects achieved, and a negative function of effort incurred’ 
(Hall, 2004, p. 220).  As discussed in chapter 4, procedural meaning contributes to the 
relevance of an utterance by guiding the hearer towards the intended effects, and thus 
reducing the effort required of him. 
In these pressurized cases, the speaker only has a certain amount of space, time or 
characters at her disposal, and as a consequence something has to ‘give’.  In this section 
I consider why, in such cases, subjects are so often the thing that ‘gives’.  I have argued 
above that pronouns enocode procedural meaning which contributes to the explicit 
content of an utterance.  It is not, of course, the pronoun itself which enters into the 
explicit content, but (a representation of) the referent of the pronoun.  So, it is not the 
presence of the pronoun itself which is significant in the null subject examples, but 
rather the procedural meaning it encodes, and the role this meaning plays in guiding the 
hearer to the intended referent in a particular discourse context.  In section 6.3.5 above, 
I showed how the procedural information carried by third person pronouns may be 
either redundant or decisive in deriving the explicit content of an utterance.  Bearing 
this in mind, I propose that in the pressurized cases, the chances that a speaker will drop 
a pronoun (or rather, that she will sacrifice the procedural meaning it encodes) will 
depend on what that meaning contributes to the explicit content of the utterance. 220 
As discussed above, there are cases where it is very likely that the intended 
referent is already the most accessible candidate for the hearer in the discourse context.  
In such cases, the speaker is risking very little in terms of communicating the intended 
explicit content by omitting the pronoun.  My approach predicts that first person 
pronouns will be omitted more frequently than others, since the speaker will very often 
be the most accessible potential referent in the discourse context.  However, it does not 
rule out the possibility that other pronouns will be vulnerable, given a discourse context 
where the non-first person referent is the most accessible.  My approach also predicts 
that expletive pronouns will frequently be candidates for omission, since they too 
contribute little to the explicit content of an utterance. 
Given my treatment of pressurized null subjects within the overall account of 
referring expressions, it may be tempting to ask why omission of highly accessible 
subjects is not more widespread.  Recall that according to relevance theory, 
communication takes place at a risk, and sending a hearer down the wrong inferential 
path (e.g. towards the wrong referent) is likely to be very costly in terms of effort.  
Processing a pronoun, on the other hand, is likely to be quite cheap in terms of hearer 
effort, both because they are high-frequency items and because of their limited semantic 
content.  So, all else being equal, it does not make sense to risk misunderstanding for 
very little gain in terms of effort saved.  In the pressurized discourse contexts, on the 
other hand, omission of the subjects frees up space, characters and/or time which the 
speaker can devote to encoding information which leads to cognitive effects, thereby 
making the utterance more relevant. 
6.4.2.3  The ostensively vague null 
There are some instances of diary-style null subjects which appear to be neither driven 
by informality nor produced under pressurized circumstances.  In these cases, the 
speaker may not know, or may not want to commit to, the exact identity of the referent.  
Such uses are discussed by Oh (2006, pp. 842-843), who notes that ‘zero anaphora can 
be deployed precisely in order to avoid the selection of a particular term and the stance 
that speaker would thereby be taking’.  Alternatively, it may be that identification of an 
exact referent simply does not make much difference to overall relevance.  I will call 
such instances the ostensively vague null subjects.  In these cases, the utterances are not 
only relevant enough to be worth the addressee’s attention, but they are also the most 
relevant ones compatible with the communicator’s abilities and preferences.  To 
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(59)  To be collected. Spoke to waste services. (sign on a pile of rubbish outside a 
university department) 
(60)  OK. Got that! (message on an ATM after the user has entered their PIN). 
(61)  AB trying to find replacement cost for item returned damaged.  Will contact 
when known.  (Staff note on library user record. (AB = initials of a member of 
staff)) 
(62)  Very excited about entering our 2
nd phase of 10 year plan. 
In examples (59)-(62), it seems that resolving reference on a specific person or persons 
is not important.  The exact identity of the agent of the verb does not contribute to the 
relevance of the utterance.  Rather, the utterance achieves relevance by asserting that an 
action has taken (or will take) place.  In (59), it is not necessary for the hearer to know 
or to be able to infer who has spoken to waste services.  It is enough to know that the 
event has taken place.  If the hearer follows the path of least effort, they will reach an 
interpretation which makes the utterance optimally relevant (i.e. that somebody has 
spoken to waste services, and hence that the pile of rubbish is being dealt with), and will 
therefore stop before they reach the point of assigning a precise reference to the null 
expression.
21  
In (60) and (61), the null subject is driven not by the unimportance of precise 
details about the identity of the referent, but by the speaker’s preference for being non-
committal.  The ATM (or rather the human who programmed the ATM) in (60) is, we 
assume, aiming to give the transaction a friendly, relaxed and personal tone.  However, 
using the personal pronoun ‘I’ in this utterance would anthropomorphize the ATM in a 
way that seems inappropriate when one is obviously dealing with a machine.  The null 
subject version offers a compromise.
22  Utterance (61) is a case of non-committal use in 
a different context.  Although it may seem that the staff member ‘AB’ is the most 
accessible potential referent in this discourse context, (61) does not commit her to 
contacting the customer herself.  Rather, the utterance goes no further than asserting that 
the user will be contacted.  In this example, it is also unclear what the overt version of 
                                                
21 We might achieve a similar effect by using the passive form, for example: Waste services have been 
informed.   
22 I am not claiming that this was consciously thought out by the programmer of the machine, although 
this is not impossible. 222 
the utterance would be (even if we assume co-reference with AB).  We do not know if 
this was written by AB referring to herself in 3
rd person, or by somebody else who is 
familiar with the situation.  In terms of what is communicated, it does not matter.  The 
utterance achieves relevance by asserting that the user will be contacted. 
In utterance (62), it is again unclear what the overt version of the subject referring 
expression would have been.  Assuming that a first person reading is highly accessible, 
a hearer still does not know whether the speaker is asserting (63) or (64).  Again, it does 
not seem to matter in this case. 
(63)  We are very excited about entering our 2
nd phase of 10 year plan. 
(64)  I am very excited about entering our 2
nd phase of 10 year plan. 
These examples highlight an important feature of the processing and interpretation of 
null subjects.  Null subjects in English behave as referring expressions in their own 
right.  It is not necessary to go through the process of identifying the content of the 
pronoun that has been elided.  Rather, the hearer proceeds as with other referring 
expressions: he follows the path of least effort, looking for an overall interpretation that 
will satisfy his expectations of relevance.  If identification of the agent is necessary (and 
as we have seen, this is not always the case), then he will test potential referents in order 
of accessibility.  He need not identify a ‘missing’ pronoun, and reconstruct its encoded 
meaning before proceeding. 
6.4.3  Null subjects and poetic effects   
I am not presenting these three categories as necessarily an exhaustive taxonomy of 
English null subjects, or as theoretically distinct.  They are simply illustrations of how a 
speaker can use null subjects as a form of referring expression, and thereby make her 
utterance optimally relevant.  The cases may also overlap.  So, for example, entries in 
the fictional Bridget Jones’ Diary by Helen Fielding were originally published as a 
serialised newspaper column, and as such were subject to strict word limits.  As a result, 
whilst in some cases the nulls may contribute to the overall informal tone of the writing, 
they may also be one means of dealing with a length-restricted format, and their 
contribution to relevance may draw on both these aspects.   
I have surveyed three broad categories of data, but my main claim is that null 
referring expressions are a means by which a speaker may make her utterance optimally 223 
relevant.  As a result, the null elements may interact with the discourse context in other 
ways, and achieve other effects.  For example, the following passage is taken from the 
novel ‘The Crow Road’ by Ian Banks, and features several null subjects: 
…I had to climb over the wall…gate was locked.  By the time I got there he 
was out of reach.  I thought he was shinning up a drainpipe.  Just assumed.  
Heard rumbles, I think, but…didn’t think anything of it.  No flashes, that I 
can remember.  Kenneth was yelling and swearing and shouting 
imprecations; calling down all sorts of punishments; I was trying to get him 
to come down; told him he’d fall; told him the police were coming; told him 
to think of his family.  But he kept climbing. 
          (Banks, 1996, pp. 314-315). 
Here the author uses the null subject utterances and short sentences to introduce a sense 
of panic and urgency into the narrative, perhaps indicating that the speaker is out of 
breath or under pressure.  The fictional narrator is producing pressurized nulls, and so 
the author is able to create a feeling of tension and panic. 
Similar effects are discussed by Blakemore (2008), who considers the effects 
produced by apposition of two or more identical or similar phrases in the representation 
of a character’s thoughts, as in (65): 
(65)  In the beginning it was a tension, an element of strain that grew and crept like a 
thin worm through the harmony of their embrace (Hulme, 1985 [1984], p. 6) as 
quoted in (Blakemore, 2008, p. 37). 
According to Blakemore, in this example, the repetition of the same idea, phrased in 
different ways, captures a difficulty in expressing a particular concept.  However, she 
adds that crucially ‘it is not Keri Hulme (the author) who is represented as grappling 
with her feelings...but the character whose feelings Hulme represents’ (2008, p. 41).  
Likewise, it is not the author, Ian Banks, who is out of breath and panicking in the 
excerpt above, but the character, Prentice McHoan, as represented by Banks.  Of course, 
these two examples differ in that Banks is writing a first person narrative, whereas 
Hulme is representing her character’s thoughts in the free indirect style.  However, 
Banks’ first-person narrator is retelling past events, rather than relating them as they 224 
happen, and the feelings and emotions represented are taken to be those of the character 
at the time of the events, not at the time of the description.  
Thus, above and beyond the categories described in this section (pressurized, 
informal, ostensively vague null subjects), null subjects may also be used in the creation 
of poetic effects.  A writer/speaker may use them to create a particular style or tone by 
mimicking the sort of discourse contexts in which null subjects spontaneously occur, 
and thus creating a range of weak implicatures having to do with the character’s 
emotions and state of mind (e.g. feeling pressurized, relaxed or evasive).  In fictional 
texts, the reward for the extra effort expected of the hearer/reader may lie ‘in the 
relationship which is created between the reader and the fictional individuals in the 
fictional world which the author is representing’ (Blakemore, 2009). 
6.5  Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I have applied my account of referring expressions, developed in 
chapters 4 and 5, to the diary-style null subject data.  I began by considering how null 
subjects in English might fit into other pragmatically-orientated analyses of referring 
expressions, and argued that neither Accessibility theory nor the Givenness hierarchy 
offers a satisfactory explanation of the data.  To investigate null subjects further, I then 
considered how overtly realised pronouns function in discourse, and suggested a 
treatment of them within my relevance-based framework.  Following earlier work by 
Wilson and Sperber (1993), Powell (2002) and Hedley (2005; 2007), I started from the 
assumption that pronouns encode procedures, and went on to consider what these 
procedures might look like.  I argued that the gender, person and number information 
carried by pronouns should be seen as grammatical rather than semantic or conceptual, 
and that the procedures associated with pronouns work on a sub-personal level to 
indicate that the intended referent belongs to a particular category.   
In the final section, I turned my attention back to the null subject data, and argued 
that the use of null subjects in certain discourse contexts in English creates extra or 
different effects which in turn justify the extra effort to which the hearer is put in 
processing null subject utterances.  I identified three major categories of null subject 
use: informal style nulls, which contribute to a casual, intimate tone of a discourse, 
pressurized nulls, which free up restricted speaker resources, and so contribute to 
relevance, and ostensively vague nulls, which save the hearer the effort of resolving 
reference when this does not directly contribute to the relevance of the utterance.  225 
Finally, I noted that use of null subjects may be exploited by writers and speakers to 
create poetic effects. 
Throughout this chapter, I have argued that the use of null subjects (and referring 
expressions in general) is driven by considerations of relevance.  A speaker aims to 
produce an utterance which provides the most cognitive effects in her hearer, whilst 
minimising the effort to which that hearer is put, and allowing for her own abilities and 
preferences.  In chapter 7, I apply this treatment to other, non-subject omissions, and to 
null subjects in other discourse contexts.  I then consider the implications that my 
discussion may have for our understanding of referring expressions in general, and the 
conceptual/procedural distinction in particular. 226 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1  Introduction 
In chapter 6, I returned to the diary drop null subject data in English and offered a 
relevance-based account of the phenomenon.  I argued that the distribution and 
interpretation of null subjects falls out naturally in certain types of discourse context 
from the fact that the speaker is aiming at optimal relevance.  In this concluding chapter 
I attempt to tie up some loose ends and draw some general conclusions.   
In chapter 1, I discussed certain characteristics and distributional patterns 
associated with other null elements in the diary-style null subject examples, which 
include determiners, auxiliaries and prepositions, along with some objects.  Following 
the analysis outlined above, these elements should only be omitted when they contribute 
little or nothing to the overall relevance of the utterance (in terms of either effort or 
effect).  I do not pretend to be able to offer a comprehensive account of each of these 
categories in this thesis.  However, in the next section I consider them briefly, and make 
some suggestions about how they might fit into my analysis of the pragmatics of diary-
style texts.  In the following section, I discuss the child null subject data and consider 
the status of null subjects in imperatives, which although fully grammatical in English, 
might be seen as ultimately motivated by similar considerations to those outlined above.  
I will also draw some general conclusions about the nature of the conceptual/procedural 
distinction, and end with some reflections on the differences between my approach to 
referring expressions in general, and null subjects in particular, and those proposed by 
Ariel and Gundel et al. 
7.2  Non-subject omissions 
7.2.1  Determiners 
In chapter 4, I argued that the determiners in definite descriptions and complex 
demonstratives encode procedural meaning, and made some suggestions about how 
definite determiners might contribute to the overall interpretation of an utterance.   
Recall that use of a plural noun phrase can lead to either a definite interpretation, 
as in (1), or a generic interpretation, as in (2), depending on whether or not a definite 227 
determiner is present, while the combination of a plural noun with an indefinite 
determiner is ungrammatical.
1. 
(1)  James really likes the cats. 
(2)  James really likes cats. 
(3)  *James really likes a cats. 
When the noun is singular, the contribution of the determiner to the interpretation of the 
referring expression is different. 
(4)  James really likes the cat. 
(5)  *James really likes cat.
2 
(6)  James really likes a cat. 
As discussed in chapter 4, in interpreting ‘the cat’ in example (4), the hearer will test the 
most accessible potential referent from the set of things that are cats, and accept it if it 
leads to an overall interpretation that is relevant as expected.  In this case, reference is 
resolved on one particular, definite cat.  In (6), the indefinite determiner is generally 
seen as introducing a new discourse referent, and encouraging the hearer to open a new 
conceptual address or file in which subsequent information about this referent can be 
stored (Heim, 1982).  As before, the conceptual information carried by the indefinite 
noun phrase will constrain potential discourse referents to the set of things that are cats.  
However, the hearer is not expected to identify the discourse referent with any 
particular, definite cat.  In line with the definition of optimal relevance, there are three 
possible reasons why the speaker does not go further and direct the hearer to a more 
specific cat: either she does not know which cat it is that James likes (abilities), or she 
does not want to say which cat it is that James likes (preferences), or she simply does 
                                                
1 We can achieve an interpretation where James likes an undetermined sub-set of all cats by using the 
quantifier ‘some’: 
 (i) James really likes some cats. 
2 There is, perhaps, an unusual interpretation available for (5) in which ‘cat’ behaves as a mass noun 
and has a meat-like interpretation.  Compare with ‘James likes chickens’ and ‘James likes chicken’.   228 
not regard it as relevant for the hearer to know which cat James likes.  In the last case, 
the utterance will achieve relevance simply by informing the hearer that there exists a 
cat that James likes.  In these circumstances, if the speaker were to formulate her 
utterance so that it leads the hearer to resolve reference on a particular cat, she would be 
putting him to extra effort, and encouraging him to look for extra effects to compensate. 
Bearing this analysis in mind, let us return to the examples of null determiners in 
the diary-style texts, repeated here for convenience. 
(7)  Still have horrible cold. 
(8)  Very happy with dealer. 
(9)  Am delighted with dress. 
(10)  That would indeed be sick in manner of Oedipus. 
(11)  Also managed to conceal coat by rolling it into ball to create pleasing sense… 
(12)  Dialling tone seems normal. 
Notice, first, that if the speaker wishes simply to avoid directing the hearer to a specific 
referent, she has the unmarked option of using the indefinite article, as in (13).  
However, omitting the article altogether introduces a further element of vagueness or 
indeterminacy at the level of explicit content.  In examples such as (7), it is not clear 
what exactly the overt form of the utterance would be if the determiner were to be 
articulated.  For example, a fully articulated version of (7) could take any of the 
following forms. 
(13)  I still have a horrible cold. 
(14)  I still have my horrible cold. 
(15)  I still have that horrible cold. 229 
The choice of one or other form does not increase the overall relevance of the utterance.  
By omitting the determiner, the speaker need not make this choice, and the hearer need 
not reconstruct the fully articulated sentence in order to retrieve the intended meaning.  
Thus, these types of determiner omission seem to function in a similar way to the 
ostensively vague null subjects discussed above (section 6.4.2.3).  
Null determiners can occur when the associated noun is intended to be understood 
as definite, as in (9), or indefinite, as in (11), and I suggest that they occur for similar 
reasons, and function in a similar way, to the null subjects.  In some cases, the 
definite/indefinite information encoded by the determiner will make a crucial difference 
to the overall interpretation of the utterance.  For example, when translating the phrase 
‘the/a seagull’, in the play of the same name, from Russian to English, the choice 
between determiners makes a crucial difference to what the character Nina is 
understood to assert when she utters (16)/(17) (Frayn, 1986, pp. xix-xx).   
(16)  Nina:  I am a seagull. 
(17)  Nina:  I am the seagull. 
Although both utterances are metaphorical, in (16) the metaphor attributes to Nina some 
properties of seagulls in general, whilst in (17) it attributes to her properties of a 
particular seagull that has featured earlier in the plot. 
Whilst there are cases where the choice of determiner has a decisive effect on 
interpretation, in very many cases it will already be clear from the discourse context 
whether the speaker is referring to a particular definite category member or not.  Thus, 
as with the third person gendered pronouns discussed above, there are occasions where 
the definite/indefinite information encoded by the determiner is largely redundant.  For 
example, utterances (8) (‘Very happy with dealer’) and (9) (‘Am delighted with dress’) 
are from internet auction feedback message boards.  It is clear from the discourse 
context that the speaker is giving feedback about a specific dealer and a specific dress 
respectively.  In utterance (11) (‘Also managed to conceal coat by rolling it into ball to 
create pleasing sense…’), on the other hand, there is no identifiable ball in the discourse 
context to which the speaker might be referring, and the phrase achieves relevance 
merely by providing information about shape.  However, in unmarked registers of 
English it is usual to mark definiteness on the determiner, just as it is usual to choose a 
gendered pronoun.  Thus, following the same argument I used above for the pronominal 230 
subjects, these redundant determiners will be high on the list of vulnerable items when it 
comes to saving time or space, or when seeking to a create an informal tone or style. 
7.2.2  Auxiliaries and the copula 
The distribution of null versus overt forms of auxiliary verbs and the copula in English 
seems to further support the hypothesis that speech elements will be more vulnerable to 
omission the smaller their contribution to overall relevance.  Occurring alongside the 
main verb in a sentence, auxiliaries in general provide information about the tense, 
aspect or voice of the verb, while modal auxiliaries carry information about the status of 
the embedded propositions as certainly, possibly or necessarily true.  As noted in 
chapter 1, auxiliaries, in general appear vulnerable to omission in certain circumstances.  
My approach to diary-style omissions would predict that the smaller the contribution 
such elements make to the relevance of the utterance, the more likely it is that they may 
be omitted in these registers.  This does indeed seem to be the case.  For example, 
modal auxiliaries encoding epistemic or deontic information are not usually omitted.   
(18)  Get up in a minute. 
(19)  I must get up in a minute. 
(20)  I should get up in a minute. 
(21)  I will get up in a minute. 
If a speaker were to utter (18), say, it would be very difficult for the hearer to infer 
which (if any) of the possibilities in (19)-(21) she was intending to communicate.  Since 
the content of the modal makes a substantial difference to the relevance of the utterance, 
omission will be highly likely to lead to infelicity or misunderstanding.  Moreover, 
omission of both the subject and the modal auxiliary yields the same form as the 
imperative, increasing the range of non-equivalent possible interpretations.  The 
meaning encoded by the modal is therefore crucial to the overall relevance of the 
utterance, and it cannot be omitted.  Utterances (22) and (23) are examples of overt 
modal auxiliaries from a diary-style text.. 
(22)  But could buy book of cocktails (Fielding, 1996, p. 79). 231 
(23)  Must stop doing the instants (Fielding, 1996, p. 108). 
For similar reasons, the auxiliary ‘to have’ is required to distinguish between the simple 
past tense and the perfect past tense.  Its omission will change the overall interpretation 
of the utterance, and so it too will generally be overtly realised, as illustrated by (24). 
(24)  Have decided to serve the shepherds [sic] pie. (Fielding, 1996, p. 82) 
Likewise, the so-called ‘dummy do’ auxiliary in constructions such as (25) is not 
usually dropped.  This form not only carries tense information, but is only used in a 
positive declarative utterance when the speaker wishes to add emphasis.  Since null 
elements are unable to carry stress, it is unclear how it could be dropped without 
changing the overall interpretation of the utterance. 
(25)  I did want to go. 
(26)  Did want to go. 
(27)  ?want to go. 
(28)  Wanted to go. 
Although (27) is not ungrammatical in the diary register, it will lead to a present tense 
interpretation, and the variant in (28) does not carry the same emphasis.
3 
7.2.3  Objects 
As outlined in chapter 1, diary-style utterances may contain instances of omitted objects 
as well as subjects, albeit much less frequently.  My relevance-based account suggests 
an explanation both for the occurrence of null objects, and for the asymmetry in 
distribution.  As is the case with subjects, objects will be vulnerable to omission in 
informal and pressurized registers when they contribute little or nothing to the overall 
                                                
3 Notice also that although ‘I will’ and ‘I am’ are generally contracted to ‘I’ll’ and ‘I’m’ when spoken, 
they are vulnerable to subject-drop in diary-style written contexts (e.g. ‘Will call later’ ‘Am feeling under 
the weather today’).  When written, the contracted form of ‘I am’ has one character more than the 
auxiliary on its own, but both forms of ‘I will’ are the same length.  However, the contracted forms are 
part of the standard grammar of English and so are unmarked.  My account therefore predicts that subject 
drop (as opposed to contraction) of these phrases will occur more often in informal style and ostensively 
vague cases, where they lead to extra effects, than in pressurized contexts.   232 
relevance of the utterance.  Thus, in certain circumstances, and when the intended 
referent is the most accessible in the discourse context, the overt form of the object 
referring expression may be omitted.  The asymmetry arises purely from the fact that 
subjects are more likely to be highly accessible than objects.  According to my analysis, 
an object referring expression should only be vulnerable to omission if it refers to the 
most accessible potential referent in the discourse context.  We would therefore 
normally expect to find an argument pronominalized when it is overtly realised in non-
diary-style utterances.  It follows that to study the rate of object drop in these registers, 
we should compare the frequency of null objects with the frequency of overt object 
pronouns.  I assume that any non-pronominalised object referring expression encodes 
some other conceptual information that contributes to the overall relevance of the 
utterance.  In a sample of 20 pages from a diary text featuring rampant subject drop, 
there were 3 overt object pronouns and 9 omitted object pronouns.
4  This seems to 
suggest that the asymmetry is not the result of a grammatical restriction, but rather a 
matter of pragmatics.  When an argument in object position would normally be realised 
as a pronoun, it will be omitted in 75% of cases in the informal and pressurised diary-
style texts.
5 
As mentioned in chapter 1, it has been noted that recipes and other instructional 
registers often display a high rate of object drop in English (Massam & Roberge, 1989; 
Culy, 1996; Wharton, forthcoming), with utterances (29) and (30) being typical 
examples: 
(29)  Fry until golden brown. 
(30)  Drizzle with olive oil. 
Although this type of procedural discourse is distinctive in style, I suggest that it is still 
pragmatically driven.  For example, to be felicitous, the intended referents of the null 
                                                
4 Sample taken from (Fielding, 1996).  I did not include instances of reported speech. 
5 I would suggest that the case for asymmetry is even weaker than this data suggests.  The object 
pronouns which were overtly realised did not necessarily refer to a uniquely identifiable potential 
referent.  For example: 
 
(ii) If Magda’s husband has nothing to be ashamed of dining with this worthless trollop in my suit, he 
will introduce me.  
 
If the object pronoun ‘me’ were not overt, it would not be clear whether the speaker meant ‘introduce me’ 
or ‘introduce her’.  So the pronoun is overtly realised not because it is an object, but because it contributes 
to the overall relevance of the utterance. 233 
objects in (29) and (30) must be highly accessible.  Utterance (30) will not be felicitous 
if discourse initial, as there would be no accessible potential referent.  Compare this 
with an instruction such as (31) on a bottle of medicine: 
(31)  Shake before use. 
In (31) there is a highly accessible candidate referent (namely the bottle itself), but this 
is not the case in (30). 
However, the recipe null objects do not obviously seem to fit with the categories 
of null subjects that I proposed in section 6.4.2.  The discourse context is not 
particularly pressurized, the style is not informal, and the writers are certainly not 
intending to be vague about what should be fried, drizzled or shaken.  How then might 
we account for these null objects?  I suggest that in these cases the intended referents 
are the most accessible ones in the discourse context, and so the extra effort demanded 
of the hearer by leaving the object null is minimal.  The nature of recipes (and 
instructional registers in general) means that the discourse follows a very specific and 
focused path within a fairly narrow discourse context, which could be in danger of 
becoming fairly repetitive.  Compare (32) with (33): 
(32)  Take six onions.  Chop them, salt them, drizzle them with oil, and fry them. 
(33)  Take six onions.  Chop, salt, drizzle with oil and fry. 
The use of overt pronominal objects in (32) does little if anything to reduce the hearer’s 
effort (indeed, it could be argued that the intended referent, ‘onions’, is so highly 
accessible that the processing of the linguistic material puts the hearer to extra effort in 
(32)).  Although repetition may be used by speakers to create extra or different effects 
(as discussed in Wilson & Sperber, 2004, pp. 219-222), this is not what the writer of 
(32) intends, and as no extra or different effects are obviously derivable, the utterance 
seems stylistically awkward
6.   
So the use of null objects in instructional registers such as recipes is once again a 
result of the speaker/writer aiming at optimal relevance.
7 
                                                
6 It may also be that the recipe null objects are a better candidate for the topic drop analysis than the 
diary-style null subjects.  
7 Wharton (forthcoming) points out that recipes also include many null-subject utterances, and notes that 
apparently imperative sentences in recipes seem to lack directive force: their utterance is not ‘an order, a 234 
7.3  Further null-subject data 
7.3.1  Embedded and root nulls 
As noted by Haegeman and Ihsane (1999; 2001) and outlined in chapter 1, there appear 
to be two diary dialects in English.  In one, null subjects are restricted to root positions, 
whilst in the other, embedded nulls can and do occur.  Haegeman and Ihsane settle on a 
pronoun ellipsis account for the second, minority dialect and suggest that in such 
registers, ‘constraints on the identification of the null pronouns are relaxed’ (1999, p. 
143).  According to my relevance-based account, such differences should arise either 
because the restrictions on the abilities of the speaker are different, or because the 
different ‘dialects’ lead to extra or different effects.  The stylistic variations between the 
two apparent dialects suggest that each of the motivating factors I have identified - 
familiarity, informality and pressure - forms a continuum, with different types of 
omission located at different points along the scale.   
Haegeman and Ihsane first noted significant instances of embedded null subjects 
in informal, fictional diaries (for example Fielding, 1996; 2004).  These texts are 
intended to simulate a private, intimate diary, and to create a sense of empathy and 
solidarity between the reader and the fictional narrator, Bridget Jones.  The narrator is 
writing to and for herself, and the reader has the illusion of eavesdropping on this 
personal narrative.  To create a realistic fictional diary in this style, the author, Helen 
Fielding, assumes almost complete mutuality between the cognitive environment of her 
narrator and that of the fictional addressee.  Both are, after all, one and the same person.  
As a result, these diaries, along with other similar texts (Ginsburg, 1995; Bywater, 
1998; Faulks, 1998) sit at the far end of the informality scale, and informal null subjects 
abound.  This contrasts with non-fiction diaries written either explicitly for publication 
or at least with the possibility of a wider readership in mind. 
It is not only the actual relationship between the hearer and speaker that drives the 
use and frequency of informal nulls (and other omissions), but the nature of the 
relationship as the author wishes to project it.  The freedom with which the speaker can 
omit certain speech elements reflects how much she judges (or wishes her hearer to 
think she judges) to be shared between herself and her hearer. As noted in 6.4.3, this 
                                                                                                                                          
request or an entreaty of any kind.  It is simply one stage in a series of steps the reader can choose to 
follow or not’ (p.7).  Also, some non-imperative recipe utterances may be subjectless, as in (iii) and (iv) 
  (iii)  Serves six. 
  (iv) Feeds a family of four. 235 
parallels the work on free indirect style by Blakemore (2009), in which the author aims 
to ‘present the illusion of a character acting out his mental state in an immediate 
relationship with the reader’.  In the diary-style texts, the frequency of omissions will 
help to set the style and tone of the discourse by giving access to a wide range of weak 
implicatures.  
However, informality is not the only motivating factor which involves a 
continuum.  Discourse contexts may also be more or less pressurized, and this in turn 
will affect the likelihood and frequency of omissions.  The omission of prepositions 
(although attested) is much less common than the omission of the other parts of speech 
discussed above.  However, prepositions are frequently omitted in telegrams.  Telegram 
companies charged for their service by the word, and so they have unwittingly provided 
us with examples of utterances produced in an explicitly and artificially pressurised 
discourse context.  Whilst the information encoded by prepositions may contribute 
sufficiently to the relevance of an utterance to be articulated in most of the diary-style 
texts, they become vulnerable once the pressure on word limit is increased to this 
degree.  In each case, the utterance produced is still the most relevant one that the 
speaker could have uttered given her abilities and preferences.  However, an increase in 
the pressure on the speaker, affecting her abilities and/or preferences, means that the 
hearer might expect to have to do more inferential work, and thus expend more effort to 
derive the intended meaning. 
7.3.2  Child nulls again 
In chapter 2, I outlined my argument that null subjects in child language result from the 
fact that the child is operating under processing constraints, and therefore omits the 
elements which contribute least to the overall relevance of an utterance.  In chapter 6, I 
made a parallel case for the adult nulls in diary-style texts, and discussed why it is that 
pronouns often contribute the least in relevance-terms.   
Whereas in the adult cases I have identified three circumstances which might lead 
to the use of null subjects, in the case of the child null subjects, the child’s developing, 
and thus limited, processing and cognitive capabilities, are the main driving force.  As 
Lois Bloom puts it, the truncated child utterances ‘can be compared to the kinds of 
sentences produced by an adult who is under pressure to be brief’ (Bloom, 1970, p. 
139).  Whereas the pressurized nulls in the adult examples may result from time or 
space constraints, the child going through the null subject stage of acquisition is subject 236 
to the internal pressures and restrictions of her developing cognitive, processing and 
linguistic systems. 
A relevance-based account has the advantage of being able to explain many of the 
distributional properties and other characteristics associated with the child nulls, as 
outlined in chapter 2.  As discussed there, a major objection to a performance-driven 
analysis of child null subjects is the fact that such approaches are allegedly unable to 
account for the observed object/subject asymmetry.  Competence accounts (Hyams, 
1986; Hyams & Wexler, 1993; Rizzi, 1994; 2005; Bromberg & Wexler, 1995) can 
specify that omissions are restricted to subject position, but this option is not available 
to performance accounts.  However, the asymmetry is to be expected on a relevance-
based account.  As with adult null subjects, there are likely to be more occasions when 
the subject referent is more accessible than the object referent, and will therefore be the 
first to be tested, than occasions when the converse is true.   
The correlation between the end of the null subject stage and the acquisition of 
inflection is also predicted on my account.  When processing resources are limited, we 
would expect not only subjects but other high-cost, low-effect elements to be 
vulnerable.  The lack of grammatical inflection is less likely to interfere with the overall 
interpretation of an utterance than, say, the lack of a content word such as a noun or 
verb
8.  The correlation between expletive use and the end of the null subject phase is 
likewise expected on my relevance-based analysis.  If the elements which contribute 
least to the overall relevance of an utterance are most likely to be omitted, then 
expletive pronouns should be highly vulnerable. On my account, then, expletives are not 
the catalyst for grammatical change, as proposed by Hyams (1986).  Rather, once the 
child’s processing capacities have matured to the point where expletives are no longer 
dropped, we would expect to find that other omissions are also no longer necessary.  As 
discussed above, Valian (1990) finds evidence of expletive use across the MLU range of 
children she studied, both within and after the null subject phase.  We can understand 
why this might be so if we treat the omissions as due to a processing overload (and 
therefore as linked to the child’s abilities) rather than as related to the acquisition of 
expletives as a grammatical category.  It is not that the child cannot represent or produce 
an expletive during this phase.  Rather, expletives are highly vulnerable to omission 
when the child’s processing capacity is limited. 
                                                
8 I am not claiming that the child has already acquired inflection and then omits it.  A model where 
inflection is mastered late because the child pays less attention to this aspect of utterances than to others is 
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The empirical findings discussed in Valian, Aubry and Hoeffner (1996) are also 
consistent with my relevance-based analysis.  They found that in imitation experiments, 
children in the null subject stage imitated pronominals less often than full subjects.  If a 
referent is pronominalized in the target sentence, then we can assume that it is highly 
accessible in the discourse context.  It is therefore much more likely to be vulnerable to 
omission than, say, a definite description which encodes conceptual information, and 
therefore contributes to reference resolution.  That expletive pronouns will be omitted 
more often than referential pronouns is to be expected for the same reasons. 
Relevance theory thus gives us a means to reinterpret the intuitive, but at times 
vague, conclusions drawn by the processing and pragmatic accounts within an 
independently motivated cognitive pragmatic framework.  Relevance theory explains 
why the sort of elements which Bloom describes as ‘weakly stressed, carry little 
information value, [and] are most predictable’ (1970, p. 140) are those which are most 
likely to be omitted. 
7.3.3  Imperatives 
There is, of course, a category of null subject sentences in English which are fully 
grammatical across all registers and dialects: imperatives.  Traditionally, the subjects of 
imperative sentences have been analysed as second person (Bullokar, 1586; Jespersen, 
1940; Sweet, 1960; Katz & Postal, 1964; Thorne, 1966; Schmerling, 1982). 
(34)  Get up. 
(35)  You will get up. 
(36)  Get up, will you? 
On these analyses, the subject and modal in (35) are unarticulated in (34), and they are 
moved to produce the tag question in (36).  The short forms are seen as acceptable 
because ‘the subject you is “understood”, not needing to be marked because it is the 
only possible subject’ (Thorne, 1966, p. 69). 
However, more recent approaches to imperatives have noted that a range of other 
subjects are available (Platzack & Rosengren, 1998; Jensen, 2003). 
(37)  Nobody move. 238 
(38)  Everybody stay where you are. 
(39)  Whoever laughed leave the room now. 
(40)  Somebody help me. 
Although it is outside the scope of this thesis to offer a syntactic analysis of the English 
imperative, I feel that the parallels between the subjectless imperative sentences and the 
diary-style subject deletions are worthy of more comment.  Platzack & Rosengren 
(1998) refer to the noun phrase which is optionally overtly realised in imperatives as 
overt ImpNP, and go on to claim that ‘as in the case of null subjects in finite clauses, the 
overt realization of ImpNP is a matter of pragmatic considerations’ (1998, p. 197).  I 
want to suggest that these pragmatic considerations, as with the diary nulls, are 
ultimately considerations of relevance in Sperber and Wilson’s sense.   
Since imperatives are typically used to convey requests, orders or instructions, 
they are generally addressed directly and explicitly to a hearer or group of hearers.  
Thus, the mere act of addressing someone with an imperative utterance will, in general 
create the expectation that they are the subject of the request, order or instruction.
9  It is 
highly likely that the addressee will also be indicated by some extra-linguistic means 
(eye direction, head nodding, pointing or other gesture).  If the speaker chooses to 
overtly articulate the subject, she is therefore, in effect, requiring the hearer to expend 
more effort than is necessary, and so the hearer will be entitled to expect extra effects.  
Thus, the bare imperatives are the unmarked versions in most cases. 
Given this approach to the pragmatics of imperatives, it is easy to see why some 
existing accounts claim that the subject of an imperative sentence must be in the second 
person.  This will indeed be the most frequent interpretation, and evidence from tag 
questions suggests that even examples such as (37)-(39) are interpreted as second 
person, as illustrated in (41) and (42):   
(41)  Everybody stay where you are, will you? 
(42)  Whoever laughed leave the room now, will you? 
                                                
9 Mauck, Pak, Porter and Zanuttini (2005, p. 146) present a cross-linguistic study of imperative 
subjects, and conclude that whilst the subject and addressee need not always coincide, at least ‘In all 
cases, the addressee must have some control over whether the subject has the property denoted by the 
predicate’.   239 
Furthermore, these examples lend support to the hypothesis that the choice between 
overt and null imperative subjects is pragmatically driven.  It seems that null subjects 
are not always a felicitous option for imperative utterances.  Consider (37) (‘Nobody 
move’).  Uttering this sentence without the overt subject ‘nobody’, as in (43), will lead 
to a very different interpretation. 
(43)  Move. 
It is not possible to address an utterance or other ostensive stimulus to nobody.  It might 
be argued that this is because not only the subject but also the sentence negation have 
been omitted, and that the grammatically correct null subject version of (37) would 
therefore be as in (44), with the missing subject understood as ‘everybody’.  
(44)  Don’t move. 
But here again, (44) has a range of possible interpretations on which the missing subject 
would be a single person or a few people rather than everyone in the group of 
addressees.  Thus the act of ostensive communication alone is not enough to guide the 
hearer(s) to the intended referent, and to achieve optimal relevance, the speaker must 
articulate the subject.  The extent to which the overt subjects in (38) and (39) may be 
left unarticulated depends on the discourse context in which they are uttered.  As 
always, the hearer will test interpretations in order of accessibility.  If the intended 
referents of ‘everybody’ and ‘whoever laughed’ are the most accessible potential 
referents in their respective discourse contexts, then the option to utter a bare imperative 
may be available to the speaker.  And, as always, accessibility may be affected by, 
amongst other factors, the prior discourse, the physical context and any extra-linguistic 
gestures of the speaker. 
Utterance (40) (‘Someone help me’), and its subjectless alternative in (45), again 
shed some light on the role of pragmatics in the production and interpretation of 
imperatives.   
(45)  Help me. 
Whilst a second person interpretation may be the most common for imperative 
utterances, examples such as (45) suggest that in some cases, as with the ostensively 240 
vague diary null subjects, it might not be necessary to reconstruct a determinate subject 
referent at all.  The relevance of an utterance of (45) is most likely to arise from the fact 
that the speaker is requesting help.  It is not necessary for a hearer to decide whether the 
speaker intended to produce an abbreviated version of (40), or any of a range of other 
possible alternatives such as (46)-(48). 
(46)  You help me. 
(47)  John help me. 
(48)  One of you help me. 
The intended addressee (and subject) of the utterance may be obvious from the 
discourse context or extra-linguistic cues, but regardless of this, the hearer is likely to 
have achieved adequate effects before he goes to the effort of resolving the reference of 
the missing subject.  Alternatively, the appeal to the speaker’s abilities and preferences 
in the presumption of optimal relevance might also play a part in the processing of (45).  
The speaker might not have a preference about who helps her, as long as someone does. 
Bearing this analysis in mind, consider the following instructional imperatives: 
(49)  Stand behind the yellow line. 
(50)  Mind the gap. 
(51)  Shake before use. 
(52)  Love like you’ve never been hurt. 
Again, with examples (49)-(52), it is not necessary to reconstruct a subject (second-
person or other) in order to interpret the intended meaning.  In a similar fashion to the 
ATM example discussed in section 6.4.2.3 (‘OK, got that’), the speakers of these 
utterances are being deliberately vague about what the subject of these utterances is 
intended to be.  It is not clear how such examples would be enriched to include overt 
subjects.  Examples (53)-(56) suggest some possibilities for utterance (49).   241 
(53)  You should stand behind the yellow line. 
(54)  Everyone should stand behind the yellow line. 
(55)  Passengers should stand behind the yellow line. 
(56)  Anyone standing on this platform should stand behind the yellow line. 
None of these, however, can be said to exactly capture what is communicated by (49).  
Rather, it might be said that the utterance is addressed to whoever might read it and find 
it relevant enough to be worth their attention.  It would be extremely hard to spell out 
more fully precisely who this is: for instance, it is clearly addressed not only to 
passengers but to people accompanying or meeting passengers, people walking along 
the platform to another destination or people who have wandered into the station by 
mistake, but not to passengers getting on or off the train, people repairing the track, 
people rescuing children who have toddled over the line, etc. etc.  Thus, a huge amount 
of contextual information is needed to assign a referent appropriately in a null subject 
imperative such as this. 
Finally, there is the issue of subjectless tag questions such as (57)-(58) 
(57)  Sit down, will you? 
(58)  Feeling sick, is he?  
Given my approach to subjectless utterances, and imperatives in particular, it seems that 
the addition of a tag question may add emphasis, as in (57), or may act as a repair 
mechanism to avert possible misunderstanding, as in (58).   
7.4  Concluding remarks 
7.4.1  Revisiting procedural meaning  
7.4.1.1  The vulnerability of procedural meaning to omission 
In the course of this thesis, I have argued that the omission of subjects and other 
material in diary-style texts can be explained by taking a relevance-based pragmatic 
approach.  I have proposed a procedural analysis of pronouns, and linked their 242 
procedural nature to the fact that they are vulnerable to omission in the circumstances I 
have identified, and for the reasons I have discussed.  In each case, the omissions result 
from pressure on the speaker’s abilities or preferences, or provide a means for achieving 
extra or different effects.   
An interesting implication of my analysis is that expressions which encode mainly 
procedural meaning should be particularly vulnerable to omission.  This follows 
naturally from the nature of procedural meaning and its role within the relevance-
theoretic pragmatic framework.  As Carston (2002b) puts it, the role of procedural 
meaning is to ‘indicate, guide, constrain, or direct the inferential phase of 
comprehension’, which makes it essentially an ‘effort-saving device’ (2002b, p. 162).  
Procedural meaning contributes to the overall relevance of an utterance by reducing 
hearer’s effort.  Bearing this in mind, let us return to the three categories of null subjects 
discussed above. 
In pressurised environments (e.g. newspaper headlines, message boards, 
postcards, text messages, note-taking etc) the speaker’s production abilities are 
constrained.  In these discourse contexts, it will be manifest to the hearer that the 
speaker is operating under constraints, and that he should adjust his expectations of 
relevance accordingly.  Whilst he can still presume that the speaker has aimed at 
optimal relevance within the constraints imposed by her limited production abilities, the 
level of relevance achieved may be relatively lower than if the utterance were produced 
without constraints.  In other words, he must expect to put in more effort in order to 
derive the same overall interpretation, and this demand for extra effort, rather than 
contributing to extra effects, must simply be forgiven or condoned.  Omission of the 
procedurally encoded elements is the best strategy for the speaker.  It might put the 
hearer to more effort, but the message can still be successfully conveyed, and should 
still satisfy the hearer’s (reduced) expectations of relevance.  This approach ties in with 
a more general observation that a hearer’s expectation of relevance will vary from 
speaker to speaker and from circumstance to circumstance.  So, for example, we are 
unlikely to expect the same level of effect, or the same balance of effort and effect, 
when speaking to a child as we do when speaking to a university professor.  Thus, the 
‘abilities and preferences’ clause of the presumption of optimal relevance applies to 
both effort and effects.  A hearer is only entitled to presume that an utterance will 
provide the most effects compatible with the speaker’s abilities and preferences (i.e. 
what she knows, and is prepared to divulge), and that it will put him to the minimal 243 
effort compatible with the speaker’s abilities and preferences (i.e. that it is the most 
economical one that she is willing and able to provide in the circumstances). 
In the informal diary-style discourse contexts, there may be no obvious pressure 
on the speaker’s time or restriction on the length of utterance, and yet speakers still omit 
potentially effort-saving linguistic devices.  Again, the hearer will assume that the 
speaker is being optimally relevant, and therefore that she did not intend to put him to 
gratuitous effort.  In this case, she had the ability to use the effort-saving devices, but 
preferred not to.  As a result, the hearer must assume that she intended the extra effort 
required to yield some extra or different effects.  This assumption in turn suggests that 
the speaker trusted the hearer to derive the intended interpretation without further 
linguistic cues, resulting in the informal and intimate tone of the diary-style nulls. 
Finally, what role does the (absence of) procedural meaning play in the case of the 
ostensively vague nulls?  I suggest that it plays no role.  The hearer will follow the path 
of least effort in deriving possible interpretations, and will stop when her expectations 
of relevance are satisfied.  With the ostensively vague nulls, the hearer’s expectations of 
relevance will be satisfied before he has reached the point of resolving reference in any 
but the most general terms.  In these circumstances, a procedural device which 
‘indicates particular computational processes’ would not be effort saving, but would 
instead put the hearer to gratuitous effort.  Thus each of the uses of null subjects that I 
have identified ultimately arises from the speaker’s aim of achieving optimal relevance.   
7.4.1.2  The nature of procedural meaning 
My analysis of null subjects in English, and referring expressions in general, also raises 
interesting issues about the nature of procedural meaning and its relation to conceptual 
meaning.   
In chapter 6, I discussed the gender, number and person information encoded by 
pronouns, and argued that it should be seen as purely grammatical, rather than as 
properly semantic or conceptual.  I also linked this suggestion to the more general claim 
that procedural information functions on a sub-personal rather than personal level.  On 
this account, the procedures encoded by pronouns and demonstratives do not restrict the 
set of potential referents by imposing conceptual constraints (e.g. MALE, INANIMATE, 
PROXIMAL) as suggested by Zaki (2009) and Hussein (2008), but by adding an extra 
layer of activation to a category of items identifiable only in sub-personal terms. For 
instance, the pronoun ‘she’ might be seen as adding an extra layer of activation to the 
category of items that can also be legitimately referred to using the pronoun ‘she’, 244 
regardless of whether they fall under the concepts ANIMATE or FEMALE; the pronoun 
‘that’ might be seen as activating a complex computation involving assessments of the 
relative positions of items to a deictic centre along a variety of dimensions, and so on.   
We might see some parallels between this proposed move away from semantic or 
conceptual treatments of pronouns and determiners and recent moves away from 
attempts to define grammatical categories in semantic or conceptual terms.  For 
instance, defining a noun as an expression which denotes a person, place or thing is 
generally regarded as falling far short of reflecting a native speaker’s grammatical 
knowledge. Rather, nouns are typically characterised in functional terms, as words 
which a native speaker can use in a certain way, which provide input to certain types of 
syntactic computation, and are therefore in some sense defined by the native speaker’s 
tacit grammatical knowledge.  Thus, although the set of nouns will generally include 
items denoting people, places and things, it cannot be defined as such.  Similarly, 
although the set of referents the pronoun ‘she’ can be used to pick out will generally 
include items that fall under the concepts ANIMATE and FEMALE, it cannot be defined as 
such.  A similar argument can be made for the proximity information encoded by 
demonstratives. 
In moving towards a sub-personal account of the procedural information encoded 
by pronouns and other referring expressions, I am building on a proposal by Wilson 
(2009), that procedural information in general should be analysed in sub-personal rather 
than personal terms. Developing ideas put forward in Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995, pp. 
172-3), she suggests that the well-formed formulas in a language may get their 
meanings in three distinct ways: by being translated into expressions of another 
language, by corresponding systematically with states of the language user, or by 
corresponding systematically with states of affairs in the world. In her view, conceptual 
expressions get their meanings in the first of these ways, by being translated into the 
language of thought, procedural expressions get their meanings in the second of these 
ways, by systematically activating states of the language user, and expressions in the 
language of thought get their meanings in the third of these ways, by corresponding 
systematically with states of affairs in the world. She concludes, ‘We may expect 
procedural items (e.g. pronouns, particles, interjections) to activate procedures 
formulated in a sub-personal “machine language” rather than full-fledged concepts 
which are constituents of a “language of thought” and thus available for general 
inference (cf. pronouns).’ In developing my procedural account of pronouns and 
referring expressions, I have tried to flesh out these ideas to some extent. 245 
More generally, a sub-personal approach to procedural meaning might shed new 
light on the comment made at several points in this thesis, and in the literature on the 
conceptual-procedural distinction in general, that while conceptual meaning is relatively 
easy to paraphrase in more or less adequate intuitive terms, procedural expressions such 
as ‘but’, ‘so’, ‘after all’, ‘still’, etc. present a much greater challenge. This is generally 
explained by appealing to the distinction between representation and computation, and 
noting that while conceptual expressions encode concepts that figure directly in the 
language of thought, procedural expressions encode computations, which are not so 
easily brought to consciousness. However, as the literature on pronouns shows, it is 
possible to combine a procedural approach to pronouns with the claim that the 
computations involved pick out sets of referents that fall under regular concepts such as 
MALE, or ANIMATE, made available by the language of thought. However, if we take 
seriously the claim that procedural meaning is sub-personal rather than personal, this 
approach becomes harder to justify. I hope to pursue this aspect of my analysis in future 
work. 
7.4.2  In support of a relevance-based account of referring expressions 
There are several key differences between my account of referring expressions, and 
those provided by the other cognitive approaches I have discussed (Ariel, 1990; Gundel, 
Hedberg, & Zacharski, 1993; Gundel & Mulkern, 1998), not only in the analysis of null 
subjects in English, but in the treatment of referring expressions in general.   
In section 7.2.2, I touched on the role of ‘dummy-do’ auxiliaries, and noted that 
they cannot generally be dropped without affecting the interpretation of an utterance.  
These data highlight an interesting general distinction between cases where there is a 
less costly grammatical alternative, and those in which there is not.  The dummy 
auxiliary ‘do’ only adds emphasis in positive declarative utterances such as (25) (‘I did 
want to go’), where there is an optional alternative without stress, in this case (59). 
(59)  I want to go. 
The ‘do’ auxiliary does not carry stress in negatives, as in (60), or interrogative, as in 
(61). 
(60)  I do not want to go 246 
(61)  Do you want to go? 
A relevance-theoretic account allows us to distinguish between these cases.  When there 
is a less costly grammatical alternative, as with (25), extra effort demanded implies 
extra or different effects, but when there is no less costly grammatical alternative, as 
with (60) and (61), however much effort is demanded, the hearer is not entitled to look 
for extra effects.  This same general point applies to the optional overt subjects in null 
subject languages, where there is always a less costly grammatical alternative to a 
sentence with an overt pronominal.  As a result, when an overt pronoun is used in these 
languages, the hearer is entitled to look for extra effects (see footnote 19, section 
6.4.2.1).  It is hard to see how a strictly grammatical account of null subjects could deal 
with such cases. 
As for referring expressions in general, on my account they are not seen as 
encoding semantic information about the Accessibility or cognitive status of the 
intended referent, and they do not instruct the hearer where in the search space he 
should look.  Instead, I have taken seriously the idea that a hearer following the 
relevance theoretic comprehension procedure will test possible interpretations in order 
of accessibility.  I have therefore argued that referring expressions should be seen as 
encoding information that restricts the set of potential referents to a point where the 
intended referent is, if all goes well, the most accessible one that yields an interpretation 
that is relevant in the expected way. 
Rather than defining a referring expression by its form (pronoun, proximal 
complex demonstrative, long definite description etc) and locating it on a scale or 
hierarchy, I have argued that each referring expression may encode conceptual and/or 
procedural meaning.  This meaning may contribute to reference resolution and hence to 
the explicit content of an utterance, but it may also affect what is implicitly 
communicated by an utterance, by contributing to the derivation of implicatures and 
other inferential effects.  Thus, choice of referring expression is seen as playing a role in 
all three of the sub tasks which, according to relevance theory, contribute to the overall 
interpretation of an utterance. 
Crucial to my account is the role of the discourse context.  In previous cognitive-
pragmatic approaches to referring expressions, the importance of the context as a source 
both of candidate referents and of potential premises for inference is overlooked or 
remains fairly peripheral to the analyses.  On my account, referring expressions are seen 
as functioning relative to the discourse context.  Moreover, context selection, guided by 247 
the presumption that the utterance will be optimally relevant, plays a role not only in 
securing reference but also in deriving contextual implications and other cognitive 
effects. 
A major advantage of my approach to referring expressions is that it allows for a 
unified account, in which Ariel’s ‘special uses’ and Lakoff’s ‘emotional’ 
demonstratives are no longer seen as exceptional or unexpected.  Rather, they fall out 
naturally from the interaction between encoded information, the discourse context and 
the speaker goal of achieving optimal relevance. 
7.4.3  Final remarks 
In this thesis, I set out to provide a relevance-based account of the pragmatics of diary-
style null subjects in English.  As discussed in chapter 1, although a variety of 
grammatical analyses have been proposed for these data, all acknowledge that 
pragmatic factors play a decisive role in their use and distribution.  I have attempted to 
offer a coherent account of what these pragmatic factors are, based on an independently 
motivated pragmatic framework, relevance theory.  In doing so, I have outlined my 
relevance-based approach to the use and interpretation of referring expressions in 
general.  On my account, null subjects in English are not as exceptional as they may at 
first appear.  Rather, they are just one means by which a speaker may achieve her 
overall aim of producing an optimally relevant utterance: that is, an utterance which is 
at least relevant enough to be worth the hearer’s attention, and which, moreover, 
produces the greatest effects, for smallest effort, compatible with her own abilities and 
preferences.  As such, they should be expected to arise spontaneously in the types of 
discourse context I have described, and for the reasons I have attempted to outline.  
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